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P R E FA C E - T H E N E E D F O R L E A D E R S H I P I N T H E
P R O V I S I O N O F G L O B A L P U B L I C G O O D S
By the end of the last millennial, it looked like a peaceful, cooperative new
century was coming up. The United Nations were defining the millennium
development goals, some philosophers were already arguing that the end of
history was approaching with Western liberalism spreading over the world
(Fukuyama 1989). In this spirit, the term of international or “global public
goods” (Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern 1999) originated as a vogue expression
including, for example, free trade, financial stability, knowledge, peace and
security, disease control, but also environmental protection.
Starting from the classical definition, a public good has to fulfill the crite-
ria of non-rivalry in consumption and non-excludability (Cornes and Sandler
1996). These criteria also apply to a certain extent to global public goods. In
addition, there is oftentimes an imperative of universality. The spirit of global
public goods is that they should be made available universally - that is, glob-
ally - even if the material circumstances would allow exclusion in some cases.
Nevertheless, as Kaul (1999, p.14) quotes Olson (1971) “the desire for peace
... for orderly financial arrangements for multilateral trade, for the advance of
basic knowledge, and for an ecologically viable planet are now virtually uni-
versal, yet these collective goods are only episodically or scantily supplied”.
The problem of many collective goods on a global scale is that their provi-
sion resembles a social dilemma situation, i.e. the stakeholders’ best pursuit of
individual interest makes them worse off than finding solutions which max-
imize the common benefit instead. In a streamlined form, the provision of a
public good can be represented by a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Following Buchholz and Eichenseer (2016) one could imagine a situation
with two countries that share an environmental medium such as air. The
countries both have the binary option to either take an abatement measure
to reduce emissions and improve air quality or not. If none of them reduces
emissions, there is no environmental benefit at all. If one takes costly abate-
ment measures, the other country benefits as well. And if both countries re-
duce emissions, the environmental benefit increases while both have to bear
costs for abatement.
Given that there is a payoff structure such that from the point of view of
one country the dominant strategy is always to do nothing (regardless of
whether the other country abates or not), no emissions will be reduced at all
in the Nash equilibrium of the game. By contrast, the social optimum would
be that both countries curb their emissions. This payoff structure resembles a
Prisoner’s Dilemma and expounds the problem of free-riding. In consequence,
a non-cooperative, “voluntary”, supply of public goods by countries that are
assumed to maximize their payoffs leads to undersupply.
One approach to get out of such a dilemma would be that both countries
negotiate and come to an agreement in which both commit to perform the co-
1
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operative action. Such agreements are, however, not necessarily stable (Buch-
holz and Eichenseer 2016). Still, this approach is reflected in the attempt to
solve global problems through international conferences. In international cli-
mate policy, the Kyoto Protocol is a primary example, coming close to the
approach of negotiating cooperative solutions.
Against this background, the Paris Agreement marks a milestone. While the
Kyoto Protocol and the attempts following have tried to maintain a coopera-
tive, centralized solution establishing mandatory mitigation goals, the Paris
approach resembles an admission to the fact that such centralized solutions
are no longer politically feasible in a post Copenhagen world1. Turning from
a top-down to a bottom-up approach with each country defining its own na-
tionally determined contributions (NDC), individually pre-announced green-
house gas abatement goals, the recent Paris Agreement on Climate Change
marks a watershed. So, the bottom-up approach adheres to the philosophy of
“know your limits” (Bodansky 2016).
The Paris Declaration codifies a system of voluntary and differentiated
shaping of climate policy. One basic idea of this approach is that a good ex-
ample given by one country sets a benchmark for other countries and thereby
induces a positive reaction expressed by higher abatement efforts of other
countries. The intention is to unleash a dynamic process and goad each other
in terms of mitigation activities. Thereby, a hope is that “leadership” might
ameliorate the problem of undersupply of the global public good of climate
protection. This new approach in global climate policy amplifies the need for a
better understanding of the effects of leadership in social dilemma situations.
The aim of this dissertation is to further explore the role of pioneers in
social dilemmas both theoretically and empirically. To this end, the thesis con-
sists of four parts that include eight chapters followed by an outlook. The
first building block, Part I, “Theoretical Considerations” encompasses three
chapters that are each dedicated to a particular aspect of leadership: Chapter
1 investigates coalition building whereas Chapter 2 sheds light on technol-
ogy transfers. In Chapter 3 sequential contributions to public goods and the
strategic choice of technology are considered. Part II “An Empirical Exam-
ple” contains a description of leadership in technological progress through
subsidization policies in Chapter 4 using the example of Germany’s EEG and
estimates the costs of incentivizing technological progress. In the following
chapters the analysis then turns to experimental economics. In Part III “A
Prerequisite for Leadership”, an important ingredient for successful leading-
by-example, reciprocity, is considered with a brief literature review in Chapter
5 whereas the stability of reciprocal patterns within individuals is reflected
experimentally in Chapter 6. The last building block, Part IV, “Leadership
in Public Goods Experiments” first contains a detailed literature review on
leadership in public goods experiments in Chapter 7 followed by leadership
in a dynamic public goods experiment in Chapter 8. The résumé recaps and
addresses the questions remaining.
1 Copenhagen world refers to the failed 2009 UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen
where an attempt was made to find a follow up agreement for the Kyoto Protocol.
Part I
T H E O R E T I C A L C O N S I D E R AT I O N S
I N T R O D U C T O RY R E M A R K S T O PA RT I
The first part of this dissertation starts with a theoretical framework.2 Theo-
retical considerations for the provision of public goods follow classical public
economic theory in the tradition of economists like Wicksell (1896) and Lin-
dahl (1919). The necessity to provide public goods as a main rationale for the
role of government in a market economy is a central message of this broadly
accepted theory. At the national level a state can ensure the provision of pub-
lic goods whereas at the international stage of global public good provision
a central authority is missing. This goes back to the idea of the Westphalian
sovereignty of nation states. But meanwhile international public goods (such
as transboundary pollution externalities, disease eradication or global secu-
rity) have increasingly got public attention and have become a central issue
of international politics (see, e.g., Sandler 2004, and Peinhardt and Sandler
2015).
Correspondingly, the attention has shifted from public goods that are al-
located by a central authority to public goods which are instead provided
through voluntary “private” contributions by the agents involved. Such pri-
vately provided public goods could be either conceived as public goods within
a nation state that are beyond the scope of the government’s focus (e.g. char-
ities) or as international/global public goods with provision resembling that
of “private” provision. In this context, a key insight has been that private pro-
vision of public goods (in the ensuing Nash equilibrium) usually does not
lead to an efficient solution but rather to some “underprovision” of the public
good as compared to Pareto optimal levels (see Cornes and Sandler 1996, and
Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian 1986).
In order to overcome the potentially fatal underprovision of international
public goods, an obvious idea seems to be to try to transfer the top-down
approach being applied for public good allocation at the national level to the
international sphere. In the Lindahlian tradition this means that - analogous
to a taxation scheme, a fair burden sharing rule must be established according
to which the country-specific contributions to the public good are determined.
It therefore does not come as a surprise that initially such a route has been
taken in international negotiations on climate protection, which by now is con-
sidered as the most important global public good. But experience over many
rounds of the “Conferences of the Parties” since the 1990s has demonstrated
some quite foreseeable flaws of this top-down approach, which has inhibited
global climate cooperation at the needed scale and which, in particular, has
made the Kyoto Protocol as the basic international climate agreement only lit-
tle effective. So, due to the absence of a central authority with coercive power
2 Part I consists of three chapters which are slightly modified versions of Buchholz and
Eichenseer (2017), Buchholz, Dippl, and Eichenseer (2015) and Buchholz and Eichenseer (2019).
Likewise this brief introduction is adopted from Buchholz and Eichenseer (2017), Buchholz,
Dippl, and Eichenseer (2015) and Buchholz and Eichenseer (2019).
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and alternative sanction mechanisms, the pervasive free-rider problem could
not be solved, and the enormous difficulties in reconciling divergent notions
on equitable effort-sharing have repeatedly turned up in climate negotiations.
In face of these deficiencies global climate policy has changed its course
to a bottom-up approach, which recently found its expression in the “Paris
Agreement on Climate Change” concluded in December 2015 (e.g., Sandler
2017a, and Chen and Zeckhauser 2018). The expectation set on this agree-
ment is that - beyond creating more transparency the pre-announced green-
house gas abatement measures of some countries should induce higher abate-
ment efforts of other countries and thus trigger a dynamic process towards a
more effective global climate protection. For public good theory this change
of paradigm in global climate policy provides some novel challenges like the
need to get a deeper understanding for the role of leadership, i.e. agents who
demonstrate good intentions in the voluntary provision of public goods (see
Buchholz and Sandler 2017).
Against this background, Chapter 1 deals with a special kind of leadership,
i.e. leadership in coalition building. Correspondingly, the research question
is how coalition formation by one group of countries influences the coali-
tion formation decision of another group. This chapter considers a two-stage
game: at stage 1 the members of two groups of countries decide in a binary
game whether they should form a coalition and at stage 2 then determine
their contribution to a global public good cooperatively within their respec-
tive group. After describing the Nash equilibria of public good provision at
stage 2, which result either after unilateral or bilateral coalition building at
stage 1, we provide some characterization of the subgame-perfect equilibria
of the entire game. Especially, we show that in many situations the coalition
formation game at stage 1 will be of the chicken type, but that other game
structures may emerge as well. Since partial cooperation by a smaller group
of countries may undermine the willingness of a larger group to form a coali-
tion some paradoxical effects can also be observed.
Chapter 2 considers another form of leadership, i.e. the case of leadership
in technological development and technology transfer. It is motivated by the
enormous difficulties which impede progress in global climate policy, i.e. to
ensure international cooperation and coordination on greenhouse gas mitiga-
tion and to conclude an international climate agreement with ambitious and
effectively binding obligations that are stable (see, e.g., Sandler 2004; Finus
and Caparrós 2001, for a detailed theoretical analysis of these problems). The
hope therefore is that - following a “bottom up approach” - pioneering activi-
ties of a coalition of leading countries might help to moderate global warming
and thus increase the supply of this presumably most important public good.
When considering such leading activities, the focus normally is on increased
abatement efforts or transfers to outsider countries. But such unilateral mea-
sures are only of limited effectiveness as the countries outside the coalition
may decrease their public good contributions as a reaction to the increased
contributions made by the coalition (show “crowding-out” behaviour) so that,
in the case of climate change “carbon leakage” results. In Sinn’s (2012b) figu-
rative terminology these outsider countries thus are “grabbing from the col-
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lection box” which reduces the positive effect on public good supply resulting
from the pioneering activities (see, e.g., Andreoni 1988; Buchholz, Haslbeck,
and Sandler 1998). Even worse, it is possible that total public good supply
may decrease when countries unilaterally raise their abatement efforts before
they enter climate negotiations (see Hoel 1991).
Quite similarly, the strategic context of privately (non-cooperatively) pro-
vided global public goods may impede incentives for innovation. It is a well-
known fact that it may harm a country if it unilaterally reduces its costs for
public good provision, i.e. develops and adopts better technologies even in
the extreme case of a completely costless innovation (see Buchholz and Kon-
rad 1994; Ihori 1996). The reason for this paradoxical effect is that a country-
specific increase in public good productivity (which is equivalent to reduced
costs of provision) concurrently increases the public good contribution of the
country considered. Consequently, other countries react by reducing their
own contributions so that crowding-out takes place. Anticipating this be-
havior, a country may block environmentally friendly technological progress
based on strategic reasons. Buchholz and Konrad 1994 show that this may
even be the case if countries cooperate in the future as a technological innova-
tion moves the disagreement point in a more unfavorable position. Thus, the
strategic environment may impede unilateral technological progress. How-
ever, as improved technologies offer the scope not only to reduce abatement
costs in the countries which carry out the R&D-efforts but also in countries
which get access to the improved technology3 the question is what happens
if there is a costless technological spillover to other countries.
Consequently, Chapter 2 considers a manifestation of leadership, which is
not based on an increase of public good contributions. Rather, this chapter
shows that pioneering activities, which are based on green technological in-
novations by members of a coalition of countries and a successive free transfer
of the improved technology to other countries may be a convenient mean of
leadership in global public good provision, e.g. in mitigating climate change.
In an otherwise standard model of private public good supply, the success of
such a policy depends on the costs of research and development (R&D) for the
coalition of innovators, the number of countries within and outside the coali-
tion and the outreach, i.e. the intensity and scope of technological spillovers.
Moreover, Chapter 2 shows in the strategic context considered that a suffi-
cient uptake of the improved technology by countries outside the coalition
may be mandatory in order to provide innovation incentives for the coalition.
Consequently, transfers of green technologies to less developed countries not
only seem to be an appropriate remedy under fairness aspects but may also
increase the research efforts in the developed countries and thus help make
greenhouse gas abatement as a whole more efficient.
3 The concept of international technology diffusion is discussed in Keller (2004). In addition,
possible kinds and channels of technology transfer in environmentally-friendly technologies
are described in Newell (2010), Popp (2011), Glachant et al. (2013), Popp (2015) and with a
focus on climate negotiations in De Coninck and Sagar (2015). Moreover, existing approaches
to and possibilities of collaborative efforts for R&D in climate technologies and technology
transfers to developing countries are considered in Ockwell, Sagar, and De Coninck (2015).
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Subsequently, Chapter 3 considers the interplay between technological pro-
gress and leadership which is expressed by going ahead in contributing to a
public good (sequential provision). This chapter is motivated by the promi-
nent role of leadership in the scientific and public debate on global public
goods, for which climate protection is the most prominent example. On the
one hand, climate policy in some countries like Germany has been driven by
the hope that leadership by a country or a group of countries will improve
public good provision and global welfare. On the other hand, it has been
shown in the framework of standard public good theory (see, e.g., Sandler
1992, pp. 57− 58, and Varian 1994) that due to the strategic reduction of the
leader’s public good contribution the leader-follower (Stackelberg) game with
sequential moves brings about a smaller public good supply than the game
with simultaneous moves. In consequence “the tendency toward underprovi-
sion is even more marked at the equilibrium of the sequential process than at
the Nash-Cournot equilibrium” (Cornes and Sandler 1996, p. 331). But also,
in a cooperative scenario (see, e.g., Chen and Zeckhauser 2018), in which a
bargaining solution is attained, leadership may be detrimental to public good
supply (see Hoel 1991 and Buchholz and Konrad 1994).
There have been a lot of attempts to support the position of leadership opti-
mists (see Edenhofer et al. 2015, and Schwerhoff 2016, for overviews), e.g. by
taking into account that leadership may resolve uncertainties about the costs
and benefits of public goods (see Hermalin 1998, and Brandt 2004) or may
cause positive technological externalities which automatically reduce contri-
bution costs in other countries (see Stranlund 1996 or Buchholz, Dippl, and
Eichenseer 2015). The interaction between technology spillovers and informa-
tion transmission through signalling may even foster the positive effects of
leadership (Mideksa 2016). Moreover, leadership proves to be successful when
it facilitates communication (see Barbieri 2012) or by integrating features of
behavioural economics when the agents involved have other-regarding pref-
erences or expectations of reciprocity (see Buchholz and Sandler 2017).
Chapter 3 shows that the result of standard public good theory that the
total amount of greenhouse gas mitigation (or public good supply in general)
will be lower in a leader-follower (Stackelberg) game than in a simultaneous
Nash game needs no longer be true when the leading country has the op-
tion to employ a technology by which it can reduce its abatement costs and
thus improve the productivity of its contribution technology. In this case both
countries are also better off in the Stackelberg game than in the Nash game.
The general result is illustrated by an example with Cobb-Douglas prefer-
ences and, finally, an empirical application to global climate policy is briefly
discussed. Summing up, Chapter 3 adds a further argument to support the
belief that leadership can have a positive effect both on the level of public
good supply and on the utilities of the countries involved.
1
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1.1 introduction
For public good theory the change of paradigm in global climate policy to-
wards a bottom-up approach provides some novel challenges as, e.g., the need
of a deeper understanding of the role which the demonstration of good inten-
tions by pioneers can play for the voluntary provision of public goods (see
Buchholz and Sandler 2017). This chapter will deal with a special one among
these issues, i.e. how coalition formation by one group of countries influences
the coalition formation decision of another group. It crucially depends on
this incentive effect whether it can be expected that cooperation within one
group stimulates cooperation by another group, which is clearly relevant for
assessing the prospects of success of the bottom-up approach. In particular,
we will explore in a two-stage game how the size of the two potential coali-
tions affect their decision in favor of partial cooperation within their group.
We thus determine the Nash equilibria at the first coalition formation stage of
the entire two-stage game, whose second stage is given by a standard model
of voluntary public good provision as in Cornes and Sandler (1996). The mir-
ror image of coalition formation is strategic decentralization as considered by
Eckert (2003), Buchholz, Haupt, and Peters (2013) and Foucart and Wan (2018)
who treat similar questions but apply a more special framework. The method
which is applied for our analysis will be the Aggregative Game Approach
(AGA) which facilitated the theoretical analysis of public good provision sub-
stantially (see Cornes and Hartley 2007, and with specific application to issues
in environmental economics Cornes 2016).
The chapter will be organized as follows: After presenting the theoretical
framework in Section 2, Sections 3 and 4 describe which Nash equilibria will
arise at stage 2, when either one group or both groups have decided to co-
operate at stage 1. In Section 5 we then analyze a group’s decision to form
a coalition given that the members of the other group either act in isolation
or are cooperating. In this context, we will - unlike Buchholz, Haslbeck, and
Sandler (1998) - not consider utility effects of small variations of a coalition’s
public good contribution but instead assume unmitigated utility maximiza-
tion of a coalition as collective Nash reaction to the public good contributions
of the other group (as in Buchholz, Cornes, and Rübbelke 2014 and Vicary
2018). Therefore, corner solutions in which one of the group does not make
any public good contribution at all, are of particular importance in the con-
text of this chapter. Based on this we explore in Section 6 the properties of
the Nash equilibria at the coalition formation stage in which the groups an-
ticipate the outcome at the second contribution stage, thus characterizing the
subgame-perfect equilibria for the entire two-stage game. In Section 6 we also
4 This chapter is a slightly modified version of Buchholz and Eichenseer (2017).
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briefly consider a version of the game in which one of the two groups acts as
the first mover at the coalition formation stage. These results are illustrated
by specific examples with Cobb-Douglas preferences in Section 7. Section 8
concludes.
1.2 the framework
There are two groups of otherwise identical countries K and M of size k ≥ 2
and m ≥ 2 , respectively. Each country i is characterized by its initial private
good endowment w and its utility function u(xi, G), where xi denotes agent
i’s level of private consumption and G indicates public good supply. Each
utility function is assumed to have the standard properties, i.e., it is twice
continuously differentiable, quasi-concave, and strictly monotone increasing
in both variables. Moreover, both goods are assumed to be non-inferior.
The main ingredient of the AGA, which in the following is used to char-
acterize equilibria, are (income) expansion paths, which are well-known from
standard household theory. For any marginal rate of substitution mrs = ρ be-
tween the private and the public good the associated expansion path is given
by e(G, ρ), which is a well-defined and strictly monotone increasing (and dif-
ferentiable) function of G. In xi-G-space, such an expansion path connects all
points (xi, G) at which country i’s indifference curves have slope −ρ so that
ρ = ∂u/∂xi∂u/∂G (xi, G) holds. In order to avoid the tedious treatment of sub-cases,
we assume e(0, ρ) = 0 and lim
G→∞
e(G, ρ) = ∞ , which, e.g., results when prefer-
ences are of the Cobb-Douglas type.
Figure 1.1: Expansion paths
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As in Andreoni (1988) and Andreoni and McGuire (1993) let G¯ρ be that
level of public good supply for which the condition e(G¯ρ, α) = w is fulfilled.
Convexity of indifference curves implies e(G, ρ2) < e(G, ρ1) if ρ2 > ρ1 and
thus G¯ρ2 > G¯ρ1 (see Figure 1.1).
The public good is produced by a summation technology. We assume that
all countries have the same marginal rate of transformation between the pri-
vate and the public good, which is normalized to one. If a country i’s public
good contribution is gi = w− xi ≥ 0 aggregate public good supply then be-
comes G =
n
∑
i=1
gi where n := k+m. An allocation (x1, ..., xn, G) thus is feasible
if and only if:
G +
n
∑
i=1
xi = nw (1)
holds.
Public good supply in the standard Nash equilibrium EN(n), in which all
n countries act non-cooperatively, is denoted by GN(n), which is given by the
condition
GN(n) + ne(GN(n), 1) = nw. (2)
The characterization of the Nash equilibrium as provided by (2) is based
on the feasibility constraint (1) and on the fact that a country, which ac-
tively contributes to the public good, only is in an equilibrium position if its
marginal rate of substitution coincides with the marginal rate of transforma-
tion mrt = 1, i.e. if its position is on the expansion path e(G, 1). Since expan-
sion paths are upward sloping, it directly follows from (2) that GN(n) < G¯1.
The Nash equilibrium EN(n) only depends on the total number n = k + m
of countries, and it is symmetric and interior, i.e. each country makes a strictly
positive contribution to the public good. In EN(n) each country’s private con-
sumption is xN(n) = e(GN(n), 1), so that a country’s utility in the standard
Nash equilibrium is uN(n) = u(e(GN(n), 1), GN(n)).
In the Cobb-Douglas case with the utility function u(xi, G) = xαi G, which
will be used as an illustration throughout the chapter, we have e(G, 1) = αG
so that condition (2) gives GN(n) = nw1+nα and thus x
N(n) = nαw1+nα and u
N(n) =
αα
( nw
1+nα
)1+α.
In the following we consider, besides the Nash equilibrium EN(n) , three
other equilibria EAK(k, m), EAM(k, m) and EB(k, m), which result when either
the countries in group K (AK-scenario) or in group M (AM-scenario) alone
or the countries in both groups K and M (B-scenario) are forming a coali-
tion and cooperatively determine their public good contributions within their
group. For L = K, M public good supply in EAL(k, m) will be denoted by
GAL(k, m) and private consumption of a country in group K by xALK (k, m) and
of a country in group M by xALM (k, m). In E
B(k, m) the respective quantities
are GB(k, m), xBK(k, m) and x
B
M(k, m).
As will be shown in the next sections, the equilibria EA(k, m) and EB(k, m)
may be standalone allocations in which only one of the two groups K or
M makes a positive contribution to the public good. Generally, for group
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L = K, M of countries with size l = k, m public good supply GS(l) in the
standalone allocation ES(l) is characterized by the condition
GS(l) + le(GS(l), l) = lw. (3)
Condition (3) follows from the maximization of utility u(w− gL, lgL) of a
member of L, i.e. under the assumption of equal burden-sharing among the
countries in L when they cooperatively determine their public good contribu-
tion. The allocation ES(l) thus is the symmetric Lindahl solution for group L.
In ES(l) private consumption of a member of group L is xS(l) = e(GS(l), l)
and GS(l) < G¯l holds (see Figure 1.2).
Figure 1.2: Lindahl equilibrium positions
In ES(l) a member of group L has utility uS(l) = u(xS(l), GS(l)), while
utility of a free-rider F, which does not contribute to the public good and thus
has private consumption xSF(l) = w, is u
S
F(l) = u(w, G
S(l)). Non-inferiority
of the public good implies that GS(l) is increasing in group size l. In the
Cobb-Douglas case with utility function u(xi, G) = xαi G we especially have
GS(l) = lw1+α , x
S(l) = αw1+α , u
S(l) = lαα
( w
1+α
)1+α and uSF(l) = lw1+α1+α .
How the two equilibria based on one-sided and both-sided partial coopera-
tion, respectively, look like and how they depend on group sizes k and m will
now be explored in detail.
1.3 unilateral cooperation
In the AK-scenario group K jointly determines the public good contributions
gAKK of each of its members collectively playing Nash against group M , whose
members still choose their contributions gAKM non-cooperatively as in the stan-
dard Nash equilibrium. An interior Nash equilibrium EAK(k, m), in which
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both the countries in group K and group M make positive contributions to
the public good, can be characterized with the help of the AGA in a straight-
forward way. For that purpose let a public good supply level GAKI (k, m) be
given by the condition
GAKI (k, m) + ke(G
AK
I (k, m), k) + me(G
AK
I (k, m), 1) = (k + m)w. (4)
Existence and uniqueness of GAKI (k, m) follows from continuity and mono-
tonicity of the expansion paths. Based on (4) we get a first characterization of
EAK(k, m).
Proposition 1. If EAK(k, m) is interior we have GAK(k, m) = GAKI (k, m) < G¯1,
xKAK (k, m) = e(G
AK
I (k, m), k) < w and x
AK
M (k, m) = e(G
AK
I (k, m), 1) < w.
Proof. On the one hand, if group K - again under the assumption of symmetric
burden-sharing - determines its joint Nash reaction kgK to the aggregate pub-
lic good contributions mgM of group M, it maximizes utility of each member
u(w − gK, kgK + mgM). This in particular means that in case of cooperation
every country in K faces mrt = k as its individual marginal rate of trans-
formation between the private and the public good. If the solution of this
optimization leads to a positive public good contribution each country in K
attains a position where mrs = mrt = k holds, i.e. a position on the expansion
path e(G, k). On the other hand, the position of the countries in group M is
still on the income expansion path e(G, 1) when their public good contribu-
tion is positive. In combination with the feasibility constraint (1) this shows
that an interior EAK(k, m) is characterized by condition (4). Interiority implies
that e(GAKI (k, m), k) < e(G
AK
I (k, m), 1) < w and thus G
AK
I (k, m) < G¯1.
The equilibrium EAK(k, m), however, need not be interior. The solution may
also be a corner equilibrium, in which either only the group K or the group
M actively contribute to the public good. We first show that the latter case can
be excluded, which is in contrast to the scenario in which the coalition acts as
a Stackelberg leader (Buchholz, Cornes, and Rübbelke 2014).
Proposition 2. A corner equilibrium EAK(k, m), in which only the outsider group
M contributes to the public good, can never occur.
Proof. If only the members of group M made a positive contribution, pub-
lic good supply would become GN(m), which in analogy to condition (2)
is defined by the condition GN(m) + me(GN(m), 1) = mw. Since GN(m) <
G¯1 < G¯k, non-inferiority would imply that the mrs of the members of K at
(w, GN(m)) is smaller than k, so that being confronted with GN(m) - coalition
K would have an incentive to contribute to the public good. This, however, is
not compatible with an equilibrium outcome.
The other type of a corner solution is the symmetric standalone equilibrium
ES(k) of coalition K. The following result provides criteria by which it can be
determined whether the interior solution or the standalone allocation ES(k)
emerges as the equilibrium outcome of the contribution game.
Proposition 3. EAK(k, m) is interior if GAKI (k, m) < G¯1 or, equivalently, if G
S(k) <
G¯1. Otherwise, EAK(k, m) is the corner solution ES(k).
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Proof.
(i) As a first step we show that the two conditions for interiority are equiv-
alent: Assume GS(k) < G¯1. Since in this case e(GS(k), 1) < w, it follows
from GS(k) + ke(GS(k), k) = kw that
GS(k) + ke(GS(k), k) + me(GS(k), 1) < (k + m)w. (5)
But as G + ke(G, k) is increasing in G and e(G¯1, 1) = w we have
G¯1 + ke(G¯1, k) + me(G¯1, 1) > (k + m)w. (6)
This implies that public good supply GAKI (k, m), which satisfies (4), must
lie in the interval (GS(k), G¯1) and thus, in particular, is smaller than G¯1.
Conversely, if GAKI (k, m) < G¯1 it is shown by a similar argument that
GS(k) < GAKI (k, m) holds.
(ii) Let GAKI (k, m) < G¯1. Then e(G
AK
I (k, m), k) < w and e(G
AK
I (k, m), 1) < w,
and the countries in K and M are in an equilibrium position when
they make the strictly positive public good contributions gAKIK = w −
e(GAKI (k, m), k) and g
AK
IM = w− e(GAKI (k, m), 1), respectively. This shows
that the allocation as defined by condition (4) is a Nash equilibrium
EAK(k, m). It is the only one since the interior solution is unique, and
group K’s standalone allocation can be excluded: From part (i) of the
proof we know that GAKI (k, m) < G¯1 implies G
S(k) < G¯1. Then the coun-
tries in M would have an incentive to contribute to the public good
when being confronted with GS(k) so that coalition K’s standalone allo-
cation cannot be an equilibrium.
(iii) Assume that the conditions stated in the Proposition are not fulfilled, i.e.
especially that GS(k) ≥ G¯1 holds. Given GS(k) the countries in group M
then have no incentive to contribute to the public good since in their
complete free-rider position (w, GS(k)) their mrs is larger than their
marginal rate of transformation mrt = 1. Therefore, K’s standalone al-
location ES(k) is a EAK(k, m), and it is the only one since an interior
solution is excluded by Proposition 1 as GAKI (k, m) ≥ G¯1 in this case.
It is a direct consequence of Proposition 3 that EAK(k, m) always exists and
is unique. We now show how the fulfillment of the criteria described by Propo-
sition 3 depends on the size of the two groups K and M.
Proposition 4. There is a coalition size k¯A ≥ 2 so that, independent of the size of
the outsider group m, EAK(k, m) is coalition K’s standalone allocation ES(k) if and
only if k ≥ k¯A.
Proof. Let k¯A = min
k≥2
{
k ∈: GS(k) ≥ G¯1
}
. Existence of k¯A is ensured as there
clearly exists some k for which the budget line G = −kxi + kw cuts the indif-
ference curve passing through (w, G¯1) so that GS(k) > G¯1 definitely holds for
such k.
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The threshold level k¯A defined in this way is independent of m as G¯1 is in-
dependent of m. Following Proposition 3, k¯A has the required properties. Ne-
glecting that k¯A has to be a natural number it can be determined as in Figure
1.3.
Figure 1.3: Threshold k¯A
When all agents have the Cobb-Douglas utility function u(xi, G) = xαi G we
have e(G, ρ) = αρG for some given ρ > 0 so that G¯1 =
w
α . As G
S(k) = kw1+α the
construction in the proof of Proposition 4 yields k¯A = min
k≥2
{
k ∈N : k ≥ 1+αα
}
.
For α ≥ 1, we thus get k¯A = 2 so that an interior equilibrium never occurs in
this case. But if α < 1 is sufficiently close to zero, interior Nash equilibria may
emerge for arbitrarily large coalitions since lim
α→0
1+α
α = ∞.
The equilibrium EAM(k, m), which results when only group M cooperates,
is obtained from the considerations above by interchanging the roles between
K and M. As seen by Proposition 4, it completely depends on the size of
group M, which type of equilibrium arises in this case: If m < m¯A := k¯A there
is an interior solution, in which public good supply GAM is GAMI given by the
condition
GAMI + ke(G
AM
I , 1) + me(G
AM
I , m) = (k + m)w. (7)
If, however, m ≥ m¯A, the equilibrium outcome EAM(k, m) is the standalone
equilibrium of group M, which implies GAM = GS(m). The positions attained
by the members of group K clearly are (xAMK , G
AM) = (e(GAMI , 1), G
AM
I ) if
m < m¯A and (xAMK , G
AM) = (w, GS(m)) if m ≥ m¯A.
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1.4 bilateral cooperation
In the second scenario both groups K and M internally cooperate when de-
termining public good contributions of their members gBK and g
B
M , but play
non-cooperatively against each other. Again, the AGA can be applied to char-
acterize the interior equilibria of this game with two-sided partial cooperation.
For that purpose let an allocation EBI (k, m) with public good supply G
B
I (k, m)
be given by the equation
GBI (k, m) + ke(G
B
I (k, m), k) + me(G
B
I (k, m), m) = (k + m)w. (8)
Existence and uniqueness of GBI (k, m) again follows from the properties of ex-
pansion paths. In complete analogy to Proposition 1 we obtain the following
result:
Proposition 5. If EB(k, m) is interior we have GB(k, m) = GBI (k, m) < min
{
G¯k, G¯m
}
,
xBK(k, m) = e(G
B
I (k, m), k) < w and x
B
M(k, m) = e(G
AK
I (k, m), m) < w.
Utilities are of the members of group K and the members of group M then
are denoted by uBKI (k, m) and u
BM
I (k, m), respectively. In contrast to the case
of unilateral cooperation it now becomes possible that the outcome is the
standalone equilibrium of each group either.
Proposition 6. EB(k, m) is interior if GBI (k, m) < min
{
G¯k, G¯m
}
or, equivalently,
if GS(k) < G¯m and GS(m) < G¯k. If, instead, GS(m) ≥ G¯k, EB(k, m) is the corner
solution ES(m) , and if GS(k) ≥ G¯m, EB(k, m) is the corner solution ES(k).
Proof.
(i) It is shown in an analogous way as in the proof of Proposition 3 that
the two conditions for interiority are equivalent and that EB(k, m) =
EBI (k, m) in this case.
(ii) Let GS(k) ≥ G¯m. Given GS(k) the countries in M then have no incentive
to make a collective contribution to the public good since at (w, GS(k))
their mrs is larger than their mrt = m, so that ES(k) is an equilibrium. It
is the only one since, on the one hand, an interior solution is excluded
by (i). On the other hand, the standalone allocation of group M is not
possible as GS(m) < G¯m ≤ GS(k) < G¯k. But GS(m) < G¯k implies that
the countries in K would have an incentive to contribute when they are
confronted with public good supply GS(m). The case GS(m) ≥ G¯k is
treated in the same way.
Existence of and uniqueness of EB(k, m) follows from Proposition 6 as
its three cases cover all possible situation and are mutually exclusive since
GS(k) ≥ G¯m implies GS(m) < G¯k. We now show how the fulfillment of the
criteria described by Proposition 6 depends on the size of the two groups K
and M.
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Proposition 7. For any m ≥ 2 there exist threshold levels
¯
kB(m) and k¯B(m), for
which k¯B(m) > m > ¯
kB(m) ≥ 0 holds and which are both increasing in m, so that
(i) EB(k, m) = ES(m) if k ≤
¯
kB(m).
(ii) EB(k, m) = EBI (k, m) if ¯
kB(m) < k < k¯B(m).
(iii) EB(k, m) = ES(k) if k ≥ k¯B(m).
Furthermore, lim
m→∞¯
kB(m) = lim
m→0
k¯B(m) = ∞.
Proof.
Let
¯
kB(m) = max
{
k ∈N : G¯k ≤ GS(m)
}
and k¯B(m) = min
{
k ∈N : GS(k) ≥ G¯m
}
.
The assertions in (i), (ii) and (iii) then are a direct consequence of Proposition
6. Monotonicity of
¯
kB(m) and k¯B(m)follows as G¯m and GS(m)are monotone
increasing in m. That any given m lies in the interiority range follows since
G¯m + 2e(G¯m, m) = G¯m + 2mw > 2mw (9)
so that for k = m the equation (8) has a solution GBI (m, m) < G¯m. To show
lim
m→∞ ¯
kB(m) = ∞ we prove that GS(m) cannot be bounded above. Otherwise, if
there were an upper bound G¯S < ∞ of GS(m), we would get a contradiction
by choosing some m for which the budget line with slope m starting at (w, 0)
cuts the indifference curve passing through (w, G¯S).
The set of k, for which according to (i) a standalone equilibrium of group M
results, may be empty. The sets of k as defined by (ii) and (iii) in Proposition
7, however, are non-empty for all m ≥ 2. For (ii) this follows by letting k = m
and for (iii) through an argument as in the proof of Proposition 4. In the Cobb-
Douglas case with the utility function u(xi, G) = xαi G we especially have G¯k =
k
αw, G¯m =
mw
α , G
S(k) = kw1+α and G
S(m) = mw1+α . Real-numbered threshold
levels
¯
kB(m) and k¯B(m) then are defined by G¯
¯
kB(m)
= ¯
kB(m)w
α =
mw
1+α = G
S(m)
and GS(k¯B(m)) =
k¯B(m)w
1+α =
mw
α = G¯m, respectively, which gives
¯
kB(m) =
α
1+ α
m and k¯B(m) =
1+ α
α
m. (10)
The both equations in (10) also show that − given some α − an increase of
group size m enlarges the sets of k, leading to a standalone equilibrium of
group M and an interior equilibrium, while it reduces the set of k, leading to
a standalone equilibrium of group K. Moreover, an increasing preference for
the private good α makes both types of standalone equilibria more likely and
an interior solution more unlikely.
If
¯
kB(m) < k < k¯B(m) a straightforward application of condition (8) to
the Cobb-Douglas case gives GBI (k, m) =
(k+m)w
1+2α for public good supply and
xBKI (k, m) = e(G
B
I , k) =
α(k+m)w
k(1+2α) and x
BM
I (k, m) = e(G
B
I , m) =
α(k+m)w
m(1+2α) for
private consumption of the countries in K and M, respectively.
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1.5 incentives for coalition formation
We now explore whether in a two-stage game the group K has an incentive
to form a coalition at stage 1 given that the members of group M either have
formed a coalition or not. Therefore we have to compare utility of the coun-
tries in K between the allocations EN(k, m) and EAK(k, m) on the one hand
and between allocations EB(k, m) and EAM(k, m) on the other. Albeit for dif-
ferent reasons in both cases group K will have a weaker (stronger) incentive
for partial cooperation when it is small (large) while group M is large (small).
1.5.1 The Optimal Coalition Formation Decision of Group K when Group M does
not Cooperate
According to Proposition 2 we have to distinguish between the cases, in which
EAK(k, m) is an interior solution or EAK(k, m) is the standalone allocation of
group K, i.e. if according to Proposition 4 either k < k¯A or k ≥ k¯A.
For the treatment of the first case k < k¯A let for any ξ ∈ [0, k] public good
supply G˜AKI (ξ, m)be given by
G˜AKI (ξ, m) + ke(G˜
AK
I (ξ, m), ξ) + me(G˜
AK
I (ξ, m), 1) = (k + m)w. (11)
We obtain GN(k + m) = G˜AKI (1, m) and G
AK
I (k, m) = G˜
AK
I (k, m) as special
cases. The function u˜AKI (ξ) indicates utility a member of K attains at some ξ ∈
[1, k], where private consumption is x˜AKI (ξ, m) = e(G˜
AK
I (ξ, m), ξ). Omitting
arguments, using eK1 and e
K
2 as abbreviations for the two partial derivatives
of the expansion path e(G, ρ) at G = G˜AKI (ξ, m) and ρ = ξ and e
M
1 for the
first partial derivative of the expansion path e(G, 1) at G = GAKI (ξ, 1), and
observing that ξ = u1(x
AK
I ,G
AK
I )
u2(xAKI ,G
AK
I )
we get, similarly as on p.629 in Boadway and
Hayashi (1999),
∂u˜AKI
∂ξ
= u2((ξeK1 + 1)
∂G˜AKI
∂ξ
+ ξeK2 ). (12)
Total differentiation of (11) gives
∂G˜AKI
∂ξ
=
−keK2
1+ keK1 + me
M
1
. (13)
Combining (12) and (13) and having in mind that the normality assumption
implies eK1 > 0, e
M
1 > 0 (so that the denominator of (13) is positive) and e
K
2 < 0
yields
∂u˜AKI
∂ξ
< 0 if and only if k < ξ(1+ eM1 ) > 0. (14)
If the slope of the expansion path w.r.t. G is bounded from below by
¯
e1,
condition (14) leads to the following result:
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Proposition 8. If group M does not cooperate, group K does not benefit from forming
a coalition if
k < min
{
k¯A, 1+ m¯
e1
}
. (15)
Proof. Condition (15) implies that (14) is fulfilled for all ξ ∈ [0, k] so that
u˜AKI (ξ) is decreasing for all ξ ∈ [1, k], which yields uAKK (k + m) = u˜AKI (k) <
u˜AKI (1) = u
N(k + m).
For the treatment of the second case where k ≥ k¯A we first define
k∗A = mink≥2
{
k ∈N : uS(k) ≥ u(w, G¯1)
}
. (16)
In a xi-G-diagram the threshold level k∗A is obtained as the minimum value
of group size k for which the budget line with slope k cuts the indifference
curve passing through the point (w, G¯1). Neglecting again that k∗A has to be
an integer, it is characterized by the tangent to this indifference curve passing
through the point (w, 0) (see Figure 1.4). Clearly, k∗A exists and k
∗
A > k¯A.
Figure 1.4: Threshold k∗A
For any integer m ≥ 2 we furthermore define
k∗A(m) = mink≥2
{
k ∈N : uS(k) > uN(k + m)
}
. (17)
Since xN(k + m) < w and GN(k + m) < G¯1 and thus uS(k∗A) > u
N(k + m)
for all k and m, k∗A(m) exists and k
∗
A(m) ≤ k∗A holds for all m ≥ 2. Based on
(17) conditions can be provided, which ensures that coalition formation is the
optimal reaction of group K.
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Proposition 9. If group M does not cooperate, the members of group K will benefit
from forming a coalition if
k ≥
_
k A(m) := max
{
k¯A, k∗A(m)
}
(18)
For any k ≥ k∗A holds coalition formation is profitable for group K even independent
of the size m of group M.
Proof. The result directly follows from the definitions of k¯A, k∗A(m)and k
∗
A .
Both Proposition 8 and 9 confirm that coalition building is fostered, when
group K is large and the outsider group M is small.
1.5.2 The Optimal Coalition Formation Decision of Group K when Group M Coop-
erates
To explore whether group K has an incentive to cooperate, when group M
does we have to compare utility of its members in the allocations EAM(k, m)
and EB(k, m). To simplify the exposition we concentrate on the situation where
the standalone solution of group M emerges as Nash equilibrium at the con-
tribution stage when group K does not cooperate, i.e. EAM(k, m) = ES(m) and
m ≥ m¯A, and the members of K have utility uSF(m) when they do not coop-
erate. First of all, it is straightforward to provide a condition which ensures
that group K prefers non-cooperation in this case.
Proposition 10. If group M cooperates and m ≥ m¯A group K does not benefit from
forming a coalition if k <
¯
kB(m).
Proof. It follows from Proposition 7 that a cooperating group K does not
want to make a positive contribution to the public good if k <
¯
kB(m). Thus
EB(k, m) = EAM(k, m) so that coalition formation would not make a change.
When
¯
kB(m) < k < k¯B(m) and hence EB(k, m) is interior, cooperation K may
also not pay for the members of group K. So one can expect that cooperation
will reduce utility of the countries in K below their utility in the standalone
equilibrium of group M if group size k lies only slightly above the lower
interiority threshold
¯
kB(m). To show this let for a continuous variable ξ ≥
¯
kB(m) public good supply GBI (ξ, m) be defined by
GBI (ξ, m) + ξe(G
B
I (ξ, m), ξ) + me(G
B
I (ξ, m), m) = (ξ + m)w. (19)
If uBKI (ξ, m) denotes utility, which a member of coalition K then attains at
ξ, we get the following result where
¯
ξ
B
(m) is given by G
¯
ξ
B
= GS(m).
Proposition 11. There is some threshold
¯
χ so that for all ξ ∈
[
¯
ξ
B
(m),
¯
χ
]
utility
uBKI (ξ, m) is falling in ξ.
Proof. See the Appendix A.
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A straightforward implication of Proposition 11 is that under some addi-
tional conditions cooperation of group K will not pay for its members when-
ever the equilibrium at the contribution stage is interior. To show this first
define for any m ≥ 2
k∗B(m) := mink≥2
{
k ∈N : uS(k) ≥ uSF(m)
}
(20)
This definition means that for all k ≥ k∗B(m) utility of a country in K is higher
in K’s standalone solution than it would be as a free-rider in M’s standalone
solution (see Figure 1.5). Since uS(m) < uSF(m) and u
S(k) is increasing in k we
have k∗B(m) > m. As u
S
F(m) is increasing in m, k
∗
B(m) is non-decreasing. We
then have the following result:
Proposition 12. Assume m ≥ m¯A, that uBKI (ξ, m) is a convex function of ξ and
that k∗B(m) > k¯B(m). For all k with ¯
kB(m) < k < k¯B(m) then group K does not
benefit from forming a coalition when group M cooperates.
Proof. As uS(k) is increasing in k and k∗B(m) > k¯B(m) is assumed it follows
that uBKI (ξ¯B(m), m) = u
S(ξ¯B(m)) < u
S(k¯B(m)) ≤ uSF(m) where ξ¯B(m) is de-
fined by G¯ξ¯B(m) = G¯m . According to Proposition 11 utility u
BK
I (ξ, m), which a
country in K attains in an interior solution, is falling on an interval
[
¯
kB(m),
¯
χ
]
.
As the convexity assumption implies that the function uBKI (ξ, m) can at most
have one minimum in
[
¯
kB(m), k¯B(m)
]
and since uBKI (¯
kB(m), m) = uSF(m), we
have uBKI (k, m) < u
S
F(m) for all k with ¯
kB(m) < k < k¯B(m).
Taken together Proposition 10 and 12 imply, that in the situation underly-
ing Proposition 12, non-cooperation is group K’s best reply to cooperation of
group M for all k ≤ k¯B(m). As in the case, where group M does not cooper-
ate, coalition building, however, becomes profitable if group K is sufficiently
large.
Figure 1.5: Threshold k∗B
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Based on k∗B(m) as defined by (20) we can provide a sufficient condition for
coalition building by group K when M has formed a coalition.
Proposition 13. If group M cooperates group K benefits from forming a coalition if
k >
_
kB(m) := max
{
k¯B(m), k∗B(m)
}
> m. (21)
_
kB(m) is non-decreasing in m and limm→∞
_
kB(m) = ∞.
Proof. The assertions directly follow from the definitions and the monotonic-
ity of k¯B(m)and k∗B(m). That limm→∞
_
kB(m) = ∞ is a consequence of Proposition
7, i.e. of lim
m→∞ k¯B(m) = ∞.
Proposition 13 shows that the incentives for group K to form a coalition are
larger if the group M is small. However, it has to be emphasized that − unlike
the case where group M does not cooperate − it is not possible that a group
K of some given size k always wants to cooperate irrespective of the size of
M.
Proposition 14. For any k ≥ 2 there exists a m˜(k) so that a group K of size k
does not benefit from forming a coalition if the size of the cooperating group M is
m ≥ m˜(k).
Proof. The assertion again directly follows from Proposition 10 since
lim
m→∞ ¯
kB(m) = ∞ as stated in Proposition 7.
1.5.3 A Comparison of the Optimal Reactions
The results of the previous subsections show that, concerning group K’s coali-
tion formation decision, some similarities but also some substantial differ-
ences between the two cases considered above exist.
On the one hand, there is a common tendency that cooperation is not prof-
itable for group K if it is small and that it becomes always profitable if it is
big enough - irrespective of whether the other group M acts as a coalition
or not. But on the other hand, coalition formation of group K is much more
likely if the other group M does not cooperate, which is reflected by some of
the results formulated above: If the members of M choose their public good
contributions non-cooperatively any group K whose size exceeds some min-
imum level wants to form a coalition independent of how large group M is
(see Proposition 9). When M, however, cooperates such a lower bound does
not exist. Rather, for any k we can find a sufficiently large group m so that
group K has no incentive to form a coalition (see Proposition 14). Moreover,
the minimum coalition size beyond which cooperation is definitely in the in-
terest of the countries in group K is higher when group M cooperates than
when it does not. This result is stated by the following Proposition.
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Proposition 15. Assume m > m¯A. For the threshold levels defined in (18) and
(21), which provide sufficient conditions for coalition formation of group K,
_
kB(m) >
_
k A(m) holds.
Proof. On the one hand, m ≥ 2 implies G¯m > G¯1 and thus k¯B(m) > k¯A. On
the other hand, m > m¯A gives GS(m) > G¯1 so that u(w, G¯1) < u(w, GS(m)) =
uSF(m). Comparing (16) and (20) then shows k
∗
B(m) > k
∗
A. Taken together, we
obtain
_
kB(m) = max
{
k¯B(m), k∗B(m)
}
>
_
k A(m) = max
{
k¯A, k∗A(m)
}
.
1.6 nash equilibria at the coalition formation stage : some
general conditions
Changing roles and taking the reactions of group M also into account now
allows us to derive some general results concerning the type of the Nash
equilibria that emerges at the first coalition formation stage of the entire two-
stage game. So Proposition 9 has shown that, if the size of a group is large
enough, it will always react by cooperating when the other group does not
cooperate, i.e. NM → CK and NK → CM. Concerning the reaction when the
other group cooperates, our general results suggest that the members of a
small group prefer to stand alone when the other group is large, i.e. CM →
NK or CK → NM. To formulate conditions for a unique Nash equilibrium
in this case consider the function
_
mB(k), which is defined by (21) through
interchanging k and m, and then its inverse
^
kB(m), which in an m-k-diagram
is obtained by mirroring
_
kB(m) on the 450-line. As
_
mB(k) > k for all k we get
^
kB(m) < m. Furthermore, let k^
B
(m) := min
{
¯
kB(m),
^
kB(m)
}
< m.
Proposition 16. If k, m > k∗A and k < k^B
(m) < m there is a unique Nash equi-
librium (NK, CM) at the coalition formation stage in which the larger group M is
willing to form a coalition while the smaller group K is not. At the second stage
group M’s standalone equilibrium ES(m) results.
Proof. As noted above we have NK → CM as m ≥ m∗A = k∗A. But given
k <
¯
kB(m) Proposition 10 says that CM → NK so that (NK, CM) is a Nash
equilibrium. It is the only one since it follows from Proposition 13 and the
construction of k^
B
(m) that for all (m, k) with k < k^
B
(m) group M wants to co-
operate when group K does, i.e. CK → CM. Under the conditions underlying
the Proposition group K clearly must be smaller than group M as k^
B
(m) < m.
The assertion concerning the second stage follows from Proposition 4 since
k∗A > k¯A.
To put it in another way: In the situation as given in Proposition 16 the
payoff structures of both groups are different: While group K has payoffs as in
a chicken game those of group M are as in a harmony game. This constellation
gives a unique Nash equilibrium at the coalition formation stage.
If, in contrast to the situation described in Proposition 16, the sizes of both
groups do not diverge too much, each group clearly will show the same reac-
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tion when the other group has built a coalition, i.e. it will either choose non-
cooperation or cooperation. Assume again that groups are large enough so
that non-cooperation of one group is responded by cooperation of the other.
If the best reaction to cooperation is non-cooperation then a chicken game
with two asymmetric Nash equilibria emerges. Under the same assumptions
as made in Proposition 12 such an outcome may result when the Nash equi-
librium at second stage is interior.
Proposition 17. Let k, m > k∗A and assume that u
BK
I (ξ, m) is a convex function of
ξ and that k∗B(m) > k¯B(m). Then for all (k, m) with ¯
kB(m) < k < k¯B(m) there
are two Nash equilibria (CK, NM) and (NK, CM). At the second stage then either
the standalone equilibrium ES(k) of group K or the standalone equilibrium ES(m) of
group M result.
Proof. Concerning the first stage, k, m > k∗A yields the reactions NK → CM and
NM → CK. From Proposition 12 we have CM → NK for all k with ¯kB(m) < k <k¯B(m). By reversing roles and observing symmetry we also obtain CK → NM.
Concerning the second stage, the assertion again follows from Proposition
4.
As always in the case of a chicken game a unique solution emerges when
we assume that one of the two groups, say group M, either commits to coop-
eration or to non-cooperation. Regarding public good supply we then have
the following result:
Proposition 18. Under the same assumptions as in Proposition 17 and given any
combination (k, m) with m < k < k¯B(m) public good supply will be higher when
group M commits to non-cooperation than when it commits to cooperation.
Proof. It follows from Proposition 17 that (NK, CM) with public good supply
GS(m) results when group M commits to cooperation. When group M in-
stead commits to non-cooperation group K forms a coalition and public good
supply becomes GS(k). Since k < m we then have GS(k) < GS(m).
Proposition 18 shows that a cooperation of a relatively small coalition may
motivate the members of a much larger group to choose the standalone strat-
egy and to become free-riders. In this case the presence of the smaller group
M leads to a public good supply which is lower than in the situation in which
M were absent. Non-cooperation of the smaller group M instead creates an
incentive for the larger group K to build a coalition and then to provide the
public good at a higher level, so that in this sense less goodwill by group M
is advantageous for public good provision. The difference between the public
good supply levels in the two cases considered in Proposition 18 may even
become quite large which is shown through an example in the subsequent
section.
The result stated in Proposition 18 resembles some well-known paradoxical
effects that may occur in the context of climate policy: Leading behavior by
a group of countries aiming at improving global environmental quality (e.g.
through unilateral increases of abatement efforts as in Hoel (1991), or to car-
bon taxes with a rapid increase of tax rates as in Sinn 2012b) can have the
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counterintuitive effect that in the end environmental quality deteriorates. In
this chapter, we have seen that such an adverse outcome may also arise from
coalition formation decisions by groups of countries.
Looking at the sequential version of the chicken game (see also Foucart and
Wan 2018), the outcome as usual depends on which of the two groups is the
first mover.
Proposition 19. Under the assumptions of Proposition 17 and Proposition 18 the
outcome always is unilateral cooperation (CK, NM) with public good supply GS(k)
when the smaller group M moves first. When the larger group K is the first mover,
unilateral cooperation (NK, CM) with public good supply GS(m) results.
Proof. If group M moves first it follows from Proposition 16 that ES(m) results
at the second stage when it forms a coalition and ES(k) when it does not.
In the first case utility of a member of M is uS(m) and in the second case
it is uSF(k). As m < k and thus G
S(m) < GS(k) we have uS(m) = u(w −
GS(m)
m , G
S(m)) < u(k, GS(k)) = uSF(k) , so that group M is better off by not
cooperating. The second part of the assertion follows from Proposition 20
since k < k∗B(m) implies u
S
F(m) > u
S(k).
As GS(m) < GS(k) then, in the situation underlying Proposition 19, equilib-
rium public good supply is smaller when the larger group K moves first. This
result is surprising, since the intuition might suggest the opposite outcome.
The assumptions made in Proposition 17, which lead to a chicken game, do
not hold in any case. Hence, it is also possible that with fairly equal group
sizes the best reply to cooperation will be cooperation, which leads to a har-
mony game with the unique Nash equilibrium (CK, CM). But in other rather
special cases a prisoner dilemma game with the unique Nash equilibrium
(NK, NM) or an assurance game with the two Nash equilibria (NK, NM) or
(CK, CM) may result too. In the next section, where Cobb-Douglas preferences
are assumed, we present examples for all these possible outcomes.
1.7 nash equilibria at the coalition formation stage : a cobb-
douglas example
Let again each country’s utility function be u(xi, G) = xαi G. To simplify the
exposition, we normalize the initial endowment of each country to w = 1.
We also no longer make a distinction between natural numbers k and the
continuous variable ξ.
Firstly, we assume α ≥ 1 so that k¯A = 1+αα ≤ 2. According to Proposition
4 then unilateral cooperation of group K leads to this group’s standalone
solution ES(k) at the contribution stage, where utility of a country in K is
uSK(k) =
kαα
(1+ α)1+α
. (22)
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When both groups do not cooperate each country’s utility in the standard
Nash equilibrium is
uN(k + m) = αα
(
k + m
1+ α(k + m)
)1+α
. (23)
To determine k∗(m) and thus the optimal cooperation decision of group
K we would have to compare the utility levels given by (22) and (23), which
however, does not allow for a closed-form solution. But it is possible to give an
explicit solution for the threshold level k∗A which is defined by the condition
uS(k∗A) =
k∗Aα
α
(1+ α)1+α
=
1
α
= u(w, G¯1) (24)
Thus
k∗A =
(
1+ α
α
)1+α
. (25)
k∗A is decreasing in α and converges to the Euler number e when α goes to
infinity. If α ≥ 1 we thus have k∗A ≤ 4 so that in this case only groups K for
all k ≥ 4 coalition formation is the best response of group K when the other
group M does not cooperate. In the following we will concentrate on this case.
If the other group Minstead has formed a coalition Proposition 10 shows that
group K’s best reaction is non-cooperation if k ≤
¯
kB(m) =
α
1+αm.
To infer group K’s coalition formation decision when
¯
kB(m) < k < k¯B(m)
and an interior equilibrium emerges at the second stage we have to consider
uBKI (k, m) =
(α
k
)α( k + m
1+ 2α
)1+α
(26)
which is convex in k as further calculations show. From
uS(k∗B(m)) =
k∗B(m)
α
(
α
1+ α
)1+α
=
m
1+ α
= uSF(m) (27)
we get
k∗B(m) =
(
1+ α
α
)α
m (28)
so that for α > 1 we have k∗B(m) > k¯B(m) =
1+α
α m. Proposition 12 thus pro-
vides that then K’s optimal reaction to cooperation of M is non-cooperation
also when
¯
kB(m) < k < k¯B(m). For α = 1 direct calculations provide the same
result. Non-cooperation also is the best response of K to cooperation of group
M if k > k¯B(m) but k < k∗B(m) while group K will choose cooperation as soon
as k ≥ k∗B(m). Note that the set
{
k ∈N : k¯B(m) < k < k∗B(m)
}
may be empty,
especially if α is not far above 1 and m is small.
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Based on these results on optimal reactions at the coalition formation stage
we now provide a complete description of the Nash equilibria at the coalition
formation stage for the special case α = 1. We then have k¯A = 2, k∗A = 4,
¯
kB(m) =
1
2 m and k¯B(m) = k
∗
B(m) = 2m, which allows us to determine the
Nash equilibria for the utmost part of all combinations of group sizes k and
m: If k, m ≥ 4 and k < 12 m it follows from Proposition 16 that (NK, CM) is
the unique Nash equilibrium at the coalition formation stage since
_
mB(k) =
m¯B(k) = m∗B(k) = 2k and thus k^B
(m) = 12 m = ¯
kB(m). Analogously, (CK, NM)
is the unique Nash equilibrium if k > 2m. If, however, 12 m ≤ k ≤ 2m
holds, Proposition 17 shows that a chicken game with the two Nash equilibria
(NK, CM) and (CK, NM) emerges at the coalition formation stage.
The case k = 2, 3 has to be treated separately: If then m ≥ 4 the unique
Nash equilibrium at the coalition formation stage is (NK, CM) and if m = 2, 3
and if k ≥ 4 it is (CK, NM). We thus obtain the partitioning of the k-m-space
as depicted in Figure 1.6.
Figure 1.6: The regions of subgame-perfect equilibria
For the remaining combinations (2,2), (2,3), (3,2) and (3,3) inside the box of
Figure 1.6 we infer that for (2,3) the unique Nash equilibrium is (NK, CM) and
for (3,2) it is (CK, NM). At (3,3) there are the two Nash equilibria (NK, CM)
and (CK, NM). In the case (2,2) it is the dominant strategy of each group not
to build a coalition so that there is a prisoners’ dilemma at the coalition for-
mation stage with (NK, NM) as the only Nash equilibrium.
For an illustration of Proposition 18 let k = 2m− 1. Then k < k¯B(m) = 2m so
that equilibrium public good supply is GS(m) = m2 when the smaller group M
commits to cooperation. But public good supply would become GS(2m− 1) =
m− 12 when group M commits to non-cooperation. Hence, if group M forms a
coalition this almost halves public good supply as compared to situation if it
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is not willing or unable to do so. If in the same situation coalition formation is
a sequential game, in which the larger group K moves first, then also (NK, CM)
with the lower public good supply GS(m) results. This illustrates Proposition
19.
For other Cobb-Douglas preferences also other game types at the coalition
formation stage may occur. Let, e.g., α = 12 and k = m ≥ 3. Then (CK, CM) is
a Nash equilibrium at the first coalition-formation stage. If, in addition, k >
k∗A = 6 coalition-building becomes the dominant strategy for both countries
so that there is a harmony game, in which bilateral cooperation (CK, CM) is
the unique Nash equilibrium. Finally, if k = m = 3 an assurance game results,
which has the two symmetric Nash equilibria (NK, NM) and (CK, CM).
1.8 conclusions
The results derived in this chapter pour some cold water on the optimistic ex-
pectation, which is connected with the bottom-up-approach in climate policy.
Rather, partial cooperation by one group of countries may make it less likely
that the members of the other group are willing to build their own coalition,
particularly if the cooperating coalition is large. But, more surprisingly, even
relatively large groups might prefer to become free-riders in the standalone al-
location brought about by a much smaller group. This causes the danger that
the level of public good supply in the subgame-perfect equilibrium is lower if
a smaller group is present than it would be if the larger group were alone. This
undesired effect on the level of global public good provision occurs in many
of our scenarios if the smaller group commits to coalition formation or if in a
leader-follower version of the coalition formation game the larger group is in
the first mover position. The adverse effect, however, is avoided if the smaller
group demonstrates unwillingness to form a coalition or if it has high costs in
producing the public good. Hence, another paradoxical effect in global public
good provision arises: Green technological progress, which enables the small
coalition to make an effective contribution to the public good, may in the end
reduce public good supply and thus aggravate the underprovision problem.
This additional feature has not been considered in this chapter. For the sake
of simplicity, it has rather been assumed that production costs for the public
good are exogenously given and identical for all countries. Moreover, there
have only been two potential coalitions whose members have the same endow-
ments and preferences. In further research, one might drop this assumption
and allow for a greater number of heterogeneous groups whose members
can differ w.r.t. their public good productivity, their income levels and their
preferences.
2
L E A D E R S H I P I N T E C H N O L O G I C A L D E V E L O P M E N T A N D
T E C H N O L O G Y T R A N S F E R 5
2.1 introduction
This chapter considers a type of pioneering activity which is not based on
an increase of public good contributions. Leading behavior rather manifests
in investments to improve green technologies (such as renewable energies
or energy efficiency measures) which help reduce abatement costs and thus
make the production of the global public good less costly and in subsequent
technology transfer.
It is well-known (see Buchholz and Konrad 1994; Ihori 1996) that it may
harm a country in the context of voluntary public good provision if it unilat-
erally reduces its cost for public good provision even in the extreme case in
which the innovation is completely costless. The paradoxical effect described
in Buchholz and Konrad (1994) is based on the fact that a country-specific
increase in public good productivity (which is equivalent to reduced costs of
provision) concurrently increases the public good contribution of the country
considered. As a consequence, other countries react by reducing their own
contributions so that crowding-out takes place. Anticipating this behavior,
countries may block environmentally friendly technological progress on the
basis of strategic reasons.
In this chapter we extend this analysis of the strategic choice of abatement
technology in consequence leads to a more optimistic pattern: If a country or
a coalition of countries is – as some kind of substitute for monetary transfers
- able to make the fruits of its innovation available to other countries free of
charge (which decreases the other countries’ costs of producing the public
good) this will not only be beneficial for these countries but also for the pi-
oneering coalition itself. This technology transfer in turn makes the coalition
more prepared to engage in green R&D-activities.
The analysis in this chapter will be carried out in the standard framework of
voluntary public good provision (as exposed by Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian
1986; Cornes and Sandler 1996). But unlike these traditional contributions to
the theory of public goods, we will make use of the more recent Aggregative
Game Approach (see Cornes and Hartley 2007 and Cornes (2016)). The appli-
cation of this approach facilitates the analysis of Nash equilibria in games of
public good provision considerably which are quite complex in the scenario
considered in this chapter.
5 This chapter is a modified version of Buchholz, Dippl, and Eichenseer (2015). A version of
Buchholz, Dippl, and Eichenseer (2015) with a strong focus on climate finance also appeared
as Buchholz, Dippl, and Eichenseer (2017).
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the
framework of the public good model for the analysis. Subsequently, Section 3
describes the interdependencies between three different kinds of countries: a
coalition K of pioneers that carry out the technological innovation, a group M
that adopts it, i.e. receives a technological spillover and the remaining group
L of countries that stick to the old technology. Comparative statics, i.e. the
change in the total level of public good provision through the technological
innovation of the pioneering countries are discussed in Section 4, whereas
Section 5 focuses on the pioneers’ change in utility, i.e. the incentives to make
the technological improvement. Section 6 then considers the utility of coun-
tries in M and L which are outside the coalition. A Cobb-Douglas example is
provided in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2.2 the framework
Let there be n countries i = 1, ..., n, which all have the same initial endow-
ment w of the private good and the same utility function u(xi, G) where xi
denotes private consumption of country i and G is public good supply. Espe-
cially in the context of climate change G can be interpreted as the amount of
greenhouse gases totally avoided. The utility function is assumed to have the
standard properties, i.e. it is twice partially differentiable with the first partial
derivatives u1(x1, G) > 0 and u2(xi, G) > 0 and quasi-concave. Moreover, we
suppose that the private and the public good both are strictly non-inferior,
which means for a given marginal rate of transformation between the two
goods that demand for both goods is increasing if endowments grow bigger.
The crucial element for our analysis is that the countries may differ in their
productivities for generating the public good which are represented by the
country-specific marginal rates of transformation mrti between the private
and the public good ai: These productivities indicate how many units of the
public good country i can produce if it spends one unit of the private good
for public good provision. The reciprocal value ci = 1ai then indicates how
many units of the public good country i has to give up in order to get one
additional unit of the private good. In the case of environmental public goods
ci thus represents the marginal abatement costs of country i.
Under these assumptions a feasible allocation (x1, ..., xn, G) has to satisfy
the aggregate budget constraint
G =
n
∑
i=1
ai(w− xi) (1)
or, equivalently,
G +
n
∑
i=1
aixi =
n
∑
i=1
aiw. (2)
To describe the Nash equilibrium of voluntary public good provision in
this setting by means of the Aggregative Game Approach, i.e. a country’s
equilibrium position let e(G, αi) be country i’s (income) expansion when αi
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denotes the marginal rate of substitution mrsi between the private and the
public good. As non-inferiority of both goods is assumed these expansion
paths are well-defined and strictly monotone increasing in G. Along an ex-
pansion path e(G, αi) the indifference curves of a country all have the same
slope −αi = − tan ρi. As an additional assumption regarding preferences we
assume that e(o, αi) = 0 and lim
G→∞
e(G, αi) = ∞, which makes sure that public
good demand of a country is strictly above zero for positive initial endow-
ments and that there is no upper bound for public good demand given that
the endowment is approaching infinity.
The essential point for the characterization of Nash equilibria now is that
a country, which makes a strictly positive public good contribution, is in an
individual equilibrium position only if its mrsi coincides with its mrti, i.e.
αi = ai holds. Otherwise, country i could attain a higher utility level either by
slightly increasing (if αi > ai or by slightly decreasing (if αi < ai) its public
good contribution. This, however, means that in an interior Nash equilibrium
(xˆ1, ..., xˆn, Gˆ) with positive public good contributions of all countries, country
i’s position (xˆi, Gˆ) has to lie on the expansion path e(G, ai) such that xˆi =
e(Gˆ, ai).
As a benchmark for our analysis we consider the case in which the produc-
tivity parameters ai are fixed and no country undertakes efforts to improve
public good productivity. Then no R&D-costs have to be taken into account,
and the budget constraint (1) for an interior Nash equilibrium becomes
Gˆ =
n
∑
i=1
ai(w− e(Gˆ, ai)) (3)
Given our assumptions the function Φ(G) :=
n
∑
i=1
ai(w− e(G, ai)), whose value
at Gˆ appears on the right hand side of eq. (3), is strictly monotone increasing
and continuous and, given our assumptions on expansion paths, has Φ(0) =
n
∑
i=1
aiw and lim
G→∞
Φ(G) = −∞. Hence, by the intermediate value theorem there
exists exactly one level of public good supply Gˆ, which fulfills condition (3).
If e(Gˆ, ai) < wi holds for each country i = 1, ..., n, the Nash equilibrium
is interior with public good supply Gˆ and private consumption levels xˆi =
e(Gˆ, ai). In this Nash equilibrium country i = 1, ..., n spends zˆi = wi − xˆi on
the public good thus inducing an increase of public good supply by gˆi = ai zˆi.
2.3 technological interdependencies
We start from a situation in which all countries have the same productivity
parameter a0. Public good supply Gˆ(a0) in the Nash equilibrium - which is
clearly interior in this initial state of full symmetry and without any R&D-
costs - then is given by
Gˆ(a0) = na0(w− e(Gˆ(a0), a0)) (4)
Now the possibility arises that a subgroup of countries undertakes some
R&D-efforts aimed at improving ”green” technologies (such as better insula-
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tion of houses, renewable energies, smart grids and new methods for power
storage) through which the reduction of carbon emissions becomes cheaper
or, in other words, the productivity of the global public good climate protec-
tion is increased. Through intended or unintended technological spillovers
other countries may also benefit from these productivity enhancing effects
even if they do not incur any of the costs associated with developing these
ecologically friendly technologies.
For a precise description of this scenario we divide the whole group of
countries into three subgroups K, L and M whose members play a two-stage
game.
2.3.1 Subgroup K Consisting of k Countries
The members of subgroup k form a technological coalition, which is willing
to play a pioneering role in climate policy by collectively promoting green
innovations. In the framework of our model this means that at the first stage
of the game coalition K is able to choose an improved production technology
for the public good which exhibits a higher public good productivity a than
the original technology. Choosing some a > a0, however, is not costless but
results in R&D-costs of ck(a) for each country in coalition K. This cost function
is assumed to be differentiable in a and has ck(a0) = 0. If, as in the case
of basic research, R&D-costs can be divided equally among the members of
the coalition ck(a) will - for any a > 0 - fall when k increases. However, if
technological progress is based on activities, which have to be carried out in
each country of the coalition at an equal scale (e.g. local learning-by-doing),
then ck(a) will not be affected by the size of the coalition.
While the coalition cooperates at the innovation stage, the coalition mem-
bers still act independently in the second stage of the game in which the
coalition members decide on their contributions to the public good. This as-
sumption reflects the notion that in climate policy cooperation on abatement
levels is harder to achieve than technological cooperation.
2.3.2 Subgroup L Consisting of l Countries
The members of subgroup L do not have a share in the spillover: They stick
to the original technology with the productivity parameter a0 irrespective
of the technological choice made by coalition K. This inability to make use
of the better environmental technologies may arise from specific physical or
meteorological conditions. E.g. countries in the tropical zones obviously do
not benefit from improved efficiency in the heating of buildings, and countries
like Canada with fewer sunshine hours than Florida cannot gain much from
the development of solar technology. But it is also possible that in developing
countries the capacities for adopting the improved technologies are lacking.
In contrast to the physical limitations these obstacles can be removed, e.g.
through education and the formation of human capital.
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2.3.3 Subgroup M Consisting of m Countries
For subgroup M there is a technological spillover from the technological in-
novations provided by coalition K so that they become more productive in
generating the public good - but possibly to a different degree than the coali-
tion members. The differentiable function b(a) describes which productivity
parameter results in each country in M when the productivity parameter cho-
sen in coalition K is a. This function measuring the intensity of the spillover
effect is monotone increasing in a with b(a0) = a0. The normal case will be
b′(a) ≤ 1, which means that the countries in M benefit not more from the
innovation than the countries in K. Nevertheless, situations are conceivable in
which b′(a) > 1 holds such that the productivity increase for subgroup M is
even larger than in K. An example for this might be solar energy when in the
countries of subgroup M solar radiation is stronger than in the countries of
subgroup K.
2.3.4 Description of the Nash Equilibrium in the Initial State
Like the countries in coalition K the countries in the outsider subgroups L
and M also determine their public good contributions non-cooperatively at
the second stage of the game. It is straightforward now by applying the Ag-
gregative Game Approach to describe the interior Nash equilibrium which
results when coalition K has chosen some productivity parameter a ≥ a0 as
we know that in the Nash equilibrium:
• the position of all countries in K is on the expansion path e(G, a).
• the position of all countries in L is on the expansion path e(G, a0).
• the position of all countries in M is on the expansion path e(G, b(a)).
Based on condition (3) public good supply Gˆ(a) in the Nash equilibrium if
coalition K has chosen the productivity parameter a is characterized by the
following equation:
Gˆ(a) = ka(w− e(Gˆ(a), a)− ck(a)) + la0(w− e(Gˆ(a), a0))
+ mb(a)(w− e(Gˆ(a), b(a))) (5)
Private consumption of the countries in subgroups K, L and M thus is
xˆk(a) = e(Gˆ(a), a), xˆL(a) = e(Gˆ(a), a0) and xˆM(a) = e(Gˆ(a), b(a)), respec-
tively. Note that eq. (5) takes into consideration that the members of group K
do not spend the whole residual between income and private consumption for
public good provision because they have to spend ck(a) > 0 for R&D-efforts
when choosing some a > a0.
Since the initial Nash equilibrium is interior it follows from a standard
continuity argument that the Nash equilibrium will stay interior when the
productivity parameter a chosen by coalition K is sufficiently close to a0. The
subsequent analysis only considers these cases.
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2.4 the change in pg supply through technological progress
Let the partial derivative of any expansion path e(G, α) w.r.t. public good
supply G be denoted by e1(G, α) which describes how private consumption
changes if one moves along an expansion path. Analogously, e2(G, α) is the
partial derivative of the expansion path w.r.t. the marginal rate of substitu-
tion α. This derivative indicates the change of private consumption, which
results when - for a given level of public good supply - the move is to an-
other expansion path corresponding to a higher marginal rate of substitution.
From the non-inferiority assumption on preferences we have e1(G, α) > 0 and
e2(G, α) < 0.
To calculate the effect on public good supply Gˆ
′
(a) = ∂Gˆ∂a , which is driven
by a marginal change of its productivity parameter by coalition K we first
consider the total differential of eq. (5) at some arbitrary a for which interiority
holds which yields
Gˆ(a) = k(w− e(Gˆ(a), a)− ck(a))
− ka(e1(Gˆ(a), a)Gˆ′(a) + e2(Gˆ(a), a) + c′k(a))− la0e1(Gˆ(a), a0)Gˆ′(a)
+ mb′(a)(w− e(Gˆ(a), b(a)))−mb(a)(e1(Gˆ(a), b(a))Gˆ′(a)
+ e2(Gˆ(a), b(a))b′(a)). (6)
We now apply eq. (6) to infer the effects on public good supply, which result
from a marginal change of a starting from a0 = b(a0). Without loss of general-
ity we can assume a0 = 1 and, to simplify notation, we use ab,breviations as
follows: Gˆ
′
= Gˆ
′
(1) zˆ = w− e(Gˆ(1), 1), κk = c′k(1), β = b′(1), γ1 = e1(Gˆ(1), 1)
and γ2 = e2(Gˆ(1), 1). Since ck(1) = 0 by assumption condition (6) then turns
into
Gˆ
′
= k(zˆ− γ1Gˆ′ − γ2 − κk)− lγ1Gˆ′ + m(βzˆ− γ1Gˆ′ − γ2β) (7)
Solving (7) for Gˆ
′
and observing k + l + m = n gives the following result.
Proposition 1. If coalition K marginally increases its productivity parameter a start-
ing from the symmetric Nash equilibrium with a0 = 1 then public good supply
changes by
Gˆ
′
=
(k + mβ)(zˆ− γ2)− kκk
1+ nγ1
. (8)
Public good supply hence increases if and only if
kκk < (k + mβ)(zˆ− γ2). (9)
Since γ2 < 0, condition (9) directly shows that – for a given distribution
over the three subgroups – an increase in public good supply always results
if the aggregate marginal costs for the technological improvement kκk are not
too high. A high spillover parameter β and a high public good contribution
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zˆ in the original Nash equilibrium are also favorable for an increase of public
good supply as both help to make the increase of public good productivity
more effective.
If, however, the R&D-costs are sufficiently high, so that kκk > (k +mβ)(zˆ−
γ2) holds, public good supply is reduced by the innovation. The reason for
this adverse effect is that due to the costly R&D-efforts coalition K’s resources
available for public good provision are eaten up while at the same time the
spillover effect is too weak, either because only few countries are positively
affected or the intensity of the spillover is small.
In addition, we can infer from conditions (8) and (9) how for a fixed total
number of countries n the size of the different subgroups affects the change
of public good supply. In this context we first note that zˆ, γ1 and γ2 refer to
the original fully symmetric Nash equilibrium and thus do not depend on k,
l and m as long as the total number of countries n = k + l + m is fixed.
Proposition 2. Assume that Gˆ
′
is positive. Then Gˆ
′
is the larger :
• the larger the coalition K is when aggregate marginal costs kκk of the techno-
logical improvement are not rising in k.
• the larger the group M is.
• the smaller γ1 > 0 and the larger −γ2 > 0 are.
In a Nash equilibrium public good supply normally is too low as compared
to Pareto optimal levels (see Buchholz and Peters 2001, for a treatment espe-
cially of exceptions). Against this background, Proposition 2 says that this
”underprovision” is mitigated both through a spatial expansion of the tech-
nological spillover, i.e. an increase of m, and an increase of its intensity β.
The same positive effect on public good supply occurs if the coalition K is
enlarged given that β ≤ 1 and kκk is decreasing in k.
As a next step, we examine the incentives that coalition K has for making a
green innovation through which its public good productivity is increased.
2.5 the incentives for coalition k to make the technological
improvement
Given some productivity parameter a, utility of a member of coalition K is
uˆk = u(e(Gˆ(a), a), Gˆ(a)) in the Nash equilibrium as e(Gˆ(a), a) = xˆk(a) is its
private consumption. A marginal variation of a changes this utility by
uˆk ′(a) = u1(xˆk(a), Gˆ(a))(e1(Gˆ(a), a)Gˆ
′
(a)+ e2(Gˆ(a)))+ u2(xˆk(a), Gˆ(a))Gˆ
′
(a).
(10)
Without loss of generality we can assume that at the original Nash equi-
librium for a0 = 1 we have uˆ1(xˆk(1), Gˆ(1)) = uˆ2(xˆk(1), Gˆ(1)) = 1. With the
abbreviations as introduced before and additionally letting uˆ′k = uˆ′k(1) eq.
(10) then is reduced to
uˆ′k = (1+ γ1)Gˆ
′
+ γ2. (11)
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Based on eq. (11), a precise condition for an increase of utility for countries
in the coalition K is provided by the next result. In its first part, this Proposi-
tion is a direct consequence of eq. (11) and in its second part it follows from
plugging Gˆ
′
as given by eq. (8) into eq. (11).
Proposition 3. Starting from the Nash equilibrium with a0 = 1 the members of
coalition K benefit from an increase of their public good productivity if and only if
Gˆ
′
>
−γ2
1+ γ1
> 0 (12)
holds or, equivalently, if and only if
kκk < (k + mβ)(zˆ− γ2) + γ2 1+ nγ11+ γ1 . (13)
As γ1 > 0 and γ2 < 0, it follows from condition (12) that a higher public
good supply is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for an increase of
a coalition member’s utility: The coalition members only benefit from their
R&D-efforts when the increase in public good supply is strong enough. Only
if conditions (12) and (13) are satisfied the countries in K are willing to form
a technological coalition in the first place.
The factors which determine the right hand side of inequality (13) are simi-
lar to those characterizing the change of public good supply: An enlargement
both of the coalition K and of the group M are favorable for an increase of util-
ity for the members of K. Concerning the incentives for innovation in K this
in particular shows how important it is to ensure a broad dissemination of the
improved technologies. Giving patents for green technological innovations to
other countries away free of charge thus may be a clever strategic move for
coalition K - and enhances the prospects that a R&D-coalition is forming at
all.
Concerning the second term on the right-hand side of (13) we note that
1+nγ1
1+γ1
is increasing in γ1. Hence, a utility increase for countries in coalition K
is more likely if γ1 is small. The effect of γ2, however, is ambiguous.6
2.6 utility effects for the countries outside the coalition
We now examine how utility of the countries in the groups L and M is
changed by the innovative activities of coalition K.
Differentiating utility uˆL(a) = u(xˆL(a), Gˆ(a)) = u(e(Gˆ(a), a0), Gˆ(a)) of a
country in L and utility uˆM(a) = u(xˆM(a), Gˆ(a)) = u(e(Gˆ(a), b(a)), Gˆ(a)) of a
country in group M w.r.t. the productivity parameter a yields
u′L(a) = u1(xˆL(a), Gˆ(a))e1(Gˆ(a), a0)Gˆ
′
(a) + u2(xˆL(a), Gˆ(a))Gˆ
′
(a) (14)
6 In this analysis it is assumed that the coalition size is exogenous. The question of the internal
stability of the coalition when coalition size is endogenous is addressed in Buchholz, Dippl,
and Eichenseer (2017).
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u′M(a) = u1(xˆM(a), Gˆ(a))(e1(Gˆ(a), b(a))Gˆ
′
(a)
+ e2(Gˆ(a), b(a))b′(a)) + u2(xˆM(a), Gˆ(a))Gˆ
′
(a). (15)
Assuming again a0 = 1 and u1(xˆ(1), Gˆ(1)) = u2(xˆ(1), Gˆ(1)) = 1 and abbre-
viating uˆ′L = uˆ′L(1) and uˆ′M = uˆ′M(1) a marginal change of productivity at
the initial Nash equilibrium thus results in utility changes as follows:
uˆ′L = (1+ γ1)Gˆ
′
(16)
uˆ′M = (1+ γ1)Gˆ
′
+ βγ2. (17)
Comparing the utility changes for the three groups K, L and M as described
by eq. (11), (16) and (17) leads to the following result:
Proposition 4. If coalition K marginally increases its public good productivity start-
ing from the Nash equilibrium with a0 = 1, the countries in K benefit least while
countries in the group L benefit most, i.e. uˆ′k ≤ uˆ′M ≤ uˆ′L.
The interpretation of Proposition 4 is as follows: Through the change of
public good productivity in coalition K utility of countries in each subgroup
is equally affected by (1 + γ1)Gˆ
′
, which is positive if public good supply in-
creases. For countries in K there is, however, a negative partial effect on utility
which is expressed by γ2 < 0 and which reflects the increased willingness to
pay for the public good when productivity improves. The same effect affects
group M but to a lesser degree if the spillover is incomplete, i.e. β < 1. If,
however, β = 1 the utility change is the same for group K and group M
even though only the members of the coalition K initially bear the cost of the
green innovation. This means that, due to equilibrium repercussions, R&D-
costs can be shifted to other countries. This indirect redistribution effect is,
in a certain sense, similar to the famous Warr neutrality in voluntary public
good provision (see Warr 1983, and e.g. Cornes and Sandler 1996), which in
particular implies that in an interior Nash equilibrium an increase of income
in some country will increase utility not only in that specific country but in
all countries.
The negative effect, which arises from the change of the willingness to pay
for the public good implied by the technological improvement, is completely
absent for countries in group L whose technology is unaffected by the in-
novation. Therefore, the members of this group benefit most. This, however,
creates an incentive problem because countries in group K attain a higher util-
ity level if they do not adopt the better technology for public good provision.
This strategic effect, however, is avoided if the technological spillover occurs
automatically, which e.g. is the case if firms in coalition K are the dominant
producers of energy technology and thus can set environmentally friendly
standards worldwide (see, e.g., Barrett 2003). For the countries in group M
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co-benefits from climate friendly technology may also arise which, on the
one hand, may be caused by improved possibilities of abating locally damag-
ing pollutants like particulate matter from power plants (see, e.g., Finus and
Rübbelke 2013) and, on the other hand, by the prospect of initiating a sustain-
able growth process implied by the transition to a low-carbon economy (see
Stern 2015). In paves the way for the adoption of green technologies. In the
sense of “issue linkage” the coalition may also introduce separate incentive
mechanisms like additional financial aid as a carrot or a stick like trade re-
strictions as envisaged by Nordhaus (2015) to ensure broad dissemination of
its green innovation.
Moreover, the countries outside the coalition K may notice that their un-
willingness to apply the new technology can undermine the willingness of
coalition K to make the R&D-efforts and to form a technological coalition.
To prevent this undesirable outcome the outsiders may also form a separate
coalition in which they commit themselves to adopt the improved technology.
2.7 a cobb-douglas example
We now specifically assume that w = 1 and that all countries have the Cobb-
Douglas utility function u(xi, G) = x
ρ
i G. For some marginal rate of substitu-
tion α the expansion path is given by e(G, α) = ραG which gives e1(G, α) =
ρ
α
and e2(G, α) = − ρα2 G. According to eq. (4), the symmetric Nash equilibrium
at a0 = 1 is given by the public good supply level Gˆ(1) = nnρ+1 , the private
good consumption levels xˆ(1) = nρnρ+1 and country-specific public good con-
tributions zˆ(1) = 1nρ+1 . Since γ1 = ρ and γ2 = − nρnρ+1 we get
Gˆ
′
=
k + mβ− kκk
nρ+ 1
(18)
uˆ′k =
(ρ+ 1)(k + mβ− kκk)− nρ
nρ+ 1
(19)
uˆ′L =
(ρ+ 1)(k + mβ− kκk)
nρ+ 1
(20)
uˆ′M =
(ρ+ 1)(k + mβ− kκk)− nρβ
nρ+ 1
(21)
We now especially look at eq. (19) and consider the extreme case when there
is only a single pioneering country, i.e. k = 1. The innovation is profitable for
this country if its R&D-costs are below a certain threshold level, i.e.
κ1 < 1+ mβ− nρ
ρ+ 1
(22)
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Now let either m = 0 or β = 0 so that there are no technological spillovers.
Then, even if the innovation is completely costless, the potentially pioneering
country has no incentive to increase its public good productivity if 1− nρρ+1 <
0 or, equivalently, n > ρ+1ρ , which is always the case if the total number
of countries is sufficiently large. A single country then would even have an
incentive to choose a technology with higher abatement costs, which is the
paradoxical effect described by Buchholz and Konrad (1994). Such a strategy
would induce higher contributions of the other countries such that free-riding
could take place on behalf of the single country that can choose the technology
parameter endogenously. But if in contrast there is a technological spillover
the innovation will be profitable for the country if the technological spillover
extends to sufficiently many countries, i.e. if
m >
(n− 1)ρ− 1
(ρ+ 1)β
(23)
Some values for m which satisfy condition (23) exist if the right hand side
of this inequality is smaller than n− 1, i.e. if the spillover is sufficiently strong
such that
β >
¯
β :=
1
n− 1 (
nρ
ρ+ 1
− 1) (24)
holds. In the case of a perfect spillover (β = 1) condition (24) is always ful-
filled. The example thus clearly illustrates how a single country’s incentive to
innovate depends on the number of followers and the strength of the spillover
effect. For a further specification consider the case where n = 10 and ρ = 1.
Then without a spillover a costless marginal increase of public good produc-
tivity does not pay for a single country. But if there is a spillover with β = 1,
which benefits at least five other countries, condition (24) implies that the
innovation becomes worthwhile for the country which undertakes it. More-
over, the lower threshold for the productivity parameter which follows from
condition (24) is
¯
β = 49 .
2.8 conclusion
In this chapter we have shown how the provision of a global public good such
as climate protection may be improved through unilateral action of a group
of countries which collectively carry out a green technological innovation that
lowers the costs of providing the global public good, i.e. the costs of green-
house gas abatement. The success of such a specific form of leading behavior
is not only more likely if the cooperating coalition is large but also if there is a
steep rise of public good productivity in as many other countries as possible,
i.e. if the technological spillover effect is strong both at the intensive and at
the extensive margin. Consequently, the basic message of this chapter is that it
is not only favorable for the climate but also for the coalition if these follower
countries get free access to the improved technology and thus receive some
indirect donation from the coalition.
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In other words, it especially pays off for the group of pioneers to trans-
form the club good of technological innovations which could be protected for
example by intellectual property laws into a public good. However, the recip-
ient countries benefit less from the innovation than the complete outsiders
that stick to the old high-cost technology. This creates an incentive problem
for technology adoption so that it may become necessary to complement the
unilateral R&D-policy by additional mechanisms to ensure a far-reaching dif-
fusion of newly developed green technologies.
A discussion of appropriate strategies lies outside the scope of this theoret-
ical chapter. An example for pioneering efforts in this regard is considered in
Chapter 4.
3
L E A D E R S H I P A N D T H E S T R AT E G I C C H O I C E O F
T E C H N O L O G Y 7
3.1 introduction
This chapter adds a further argument to support the belief that leadership
can have a positive effect both on the level of public good supply and on
the utilities of the countries involved. The mechanism, which underlies these
positive effects of leadership, completely works within the standard frame-
work of public good theory (see Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian 1986 and
Cornes and Sandler 1996). In particular, it does without assuming specific
preferences or asymmetric information but sticks in a scenario without uncer-
tainty and asymmetric information to the conventional modest assumption of
purely strategic leadership, i.e. that ”governments are ... the narrow payoff-
maximizers postulated in models as those of Hoel (1991) and Varian (1994)”
(Schwerhoff 2016, p. 200). At the same time, the analysis takes an empirically
relevant element of leadership behavior in climate policy into account, i.e.
climate friendly technological progress through which greenhouse gas miti-
gation is made less expensive. Against this background, the main point of
our analysis is that, by acting as the leader in the Stackelberg game, a country
has a higher incentive to utilize a cost-saving ”green” technology than in the
Nash game, in which strategic considerations may prevent countries from ap-
plying an improved contribution technology (see Buchholz and Konrad 1994
and Ihori 1996). The positive effect on public good supply that is caused by
the improved technology then may be so strong that it overcompensates the
negative crowding-out effect that occurs in the usual leader-follower scenario,
which even leads to a Pareto improvement.
The structure of the chapter will be as follows: In Section 2 we describe an
otherwise standard two-stage model of voluntary public good provision with
two countries L and F in which at stage 1 one of the two countries, country
L has the possibility to switch to a new contribution technology, which im-
proves its productivity in public good provision. At stage 2 voluntary public
good provision then takes place either in a Nash game or a Stackelberg game.
Section 3 first of all provides a condition implying that country L does not
want to take the opportunity of technological improvement in the Nash game
but adheres to the original less productive contribution technology. If country
L instead is the leader in a Stackelberg game of public good provision it al-
ways has an incentive to apply a productivity-enhancing technology. Section
3 concludes with a description of the subgame-perfect equilibria in the Nash
and in the Stackelberg case. In Section 4, we then provide a general condition,
which ensures that public good supply in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of
the Stackelberg game with the new improved technology in country exceeds
7 This chapter is a slightly modified version of Buchholz and Eichenseer (2019).
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public good supply in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the Nash game
with the old less productive technology. In that case, leadership also makes
both countries better off so that the sequential game structure is preferred by
both countries over the simultaneous one. In Section 5 our general results are
illustrated through a Cobb-Douglas example. Section 6 concludes by giving
some brief hints at empirical applications of our theoretical results.
3.2 the framework
We assume that there are two countries L and F, which have the same utility
function u(xi, G), where xi is private consumption of country i = L, F and
G is public good supply. This utility function has the standard properties,
i.e. it is twice continuously differentiable and strictly monotone increasing
in both variables and quasi-concave. The first partial derivatives of u(xi, G)
w.r.t. xi and G are denoted by u1 and u2, respectively. Moreover, it is assumed
that both the private and the public good are non-inferior. This implies that
the (income) expansion paths e(G, ρ), which connect all points in the xi − G-
diagram where the marginal rate of substitution mrs between the private and
the public good is equal to some given ρ > 0 are well-defined and strictly
monotone increasing in G.
The public good is produced by a summation technology, i.e. G = gL + gF,
where gL and gF are country L’s and country F’s public good contributions.
The contribution productivities of both countries, which are their marginal
rates of transformation mrt between private consumption and the public good,
are assumed to be constant and equal to a0 = 1 in the initial state. But while
country F’s contribution productivity will stay at a0 = 1, country L may -
through a binary choice at a stage before the public good provision game
starts - turn over to a technology with a higher productivity parameter a > 1.
The costs of public good provision then fall to 1a for country L, which in the
context of climate change means the transition to an improved greenhouse
gas abatement technology with lower abatement costs. For the sake of sim-
plification we assume that this technological improvement does not require
any investment costs. Empirical studies (see, e.g., Stern, Pezzey, and Lam-
bie 2012) have shown that considerable differences between abatement costs
exist across countries: In countries like China with high carbon emission in-
tensity and still unexhausted abatement options, costs of available abatement
technologies are lower than in the old industrialized countries. Moreover, in
the long run countries will encounter very different possibilities for applying
more cost-efficient abatement technologies. For example, extreme variations
in solar radiation and wind forces as well as in the availability of space for
building renewable plants make the deployment of renewable energy more
or less rewarding in different countries.8
If the initial endowment (”income”) of country L is denoted by wL and that
of country F by wF, an allocation (x1, x2, G) is feasible for some given a ≥ 1
(and no resources are wasted) if and only if azL + zF = G, where zi = wi −
8 A description of various types of abatement costs and their regional differences is provided by
the IPCC (2015, p. 457).
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xi ≥ 0 denotes that part of income country i = L, F spends on public good
provision. This feasibility constraint is obviously equivalent to axL + xF + G
= awL + wF, which includes the original case where both countries have the
contribution productivity a = a0 = 1.
In an interior Nash equilibrium NE, where both countries make strictly
positive contributions to the public good, the mrs of both countries must co-
incide with their respective mrt, which implies that, given some contribution
productivity a ≥ 1 of country L, country L’s position lies on the expansion
path e(G, a) and that of country F on the expansion path e(G, 1). Combining
this with the feasibility constraint gives the following condition for public
good supply GN(a) in an interior NE for any a ≥ 1:
ae(GN(a), a) + e(GN(a), 1) + GN(a) = awL + wF. (1)
Existence and uniqueness of the NE follow from normality of the public
good and, given equal preferences of both countries, interiority of the NE is
ensured when incomes of the both countries do not diverge too much (see,
e.g., Cornes and Hartley 2007).
Private consumption of country L in the interior NE for some given contri-
bution productivity a ≥ 1 is xNL (a) = e(GN(a), a) < wL and that of country
F is xNF (a) = e(G
N(a), 1) < wF. Country L’s public good expenditures then
are zNL (a) = wL − xNL (a), which yields L’s public good contribution gNL (a) =
azNL (a). For country F we have g
N
F (a) = z
N
F (a) = wF − xNF (a). The utility lev-
els of both countries in the NE are denoted by uNL (a) = u(x
N
L (a), G
N(a)) and
uNF (a) = u(x
N
F (a), G
N(a)), respectively. Upper bounds for public good supply
in an interior NE are given by G¯L(a), which is defined by e(G¯L(a), a) = wL,
and G¯F(1), which is defined by e(G¯F(1), 1) = wF.9
In the same situation the Stackelberg equilibrium SE for some given con-
tribution productivity a ≥ 1 results from maximizing utility of the leading
country L, i.e. maxzL u(wL − zL, azL + zRF(azL)) where zRF(azL) = zRF(gL) de-
notes country F’s reaction function as given by maxzF u(wF − zF, gL + zF). If
zRF(gL) > 0 country F consequently is in a position where its marginal rate
of substitution between the private and the public good is a0 = 1. Concerning
the slope z′RF(gL) = ∂zRF∂gL of country F’s reaction path, the normality assump-
tion yields 0 ≥ z′RF(gL) > −1, i.e. an additional public good contribution by
country L is partially crowded out by country F (see, e.g., Cornes and Sandler
1996, p. 152).
The optimal level zSL(a) of country L’s public good expenditures in an inte-
rior SE, then is characterized by the f.o.c.
mrs(wL− zSL(a), GS(a)) =
u1(wL − zSL(a), GS(a))
u2(wL − zSL(a), GS(a))
= a(1+ z′RF(azSL(a))), (2)
where GS(a) = azSL(a) + zRF(az
S
L(a)) is total public good supply in the
SE. Private consumption of country L in the SE for some given a is de-
noted by xSL(a) = wL − zSL(a). Private consumption of country F is xSF(a),
9 See, e.g., Andreoni (1988). These threshold levels coincide with the ”dropout levels” for volun-
tary public good contributions as described in Cornes and Hartley (2007).
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which equals e(GS(a), 1) in the interior case. Utility levels in the SE then are
uSL(a) = u(x
S
L(a), G
S(a)) and uSF(a) = u(x
S
F(a), G
S(a)). In Figure 3.1 we depict
the entire possibility curve
GP(zL, a) = azL + zRF(azL) (3)
along which country L as the Stackelberg leader moves, when it varies
its public good expenditure zL ≥ 0. In order to simplify the exposition, we
assume that this possibility curve is concave. If zL = 0, country L’s position
is Q = (wL, GAF ) when G
A
F is country F’s standalone solution resulting from
maxGu(wF − G, G). If 0 < zL < z¯L(a) := G¯F(1)a country L is in the interior
part of its possibility curve where country F makes a positive public good
contribution zRF(azL). If, however, zL ≥ z¯L(a) country F stops contributing to
the public good and country L is in its standalone position, i.e. zRF(azL) = 0
thus GP(zL, a) = azL holds (see Buchholz, Konrad, and Lommerud 1997). In
Figure 3.1 the two segments of GP(zL, a) meet at the point P(a) = (wL −
G¯F(1)
a , G¯F(1)).
Figure 3.1: The leading country L’s possibility curve
In Figure 3.1 country L’s position SL(a) in an interior SE is obtained as the
point of tangency between the interior part of GP(zL, a) and an indifference
curve of country L. For high levels of a the point of tangency will instead lie
on the linear segment of GP(zL, a), where the SE is country L’s standalone so-
lution with public good supply GAL (a). This outcome arises if the contribution
productivity a is large enough so that the budget line given by G = a(wL− xL)
cuts the indifference curve through point R = (wL, G¯F(1)). However, for a
equal or close to one it may happen that the leader’s mrt = a(1+ z′RF(0)) at
zL = 0 is so small that it lies below mrs(wL, GAF ). In this case the SE is country
F’s standalone solution.
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It is also possible to depict in Figure 3.1 country L’s position NL(a) =
(xNL (a), G
N(a)) in the NE for some given a. We obtain NL(a) as the point
of intersection between the expansion path e(G, a) and the possibility curve
GP(zL, a) when the NE is interior (and country F is in a position where its mrs
is equal to one) or L’s standalone solution. As z′RF(azL) < 0 and thus
∂GP
∂zL
(zL, a) = a(1+ z′RF(azL)) < a (4)
holds in the interiority zone of GP(zL, a), the indifference curve at NL(a),
whose slope is −a, is steeper than the possibility curve at NL(a). Given the
same contribution productivity a, public good supply in the SE hence is lower
than in the NE, i.e. GS(a) < GN(a) (see also Cornes and Sandler 1996, p. 331).
3.3 incentives for technological improvements in the nash
and in the stackelberg game
In the Nash case, we first of all examine whether at the original NE (with
identical contribution productivities a0 = 1 and identical consumption lev-
els xN(1) = xNL (1) = x
N
F (1) = e(G
N(1), 1) in both countries) country L will
benefit or not by marginally increasing its contribution productivity. Differ-
entiating country L’s utility u(wL − zNL (a), GN(a)) w.r.t. to a and observing
u1(xN(1), GN(1)) = u2(xN(1), GN(1)) in the original NE for a = 1 (which
follows from the NE equilibrium condition mrs = u1(x
N(1),GN(1))
u2(xN(1),GN(1))
= 1 = mrt)
immediately shows that country L loses if and only if
∂zNL
∂a
>
∂GN
∂a
(5)
holds at a0 = 1. To specify criterion (5) further let eˆ1 and eˆ2 denote the par-
tial derivatives of the expansion path e(G, ρ) w.r.t. G and ρ at the countries’
original position (xN(1), GN(1)), respectively. Normality implies eˆ1 > 0 and
eˆ2 < 0. Differentiating zNL (a) = wL − xNL (a) = wL − e(GN(a), a)) w.r.t. a at
a0 = 1 gives
∂zNL
∂a
= −(eˆ1 ∂G
N
∂a
+ eˆ2) (6)
while differentiating condition (1) w.r.t. a also at a0 = 1 yields
∂GN
∂a
=
zNL (1)− eˆ2
1+ 2eˆ1
> 0. (7)
Based on this we obtain the following result, which provides some extension
of Buchholz and Konrad (1994), Ihori (1996) and Hattori (2005).
Proposition 1. If
wL < xN(1)− eˆ1eˆ21+ eˆ1 (8)
there exists a critical level a¯ > 1 for the contribution productivity at which uNL (a¯) =
uNL (1) holds. For a ∈ [1, a¯], country L will not benefit from choosing the contribution
productivity a and moving to the corresponding new NE.
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Proof. The existence of a threshold a¯ with the required properties follows as-
sumption (8) by combining (5), (6) and (7) and then applying the intermediate
value theorem. This is possible since the leader’s utility uNL (a) is a continuous
function of a, whose value definitely exceeds uNL (1) if a is so large that in Fig-
ure 3.1 the point P(a) lies right to country L’s position NL(1) in the original
NE, so that NL(a) is located on a higher indifference curve than NL(1).
If condition (8) is not fulfilled we set a¯ = 1, which indicates that country
L would increase its utility in the Nash game by choosing a contribution
productivity a > 1. To avoid the tedious treatment of special cases we assume
that country L’s utility uNL (a) in a NE is hump-shaped if a¯ > 1 and increasing
if a¯ = 1. Then threshold a¯ is uniquely determined.
Proposition 1 in particular shows that a negative incentive for technological
progress becomes more likely if income of country L is relatively small. This
is intuitively plausible since in this case country L’s expenditure for the public
good in the original NE is relatively small so that it cannot benefit much from
falling costs of its original contribution while it suffers from its increased
willingness to contribute to the public good as induced by the technological
improvement.
As (because of eˆ1 > 0 and eˆ2 < 0) we have xN(1)− eˆ1 eˆ21+eˆ1 > xN(1), it is −
irrespective of the underlying preferences in both countries − always possible
to meet condition (8) through a redistribution of income from country L to
country F that brings country L’s income close enough to xN(1). Such a trans-
fer will not change public good supply and private consumption in the NE
as long as wL > xN(1) and wF > xN(1) holds. This reflects Warr’s neutrality
result (see, e.g., Cornes and Sandler 1996, pp. 164-165) but also is an imme-
diate consequence of the characterization of the NE as provided by condition
(1). Moreover, it can be shown that an income redistribution from country L
to country F increases the level of the threshold a¯.
Concerning the leading country L’s incentives for a technological improve-
ment in the Stackelberg case, we observe that an increase of the contribution
productivity (from an initial a to some a˜ > a) leads to an outward shift of L’s
possibility curve (see Figure 3.2).
For the linear segment of GP(zL, a) this is obvious. For its interior part it is
shown by taking the derivative of GP(zL, a) w.r.t. a, which gives
∂GP
∂a
(zL, a) = zL(1+ z′RF(azL)) > 0 (9)
for any given zL, where the inequality holds since z′RF(gL) > −1. The point
P(a) where both segments meet is parallelly shifted when the contribution
productivity increases since z¯L(a) =
G¯F(1)
a is decreasing in a. This change of
the possibility curve directly provides a generalization of a result that Hattori
and Yamada (2018) have obtained for the Cobb-Douglas case.
Proposition 2. If country L is the leader in the Stackelberg game it will never lose
when it chooses a higher contribution productivity. It becomes better off when it ac-
tively contributes to the public good after the technological change.
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Figure 3.2: The change of the Stackelberg leader’s possibility curve
The simple intuition behind Proposition 2 is that country L as a Stackelberg
leader can get the same own public good contribution (and thus the same reac-
tion by country F and, consequently, the same total public good supply) with
lower public good expenses after an increase of its contribution productivity
(see Hattori and Yamada 2018). Note that country L does not benefit from the
outward shift of its possibility curve only if the SE remains the standalone
allocation of country F.
Based on Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 we can now describe the subgame-
perfect equilibria of the entire two-stage game, where a∗N and a
∗
S denote coun-
try L’s technology choices in the subgame-perfect equilibrium in the Nash
and in the Stackelberg scenario, respectively.
Proposition 3. Assume that at stage 1 country L has the binary choice between the
original contribution productivity a0 = 1 and some higher a > 1. If there is a Nash
contribution game at the second stage, the subgame-perfect contribution productivity
is a∗N = 1 if a ≤ a¯ and a∗N = a if a > a¯. In the Stackelberg case the subgame-perfect
contribution productivity always is a∗S = a.
10
In the following section, we compare the levels of public good supply in
the subgame-perfect equilibria in the Nash case and in the Stackelberg case,
i.e. GN(a∗N) with G
S(a∗S).
10 As a special case of Proposition 3 we have for any if condition (8) is not fulfilled and thus
holds.
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3.4 increasing public good supply through leadership : a gen-
eral condition
As a first step, we infer the effect which results when, starting from an interior
SE, country L’s contribution productivity rises from any a ≥ 1 to some a˜ > a.
For a moment, we assume that country L adapts to that productivity increase
by reducing its expenditure for the public good to z˜L =
gSL(a)
a˜ . This keeps
L’s public good contribution and thus the reaction of country F constant so
that total public good supply GS(a) also does not change. In Figure 3.3 the
position of country L then moves parallely to the right.
On the one hand, normality implies that in country L’s new position S˜L
the mrs between the private and the public good is lower than in the original
position SL(a), i.e. that the indifference becomes flatter. On the other hand it
follows from (4) that
∂GP
∂zL
(z˜L, a˜) = a˜(1+ z′RF(gSL(a))) > a(1+ z
′
RF(gSL(a))) =
∂GP
∂zL
(zSL(a), a), (10)
so that in S˜L the possibility curve GP(zL, a˜) is steeper than the original possi-
bility curve GP(zL, a) in SL(a). Therefore, all points on the concave possibility
curve GP(zL, a˜) right to S˜L lie below the indifference curve passing through
S˜L, which implies that country L must move to the left in order attain a higher
utility than in S˜L. Consequently, we have the following result (which is com-
pletely obvious when the SE is country L’s standalone solution):
Proposition 4. An increase of the leading country L’s contribution productivity
yields a higher public good supply in the SE when the SE for a either is interior or
the standalone solution of country L.
As a second step we show that the original NE, where both countries have
the same contribution productivity a0 = 1, can be partially mimicked as an SE
for an appropriately chosen productivity parameter aˆ of country L. As in the
demonstration of Proposition 4 we adjust, for any a > 1, country L’s public
good expenditure to
_
zL(a) =
gNL (1)
a
=
1
a
(wL − xN(1)) (11)
so that country L’s private consumption becomes
_
xL(a) = wL − _zL(a),
which is increasing in a, while public good supply remains constant at GN(1).
The desired productivity parameter aˆ then is determined by the following
condition, which ensures that the f.o.c. (2), which characterizes an interior SE,
is fulfilled for country L’s public good expenses
_
zL(aˆ) and public good supply
GN(1), i.e. zSL(aˆ) =
_
zL(aˆ) and GS(aˆ) = GN(1):
mrs(wL − _zL(aˆ), GN(1)) = aˆ(1+ z′RF(aˆ_z(aˆ))) = aˆ(1+ z′RF(gNL (1))) (12)
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Figure 3.3: The change of the Stackelberg equilibrium through an increase of the con-
tribution productivity
It remains to be shown that a contribution productivity aˆ which satisfies
condition (12) actually exists: Starting at a = 1 we have
mrs(
_
xL(1), GN(1)) = mrs(xN(1), GN(1)) = 1 > 1+ z′RF(gNL (1)) (13)
as z′RF(gNL (1)) < 0. Hence, at a = 1 the left-hand side of (12) exceeds the
right-hand side of (12). Since, moreover, z′RF(gNL (1)) > −1 the linear function
a(1 + z′RF(gNL (1)) is increasing in a with lima→∞ a(1 + z
′
RF(gNL (1))) = ∞. But
at the same time normality implies that mrs(
_
xL(a), GN(1)) is a decreasing
function of
_
xL(a) and thus of a, which converges to mrs(wL, GN(1)) < ∞
if a goes to infinity. Hence, in (12) the right-hand side will exceed the left-
hand side if the productivity parameter gets large enough. Therefore, the
intermediate value theorem provides the existence of a unique productivity
parameter aˆ with equality of both sides in (12). Based on this we get the
following result:
Proposition 5. Assume that the original NE, where both countries have the same
contribution productivity a0 = 1, is interior. If the threshold aˆ is defined as above
then GS(a) > GN(1) holds for all a > aˆ. Moreover, min
{
uSL(a), u
S
F(a)
}
> uN(1),
i.e. the SE for any a > aˆ is Pareto superior to the NE for a0 = 1.
Proof. The result on the change of public good supply is a direct consequence
of Proposition 4 since GS(aˆ) = GN(1) if an interior SE results for aˆ. Con-
cerning the change of utilities, first note that in the SE for aˆ utility of coun-
try L is higher than in the original NE as it attains the same public good
supply GN(1) with a lower expenditure for the public good and thus with
a higher level of private consumption. Utility of country F, however, is the
3.4 increasing public good supply through leadership 49
same as in the original NE if a = aˆ. For any a > aˆ country L then will im-
prove further in the SE because as a Stackelberg leader it could have GN(1)
with an even lower expenditure for the public good than in the SE for aˆ.
But also country F becomes better off: As Proposition 4 implies that GS(a)
> GS(aˆ) = GN(1) country F in an interior SE is moving outwards on the
expansion path e(G, 1) and increases its utility when L’s contribution produc-
tivity rises from aˆ to some a > aˆ. When, however, for a > aˆ large enough
the SE is country L’s standalone allocation with public good supply GAL (a),
we observe that GAL (a) > G¯F(1) > G
N(1). Hence, as xN(1) < wF we get
u(wF, GAL (a)) > u(x
N
F (1), G
N(1)), i.e. also in such a corner SE country F’s
utility will exceed its utility in the original NE.
Comparing Proposition 1 and Proposition 5 indicates that, on the one hand,
a negative incentive for a technological improvement in the Nash game results
for a low level of the contribution productivity a while, on the other hand, a
higher public good supply in the SE than in the original NE is implied by a
high level of a. Both requirements can only be satisfied simultaneously if the
regions of a, that are defined by Proposition 1 and Proposition 5, respectively,
overlap, i.e. if the alternative contribution productivity a > 1 is small enough
to prevent the choice of a by country L in the Nash case but at the same time
a is large enough to yield a higher public good supply in the SE for a than
in the original NE for a0 = 1. The possibility for such a double advantage
of leadership is described by the following Proposition, which is the central
result of this chapter.
Proposition 6. Assume that the original NE with productivity a0 = 1 in both
countries is interior and that at stage 1 country L has the choice between the original
contribution productivity a0 = 1 and some higher contribution productivity a > 1.
If aˆ < a¯ and a ∈ (aˆ, a¯) then in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the Stackelberg
case both public good supply and the utilities of the two countries are strictly larger
than in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the Nash case.
Proof. Proposition 3 implies a∗N = 1 as a < a¯. Since a
∗
S = a > aˆ Proposition 5
then yields GS(a∗S) = G
S(a) > GN(1) = GN(a∗N) as well as the assertion on
Pareto superiority of the SE for a over the NE for a0 = 1.
In Proposition 6 as in the whole analysis until now, it has been assumed
that only the leading country L has the option to apply a more productive
contribution technology. If this assumption is abandoned and also country F
is able to switch to some contribution productivity b > 1, the outcome may
change considerably depending on the size of b. Consider the most impor-
tant situation where aˆ < a¯ and a ∈ (aˆ, a¯). Then it follows from a continuity
argument that the results of Proposition 6 (ii) and (iii) still hold given that
country F’s alternative contribution productivity b stays close to one, since in
this case the relevant equilibria do not differ too much from those for b = 1.
For higher levels of b, however, public good supply in the subgame-perfect
equilibrium of the Nash case may become higher than in the subgame-perfect
equilibrium of the Stackelberg case due to country F’s application of the im-
proved abatement technology. Finally, if b is large enough so that country F
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definitely chooses the improved technology, both the NE and the SE at the sec-
ond stage of the game are the standalone solution of country F so that public
good supply becomes the same in both subgame-perfect equilibria. The differ-
ent outcomes that may result when also the follower can choose an improved
technology will be illustrated in the next section by a numerical example. If,
in still another setting, there are (as in Stranlund 1996 and Buchholz, Dippl,
and Eichenseer 2015) automatic technological spillovers from the innovating
country L to the other country F better incentives for technological improve-
ment result for country L in the Nash scenario, which makes a¯ = 1 more
and thus aˆ < a¯ less likely. Since technological diffusion usually needs some
time, this effect will be stronger over a longer time horizon. Notwithstanding
that, meteorological conditions will permanently limit the use of renewables
as efficient greenhouse gas abatement technologies, which can make the con-
tribution productivities a and b different also in the long run.
Based on Proposition 6 we can, in addition, also consider a scenario with
endogenous timing 11 where - at a stage 0 before the two-stage game underly-
ing our analysis starts - the two countries have to decide whether they want to
act as leader or as follower. If we assume (as in Hamilton and Slutsky 1990, or
Hattori and Kitamura 2013) that the Nash game results when both countries
simultaneously either choose to be leader or follower then, in the case aˆ < a¯,
the distribution of roles with country L as the leader and country F as the
follower becomes a subgame-perfect equilibrium of this three-stage game: Ac-
cording to Proposition 6 each country (as well as the other one) would become
worse off in the ensuing Nash equilibrium when it deviates and changes its
role. The endogenous timing model thus may also be useful to explain why
the possibility for a technological improvement in one country can make it
the leader in the contribution game.
It is, however, not obvious from the beginning that the condition aˆ < a¯,
which implies advantageous leadership both w.r.t the level of public good
supply and the utility of both countries, can really be satisfied. Therefore we
have to provide an example, in which aˆ < a¯ actually holds. This will be done
in the next section by assuming Cobb-Douglas preferences.
3.5 a cobb-douglas example
Let both countries have the same symmetric Cobb-Douglas utility function
u(xi, G) = xiG for i = L, F. The marginal rate of substitution at (xi, G) is
mrs(xi, G) = Gxi so that the expansion paths for some given marginal rate of
substitution is e(G, ρ) = Gρ . For the partial derivatives we thus have e1(G, ρ) =
1
ρ and e2(G, ρ) = − Gρ2 . For a given contribution productivity a of country
L it follows from condition (1) that the levels of the public good, private
consumption and the utilities of both countries that result in an interior NE
are given by Table 3.1 where the abbreviation W(a) := awL + wF is used.
11 In models in which two countries strategically choose their emission taxes Bárcena-Ruiz (2006)
and Hattori and Kitamura (2013) have addressed the endogenous timing issue in the context
of international environmental policy.
3.5 a cobb-douglas example 51
GN(a) xNL (a) x
N
F (a) u
N
L (a) u
N
F (a)
W(a)
3
W(a)
3a
W(a)
3
W(a)2
9a
W(a)2
9
Table 3.1: The interior NE
The interiority conditions xNL (a) < wL and x
N
F (a) < wF for the NE are
satisfied if
1
2
a < q < 2a, (14)
where q = wFwL . Given q > 1 the threshold level a¯(q) as defined by Proposi-
tion 1 then is calculated from uNL (a¯(q)) = u
N
L (1). By using the fourth column
of Table 3.1 we obtain
a¯(q) = q2. (15)
Concerning the Stackelberg game, maximizing country F’s utility (wF −
zF)(gL + zF) for a given gL yields country F’s reaction function zRF(gL) =
1
2 (wF − gL) in its interior zone. Hence, country L as a Stackelberg leader maxi-
mizes 12 (wL− zL)(wF + azL), which gives zSL(a) = awL−wF2a as country L’s public
good optimal expenses in an interior SE. A complete description of the inte-
rior SE is provided by Table 3.2.
GS(a) xSL(a) x
S
F(a) u
S
L(a) u
S
F(a)
W(a)
4
W(a)
2a
W(a)
4
W(a)2
8a
W(a)2
16
Table 3.2: The interior SE
An interior solution with zSL(a) > 0 is obtained if and only if q < a. The
threshold level aˆ = aˆ(q) as defined by Proposition 5 is obtained by applying
conditions (11) and (12), i.e. by solving the equation mrs(
_
xL(aˆ(q)), GN(1)) =
aˆ(q)GN(1)
(aˆ(q)−1)wL+xNL (1))
= aˆ(q) · 12 = aˆ(q)(1+ z′RF) for aˆ(q).
By inserting the values of Table 3.2 gives
aˆ(q) =
1
3
(4+ q). (16)
Comparing (15) and (16) gives that a¯(q) > aˆ(q) if 3q2 − q − 4 > 0. Deter-
mining the zeros of this quadratic function yields
a¯(q) > aˆ(q)⇔ q > 4
3
. (17)
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In summary, it follows from condition (14), (15), (16) and (17) that any com-
bination (q, a)
q ∈
(
4
3
, 2
)
and a ∈
(
1
3
(4+ q), q2
)
(18)
leads to a higher public good supply and higher utility levels in the subgame-
perfect SE than in the subgame perfect NE. In this context note that the upper
bound condition (17) is stronger than (14) if q < 2. The ”advantageous lead-
ership range”, i.e. the set of (q, a)-combinations, which satisfies the condition
(18), is visualized in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4: The advantageous leadership range
A specific numerical example for advantageous leadership, e.g., is provided
by wL = 2 and wF = 3, i.e. q = 32 , and a = 2 . By using the formulas calculated
above, uNL (2) =
49
18 = 2.72 < 2.78 = u
N
L (1) results. This confirms that country
L does not want to adopt the improved technology in the Nash case. In the
Stackelberg case, where country L chooses the better technology, total public
good supply is GS(2) = 74 = 1, 75 > 1, 67 = G
N(1) and utilities of both
countries are uSL(2) = u
S
F(2) =
49
16 = 3, 06 > 2, 78 = u
N
L (1) = u
N
F (1). This
confirms that a Pareto improvement over the initial NE is attained.
Now we look at the same example, but now we assume that also country
F has the opportunity to switch to a higher contribution productivity b > 1.
Then a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the Nash case always is (a∗N , b
∗
N) =
(1, b) while in the Stackelberg case it is (a∗S, b
∗
S) = (2, 1) if b ∈ [1, 1.36] and
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(a∗S, b
∗
S) = (2, b) if b > 1.36 =
49
36 . Concerning public good supply in the
two subgame-perfect equilibria we have (with adapted notation) GN(1, b) =
2+3b
3 <
7
4 = 1.75 = G
S(2, 1) if b ∈ (1, 1312 ) = (1, 1.08), i.e. the essentially same
result as in Proposition 6 (ii) holds in this case in which b is relatively small.
If, however, b ∈ (1.08, 1.36) the ranking of public good supply is reversed, i.e.
GN(1, b) > GS(2, 1) holds so that the advantage of leadership by country L
w.r.t. the level of public good supply vanishes. (Note that for b < 43 = 1.33
the NE is interior with public good supply GN(1, b) = 2+3b3 while for b ∈
[1.33, 1.36] it is the standalone solution of country F, i.e. GN(1, b) = GAF (b) =
b wF2 = b
3
2 .) For b > 1.36 country F applies the improved technology with the
contribution productivity b in the Nash as well as in the Stackelberg case and
the corresponding standalone solution for country F results in both scenarios.
As the incentive for country F’s technology choice in the Stackelberg case are
changing at b = 4936 = 1.36 public good jumps there from 1.75 to G
A
F
( 49
36
)
=
49
36 · 32 = 2.04.
3.6 conclusion
In public good theory, it appears to be a common belief that leadership will
aggravate the underprovision problem, which is a typical feature of non-
cooperative public good provision and which also is of empirical relevance
with regard to global climate policy. Without leaving the standard framework
of public good theory, this assertion, however, needs no longer be true if the
leading country can choose the technology, by which it generates its public
good contribution and, more specifically, by which it carries out abatement
measures. Rather, leadership may remove the obstacle, which could prevent
the application of a cost-saving abatement technology in the Nash game, and
by application of this improved contribution technology, public good supply
may become larger and utility of both countries may increase in the leader-
follower game so that a double advantage of leadership arises (see Proposition
6). Moreover, this effect becomes more likely if the poorer country acts as a
leader since the incentives to adopt the improved technology in the Nash case
are particularly weak in this case (see Proposition 1 and the Cobb-Douglas ex-
ample). The possible Pareto improvement through leadership in the presence
of a technological improvement may also provide an explanation as to why a
country may become a leader in the contribution game at all (see the consid-
erations following Proposition 6).
In real-world global climate policy China seems to have adopted a lead-
ership position in the process following the Paris Agreement. Statements by
high-ranking Chinese representatives are indicative of such a change of at-
titude.12 Concerning China’s leadership, a central role is attributed to the
development and application of cost-saving abatement technologies. China’s
”leadership had identified low-carbon technologies as the technologies of the
12 So the general secretary of China’s Communist Party, Xi Jiniping, has declared at the 19th
National Party Congress in October 2017 that China has ”taken a driving seat in interna-
tional cooperation to respond climate change”. For a critical assessment of the recent trends in
China’s clean-air policy see The Economist.
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future ...” (Hilton 2016). In particular, China is intensifying the development
and application of low-carbon technologies as wind and solar power and
e-mobility. This chapter has shown by the central Proposition 6 that in the
strategic context of global climate policy such leadership - by triggering en-
vironmentally friendly technological progress - may not only lead to more
overall climate protection but can also be in the interest of all countries in-
volved. Against the background of our results it does not come as a surprise
that these positive effects of leadership occur when it is a - compared to the
OECD countries - still relatively poor country that acts as the leader.
Part II
A N E M P I R I C A L E X A M P L E
I N T R O D U C T O RY R E M A R K S T O PA RT I I 1 3
Part II considers an empirical example of leadership in climate policy. At the
Global Climate Action Summit at San Francisco in September 2018, Nobel lau-
reate and climate activist Al Gore emphasized that humankind has the tools it
needs to solve the climate crisis. In particular he referred to the ”relief that is
literally heaven sent” from sun and wind with the cheapness of these sources
of electricity not only making them competitive but even more favorable than
conventional technologies in many parts of the world.
Even though the largest part of renewable energy is literally falling from
the sky, this does not apply to the technology development that is requisite to
make use of it. In fact, developing the technological innovations that make it
possible to use renewable energies at a competitive level requires much effort.
Leadership by countries does not only materialize in achieving mitigation
efforts but also in promoting green technological progress. This has already
happened in the past with tremendous consequences: In the case of photo-
voltaics an unprecedented cost reduction of 99.4% between 1976 and 2014 has
been the result of policy measures taken by a group of nations that alternated
in taking the leadership in capacity additions and research and development
(Trancik et al. 2015). These technological developments could indeed prove to
be a major game changer for global climate policy, as they offer the perspec-
tive of negative abatement costs in the near future.
In the same vein, the Paris Agreement (United Nations 2016) emphasized
that innovation is crucial for an effective global response to climate change,
which constitutes a strong mandate for technological development and trans-
fer (Minas 2016). In the Paris Agreement there is a close link between the
Climate Convention’s Technology Mechanism (TM) and “climate finance”, i.e.
the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the Global Environmental Facility (GEF).
In face of this relationship, financing technological progress in green tech-
nologies is part of an individual country’s contributions in the fight against
climate change. Traditionally (in the Kyoto world), individual countries’ pub-
lic good contributions only consisted of emission reductions. In the Paris
Agreement a broader approach is applied, by which Nationally Determined
Contributions (NDCs) are considered as indicators of the countries’ climate
policy efforts. In the NDCs of 137 parties the word “technology” (NDC Part-
nership 2018) appears, and a great deal of these submissions (especially from
developing countries) refer to their own efforts in the field of technology and,
moreover, express the desire for technological support as a prerequisite for
more ambitious mitigation efforts.
13 Part II (including these introductory remarks) is a slightly modified version of Buchholz, Dippl,
and Eichenseer (2019).
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Consequently, Chapter 4 considers an empirical example of leadership in
climate-friendly technological progress: Germany’s feed-in tariff for solar en-
ergy. By creating reliable demand it constitutes technological leadership. Based
on global learning curves, we argue that the enormous reduction of prices for
photovoltaic modules is due to such demand side interventions and related
international technology diffusion and policy transfer, especially to China. In
addition, we calculate the costs of incentivizing this technological progress
for the German case (through the EEG).
4
S U B S I D I Z I N G R E N E WA B L E S A S PA RT O F TA K I N G
L E A D E R S H I P I N I N T E R N AT I O N A L C L I M AT E P O L I C Y:
T H E G E R M A N C A S E 1 4
4.1 introduction
The aim of this chapter is to provide some quantitative assessment of a coun-
try’s indirect contribution to climate protection via the promotion of green
technologies. In particular, we show how subsidies such as Germany’s feed-in
tariff for solar energy have helped create a market for climate-friendly tech-
nology and thereby constitute a contribution and a manifestation of climate
leadership in a broader sense.15 Based on global learning curves, an enor-
mous reduction of prices for photovoltaic modules can to a large degree be
attributed to these demand side interventions such as Germany’s “Renewable
Energy Law” (“Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz” EEG) and the subsequent tech-
nology diffusion enabling other countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
more cheaply. Using the example of the German feed-in tariff for solar power,
we aim at calculating in monetary terms the scale of these contributions re-
lated to technological development of solar energy. Hence this chapter does
not discuss the fiercely disputed question whether the implementation and
subsidization of renewables through the German EEG has been efficient. In-
stead, it focuses on the costs associated with taking on a leadership role in
the deployment of renewable energies. Or, in other words, the chapter does
not deal with static but with dynamic efficiency of the subsidization of renew-
ables in Germany (Del Río 2012).
The remainder of this chapter will be organized as follows: In Section 2,
we describe the global learning process that has occurred in the field of pho-
tovoltaics making reference to the concept of “learning curves”. In Section
3, we consider the German EEG and the learning by doing associated with
it. In particular, we quantify the cost burden of the subsidization of solar en-
ergy through the EEG that has mainly been borne by the German electricity
consumers so far. Section 4 concludes by discussing possible consequences
that may result with regard to the assessment of climate policy if promotion
of green technology is explicitly considered as a component of a country’s
contribution to the fight against global warming.
14 This chapter is a slightly modified version of Buchholz, Dippl, and Eichenseer (2019).
15 How leadership in the development and application of green technologies is perceived by
energy policy experts as one of the targets of the German Energy Transition (“Energiewende”)
has been empirically investigated in a survey by Joas et al. (2016).
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4.2 learning curves and technological progress in photovoltaic
To show how market formation policies achieve technological progress we
need to understand how technological development generally comes about.
Two approaches can be distinguished: The first approach is referred to as
“learning by searching” or simply “R&D”. It is prevalent in an early stage
of technological development and is characterized by financing or subsidiz-
ing research activities through private firms and the government. The second
concept relates to the deployment of technology at a later stage paving the
way to commercial maturity. It is best known as ”learning by doing”. Techno-
logical progress achieved through learning by doing is commonly analyzed
by making use of so-called learning curves (first described by Wright (1936)).
Arrow (1962) highlights that technological progress is the result of an on-
going extensive learning process. His claim is that we can attribute learning
to experience. Traditional learning curves (see Yelle 1979 for a review) fo-
cus on the relationship between cumulative output and working hours (as a
proxy for production cost). The learning curves used to describe technological
progress in the photovoltaic sector generally relate the cumulative output to
module price/kWp where the module price is a proxy for production costs
(e.g. Neij 1997; Harmon 2000; Van der Zwaan and Rabl 2003; De La Tour,
Glachant, and Ménière 2013; Rubin et al. 2015).
Based on data from Mayer et al. (2015), EPIA (2014) and Solar Power Europe (2016). The dashed line
represents a linear trend.
Figure 4.1: Learning curve for PV modules
Learning Curves represent a ”fit of a power function to the measured points”
(Wene 2000). We can describe the curve by:
C(X) = C1X−b (1)
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where C(X) refers to the cost of producing the xth unit of output for a specific
cumulative output X (which explicitly includes the xth unit) (Wene 2000).
The constant C1 gives the costs associated with one unit of cumulative out-
put (X = 1) and the parameter b is dubbed the learning index. The learning
index helps determine the ”learning rate” which refers to the reduction in
costs (of producing one unit) when cumulative output is doubled (X2 = 2X1):
LR =
C(X1)− C(X2)
C(X1)
= 1− 2−b (2)
De La Tour, Glachant, and Ménière (2013) consider several studies on learn-
ing curves for photovoltaic modules in a meta-analysis and calculate an av-
erage learning rate of 20.9%. This means that for each doubling of cumula-
tive output, module costs (or prices) per kWp decrease by 20.9% . Rubin et
al. (2015) who calculate an average learning rate of 22% obtain similar results.
Despite the criticism by several authors (e.g. Nemet 2006; Jamasb and Köh-
ler 2008; Rubin et al. 2015) on (log-linear) learning curves, they remain the
standard instrument in assessing technological development and future pro-
spects of photovoltaic (in the following PV) technology. As a consequence
of this learning process solar power is getting more and more competitive
and will soon be the cheapest form of electricity in many parts of the world
(Mayer et al. 2015), especially in the developing countries, where solar radi-
ation is generally significantly higher than in Germany. Latest estimates by
Frauenhofer ISE (Burger et al. 2018) suggest an average learning rate of 24%
for the last 36 years for all commercially available PV technologies.16 Figure
4.1 depicts the relationship between cumulative capacity produced and mod-
ule prices (inflation adjusted with 2014 as base year) between 2000 and 2014.
Learning by doing for marketable goods and devices requires their wide
use and application, which often can only be achieved by pushing them in the
market or even by creating a market for them. In the case of solar power, this
has happened through market-formation policies of a pioneering group of in-
dustrialized countries (Trancik et al. 2015). Trade and the ensuing untargeted
diffusion of technology have led to a global learning effect17 in the course of
which there has also been a transfer of knowledge and technology which has
paved the way for the creation of production capacities around the world, es-
pecially in China. Chinese companies mainly procured production skills for
photovoltaic production by international trade in manufacturing equipment
and Chinese returnees (De La Tour, Glachant, and Ménière 2011).
So, with the help of technology transfer, process innovation, talent mobi-
lization and scaling strategies as well as interaction with the global innova-
tion system and global market formation policy (Zhang and Gallagher 2016),
China’s PV industry witnessed a formidable takeoff from 4% share of global
16 Likewise, one can use learning curves to predict technological development in inverters, an-
other key component of PV systems. Historical data indicates learning rates of about 18.9 %
(Mayer et al. 2015) in this case.
17 Similarly, inverters reflect global learning effects while there are local learning effects for ex-
ample in the installation of the system.
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cell production in 2004 to 71.4% in 2012 (Puttaswamy and Ali 2017). Dur-
ing the 2000s a large share of China’s production in PV cells and modules
was exported with only about 5% sold to domestic consumers (Liu and Gold-
stein 2013). Only in the aftermath of the global economic crisis of 2008, China
fostered its domestic demand for photovoltaic installations (Puttaswamy and
Ali 2017). By 2015, China surpassed Germany as the lead market for PV de-
ployment (IEA PVPS 2016). This clearly shows that market formation policies
have created incentives for the diffusion of PV (production) technologies, es-
pecially for China, which consequently again “greatly drove down the cost of
solar panels” (Gallagher 2013, p.33).
4.3 germany’s contribution through the eeg to global learn-
ing by doing
4.3.1 The EEG and Learning by Doing
Germany’s EEG as introduced in 2000 is a classic example of a market forma-
tion policy. It requires network operators to feed-in electricity from renewable
sources into the grid. This tariff is a 20-year, technology-specific, guaranteed
payment for a plant operator’s electricity generation. Feed-in tariffs decrease
in regular intervals (Figure 4.2) to exert cost pressure on energy generators
and technology manufacturers. The decrease (called ”degression”) applies to
new plants.
Based on data from Netztransparenz (2018b) and own calculations.
Figure 4.2: (Fixed)Feed-in tariffs in Germany by installation date
In its original version in 2000 the aim of the EEG was to facilitate a sustain-
able development of energy supply, particularly for the sake of protecting
our climate and the environment, while in the amendment of 2004, the social
democratic-ecological coalition government (1998-2005) emphasized the objec-
tive to ”promote the further development of technologies for the generation
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of electricity from renewable energy sources” in article 1 EEG (Bundesgeset-
zblatt I, 2004, p.1918). Thus, the EEG entails an emission reduction component
as well as a technology development component on which we will focus in
this chapter. In this context, we will restrict our analysis to energy generated
from PV because solar energy only accounts for 19.21% of predicted German
energy generation from regenerative sources covered by the EEG but makes
up for 34.06% of predicted EEG expenses in 2018 (Netztransparenz 2017). Fur-
thermore, in the public debate it is arguably the most controversial source of
energy supported by the EEG as Germany, being located between the 47th
and 55th parallel, is not exactly known for its long hours of sunshine.
After having described the main features of the EEG, we assess the impact
that Germany’s subsidization of PV and the related creating of a market has
had on technological progress through learning by doing and thus on cost
reduction in the PV sector.
To this end, we depict in Figure 4.3 both the total capacity of PV annual
new installations and Germany’s share of it, which is described by the yellow
bar. Obviously, the German share has been considerably high throughout the
whole period (22% share of all new installations between 2000 and 2014) and
especially between the years 2004 to 2007 (57%) as well as in 2009 and 2010
(48%).
Based on data from BMWi (2016), Solar Power Europe (2016), and EPIA (2014).
Figure 4.3: New installations
Figure 4.4 reflects this pattern by depicting the German share not of annual,
but of cumulative installed capacity (again in yellow). Since 2004, Germany
has taken the leading role with regard to cumulative installed capacity and
constituted the lead market for PV deployment. The relative share of Germany
in cumulative capacity reached a peak in 2009. By 2014 worldwide cumulative
capacity was about 140 times larger than in 2000, whereas cumulative capacity
in Germany had expanded by a factor of 336.
4.3 germany’s contribution through the eeg to global learning by doing 63
Based on data from BMWi (2016), Solar Power Europe (2016), and EPIA (2014).
Figure 4.4: Cumulative capacity
Own calculations based on data from BMWi (2016), Solar Power Europe (2016), and EPIA (2014).
Figure 4.5: German share of doublings
However, what really matters for learning by doing is the share in each
doubling, as this is what the average 24% cost reduction in module prices
(Burger et al. 2018) refers to. Figure 4.5 depicts the German share in doublings
of cumulative capacity since 2000. On average Germany has had a share of
about 35% in each doubling of cumulative capacity. Thus, it can be concluded
that Germany - by taking on a pioneering role and providing a stable and
reliable market for PV modules - has contributed to driving PV down the
learning curve and thus achieving technological progress. This corresponds
to the observation by Trancik et al. (2015) that Germany with its policy of
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subsidizing renewables has been the primary driver for PV from 2004–2012
(based on new installations).
4.3.2 Costs Related to Technological Progress
As a next step we want to get an idea of the magnitude of the costs that have
arisen for Germany by taking on this pioneering role through promoting the
application of PV. To this end, we compare the net value of subsidies for all PV-
installations that were connected to the grid by the end of 2014 with the net
value of subsidies that hypothetical new entrants in late 2014 would have paid
(keeping the amount of electricity produced equal). The idea underlying our
thought experiment is to determine the additional costs that PV-subsidization
has caused for German energy consumers. These subsidies made Germany a
forerunner in PV-application and thus helped induce cost-reducing learning-
by-doing effects at a global scale.
Or, to put it differently, these “excess costs” represent the hypothetical costs
savings Germany could have obtained if it had begun to start building up its
PV-capacity only in late 2014. As a reward for waiting this – also quite hypo-
thetically – would have made it possible to benefit from the price reductions
having occurred until then (which in turn would have had to be financed
by other countries) while the long-run effect on Germany’s aggregate CO2-
emission and hence on the global climate would essentially be the same. The
difference between these hypothetical costs of subsidizing solar energy and
the real costs will be interpreted as Germany’s contribution to the technolog-
ical progress in the PV-industry.
In order to gain a better understanding of our thought experiment it may be
important to note that the two cost values that we are going to compare clearly
do not reflect the total costs that arise for Germany due to the substitution of
fossil fuels through solar energy: The “system costs” of renewables are higher
than the “levelized costs of electricity” (LCOE) per MWh generated by PV,
which are covered by the level of the feed-in tariffs (see, e.g., Stram 2016, and
Pariente-David 2016). In addition, there are network expansion costs and costs
systemically associated with accommodating the volatile supply of energy
from renewable sources into the grid. Not only do transmission networks
have to be adapted and extended to cope with a higher share of solar energy
but also – due to the intermittency of the most important renewables – reserve
and storing capacities must be made available to ensure a sufficiently steady
supply of electricity also when the sun doesn’t shine (see, e.g., Joskow 2011).
These “hidden costs” of renewables are hard to quantify but may be relatively
high – and unavoidable if the economic and social losses of reduced supply
security are to be prevented (see Röpke 2013).
As important as the system costs are for an overall cost-benefit analysis of
the EEG it cannot be expected that they differ greatly between our scenarios.
It can instead be reasonably assumed that whether PV-plants are built a few
years earlier or later will not have a high impact on the total system costs.
Therefore, system costs do not seem to be of much relevance for our results.
4.3 germany’s contribution through the eeg to global learning by doing 65
For our calculations we choose the year 2014 as the reference point since the
major cost reductions have been realized by the end of 2014 (see Figure 4.2).
We then determine the difference between the costs of subsidization for solar
energy that actually occurred under the EEG to those incurred by hypothetical
new entrants making instalments only in late 2014 with the reduced costs
of PV at that time. To calculate these “excess costs” we apply two different
methods. The first method is cohort based whereas the second one is year
specific.
4.3.2.1 The Cohort Based Approach
A key parameter of this approach is the feed-in tariff for each cohort. As the
feed-in tariff are staggered by size of an installation this parameter must be
based on assumptions about the average size of an installation in Germany
for which we assume a value of 25.5 kWp 18 Subsequently, we compute the
feed-in tariff for this average installation. In December 2014, the first ten kWp
are valued at 12.59 Cent and the remaining 15.6 kWp at 12.25 Cents resulting
in a feed-tariff of FI∅PV2014 = 12.38 Cent per kWh. This figure also represents
an estimate of 2014 costs associated with generating one kWh of PV energy
using an average sized installation. It can further be interpreted as the costs
of incentivizing one kWh of PV energy at the end of the year 2014. 19
We now compare the feed-in remuneration that each of the 14 cohorts t =
2000, . . . , 2013 of installation will receive during the funding period of 20 years
with the costs that a cohort of the same size would generate over 20 years if it
applied the improved 2014 technology and thus was compensated by FI∅PV2014 .
Formula 3 sums up the excess costs for the cohorts from t=2000 up to t=2013
as a rough estimate without discounting:
2013
∑
t=2000
[
20FI∅PVt PZt − 20FI∅PV2014 PZt
]
(3)
In this formula FI∅PVt indicates the feed-in tariff of the average installation
in year t, and Zt is the total capacity of cohort t measured in MWp. The
parameter P represents a productivity parameter that indicates the number
of kwh generated from one MWp within one year 20 Figure 4.6 provides a
graphical representation of the cost burdens associated with the individual
cohorts. Table 4.1 shows how the numerical quantities that are appearing in
formula (4) have developed between 2000 and 2013.
18 This is achieved by dividing the cumulative installed capacity by the number of registered
installations (1.5 Mio- BSW Solar 2015) at the end of 2014. We obtain an average size of 25.562
kWp per Installation. For our calculations we use a value of 25.5 kwp per Installation as an
assumption.
19 Note that this method leads to a rather pessimistic estimate of costs as larger scale installations
can work with feed-in tariffs of well below 9 Cent as can be seen in Figure 4.2 and prices even
below that can now be realized for large plants via tenders.
20 P empirically determined as 849 kWh/ kWp as weighted average adjusted for global radiation
using data from DWD (2018).
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Figure 4.6: Costs of technology promotion in Euro (1st Approach)
Data from BMWi (2016), Netztransparenz (2018b) and own calculations.
Table 4.1: Relevant parameters for the 1st Approach
In the case with positive discounting formula (3) turns into
2013
∑
t=2000
[
PZt
(
FI∅PVt − FI∅PV2014
) 19
∑
k=0
1
(1+ i)t+k−2014
]
(4)
where 2014 serves as the point of reference. This implies that the value of all
payments before 2014 is increased while payments after 2014 are devaluated.
For instance, for an installation that is part of the 2012 cohort, the payments
for 2012 and 2013 are compounded as 2014 is the point of reference, while the
payments for the remaining funding period after 2014 (comprising the years
2015-2021) are discounted.
Using the parameters in Table 1 and applying formula (3) gives an estimate
of excess costs of 117.8 billion Euro in the absence of discounting. Abstaining
from discounting comes close to the current level of interest rates. If we as-
sume positive interest rates at the level of long run (10 year) German sovereign
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bonds in 2014 of 1.16%21 , formula (4) gives a slightly lower value of 112.34 bil-
lion Euro. It is these excess costs that we identify as Germany’s contribution
to technological progress in PV-production.
4.3.2.2 The Year Based Approach
The second method we apply in order to calculate the excess costs of being an
early adopter is year specific. By adopting this approach we first of all com-
pare, without discounting, the actual costs of PV subsidization in Germany in-
curred throughout the years 2000 to 2013 to the hypothetical costs if the same
amount of PV energy were subsidized by the feed-in tariff FI∅PV2014 = 12.38
Cent - reflecting the state of technology in 2014.
2013
∑
t=2000
EXPPVt −YPV,FIt FI∅PV2014 −YPV,MPt (FI∅PV,MP2014 −MVt) (5)
In this formula EXPPVt indicates the total amount of remuneration for PV
energy in year t in Euro. The amount of energy (kWh) compensated with a
fixed feed-in tariff is denoted by YPV,FIt (see Table 4.3 for relevant parame-
ters). For the years 2012 and 2013, we also consider installations that make
use of the market premium model (“Marktprämie” - opportunity for direct
marketing). In this case YPV,MPt is the amount of energy produced in kwh
and FI∅PV,MP2014 the feed-in tariff for our average installation in the market pre-
mium model where an average energy source-specific market value MVt is
subtracted.
Data from Netztransparenz (2018a), Netztransparenz (2018b) and own calculations.
Table 4.2: Relevant parameters for the 2nd Approach
21 The use of the interest rate of government bonds is motivated by the assumption that in our
hypothetical scenarios the subsidies for the entire PV-instalment in 2014 would be financed
by public debt so that no risk premium of private investors (and thus no ‘beta’ as component
of the capital asset pricing model CAPM) has been included. Apart from that, as we will see
later, our numerical results are relatively robust against the choice of the discount rate. For
an assessment of risk premia of investments in different types of renewables (and different
countries) see Donovan and Corbishley (2016).
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The difference which in our context amounts to 28.02 billion Euro serves
as a proxy for the costs associated with technology promotion accrued until
the end of 2013; a huge chunk of excess costs has yet to be paid. This is
due to the fact that the PV installations that have been connected to the grid
between 2000 and 2013 benefit from their higher subsidy rates also after 2014.
The calculation of these payments, which from the perspective of the year
2014 are lying in the future, is based on the following reasoning: We assume
that systems installed in 2014 and subsequent years do not generate excess
costs as they receive a feed-in tariff of FI∅PV2014 or even one below that. All
installations that were first connected to the grid before the end of 2013 are
still running between 2014 and 2019 and reimbursed by their individual high
feed-in tariffs. Hence, the excess costs during those six years are equal to the
excess costs in 2013. Since installations receive a guaranteed feed-in tariff only
for 20 years, in 2020 the solar plants that have been installed in the year 2000
fall out of subsidization in 2020 - or, more precisely, receive their guaranteed
feed-in tariff merely for a couple of days/weeks/months, depending on when
exactly in 2000 they were first connected to the grid. For example, installations
that were first connected to the grid at the beginning of April, 2000 receive
guaranteed feed-in tariffs during the first three months of 2020. To get an
estimate of the excess costs for 2020 we thus must subtract the excess costs
of 2000 from the excess costs of 2013. Accordingly, the excess costs for 2021
are obtained by subtracting the excess costs of 2000 and 2001 from the excess
costs of 2013. For subsequent years until 2032 the excess costs are calculated
in a similar way.22
Figure 4.7: Costs of technology promotion in Euro (2nd Approach) until 2033.
Adding up the excess costs for all years from 2001 until 2032 yields total
excess costs of 122.18 billion Euro, a number quite similar to that of the cohort
based approach. Figure 4.7 visualizes these costs for individual years from
22 To control for the amount of sunshine, we normalize these values using global radiation data
from DWD (2018).
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2000 up to 2033. Applying a discounting scenario – again with the interest
rate 1.16% and 2014 as the base year – yields a value of 115.75 billion Euro.
In the scenarios with discounting we have used a relatively low discount
rate of about 1% , which reflects the low interest rates for German government
bonds. With an increasing discount rate the values of the excess costs are
decreasing but not too much as Table 3 shows.
All figures in billion Euro.
Table 4.3: Excess costs for different discount rates
Even in the case of a high discount rate of 5%, which would include a high
risk premium, the excess costs, i.e. the aggregate level of German indirect sub-
sidies for solar technology improvement, do not fall far below 100 billion Euro.
Hence, our numerical results prove to be relatively robust against variations
of the discount rate.
4.4 consequences for the assessment of climate policy and
conclusion
The EEG, first of all, has resulted in the creation of a relatively large and se-
cure market for photovoltaics in Germany, which enabled learning-by-doing
effects and thereby - as described above - has led to significant price reduc-
tions for solar energy production. Subsequently, this has encouraged other
countries to create their own production facilities in order to benefit from this
market. So, the support of renewables through the EEG helped foreign com-
panies, in particular Chinese ones, to gain strong market positions. Global
competition between solar firms has increased, which also helped to bring
about further cost reductions, and many countries have adopted measures
for the promotion of solar energy as well, which further enlarged the market
for photovoltaics considerably.23 While this has been bad news for German
solar firms and the jobs offered by them it is good news for the earth’s cli-
mate (see, e.g., Pegels and Lütkenhorst 2014). Similar effects may occur in
the future in the context of other green technologies such as electric cars or
storage facilities for electricity.
The expenses that the promotion of green technological progress by means
of the EEG and thus for the provision of the global public good knowledge
about climate-friendly technologies (Stiglitz 1999) has caused for Germany
are considerably large. As we have shown in this chapter by a simple thought
experiment the net present value of these contributions Germany amounts
23 By a theoretical argument it can be shown that the incentives for green R&D measures are
improved if the improved technology is made available free of charge to other countries (see
Buchholz, Dippl, and Eichenseer 2015; Foucart and Garsous 2018).
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to more than 100 billion Euro. This is much more than what Germany in
the past has contributed from budgetary sources to “climate finance”, i.e. for
financing measures both for greenhouse gas mitigation and for climate change
adaptation in developing and emerging countries. Until 2014 the total amount
of these expenses has been about 12.5 billion Euros and about 18.6 billion
Euros until 2016 (BMU 2017, p.59). In 2015, Germany has announced that it
will raise its annual contribution to climate finance – through bilateral and
institutions of multilateral cooperation as the “Green Climate Fund” – to 4
billion Euros by 2020. But also with this increased contribution it will take a
long time until the total level of Germany’s expenses for the development of
climate friendly technologies will be reached.
It is quite common in the discussion of the GCF to compare the different
countries’ contributions. Against this background it could be an interesting
topic for future research to also quantify the other countries’ contribution to
the promotion of green renewable technologies – in analogy to our analysis
for Germany and PV in this chapter.
The enormous improvement of solar technology and the ensuing cost re-
ductions have far-reaching benefits for global climate policy. So, the often-
expressed hope that renewable energies are able to catch up with fossil and
nuclear energy has almost come true (e.g. Obama 2017). The falling costs for
greenhouse gas abatement offer scope for governments to raise their climate
policy targets and hence to commit to more ambitious NDCs. If, however,
countries by themselves prefer renewables to their conventional counterparts
the free-rider problem that plagues global collective action on climate change
mitigation will lose its importance (see, e.g., Peinhardt and Sandler 2015).
Given lower abatement costs the risks that relate to unilateral mitigation ac-
tivities are reduced, which makes it more likely that a “ratcheting-up” process
w.r.t. national climate policy as intended by the Paris Agreement targets will
set in (Falkner 2016, and Schmidt and Sewerin 2017).
Improved green technologies in particular allow developing countries to
leapfrog many steps that today’s developed countries had to take in the past,
which means that they can use low carbon technologies already at an early
stage in their development process (Trancik et al. 2015, and Goldemberg and
Guardabassi 2012). Then they are no longer in the inconvenient situation of
having to choose between environmental protection on the one hand and eco-
nomic development on the other so that “investing in climate” and “investing
in growth” will become better compatible.24 While the diffusion of climate
friendly technology reduces the mitigation costs and thus the burden of poor
countries, the upfront expenditures of green innovation have been taken by
the developed countries. In this way, the promotion of renewables by devel-
oped countries automatically constitutes some kind of (financial) compensa-
tion for less developed countries and thus contributes to global climate justice.
The fact that technological transfers are an important component of global
climate policy obviously should have consequences for the evaluation of na-
tional policies for the promotion of renewable energy and especially for the
discussion on the faults and merits of the EEG. In its initial phase the EEG
24 See the corresponding OECD report (2017).
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- with its generous subsidization of solar over wind energy - clearly did not
attain the targeted reduction of CO2-emissions at minimum cost since the
‘law of one price’ is violated (see Sinn 2012b). This has become the central
point of criticism of the EEG (see, e.g., Frondel et al. 2010, Sinn 2012a, or
Monopolkomission 2009). This lack of cost-efficiency, which has also been re-
flected in different feed-in-tariffs for the various types of renewables, can be
interpreted as a price that had to be paid for a successful promotion of green
technology.25 Yet only a few participants in the debate on the EEG emphasize
its technology promotion effect and the related technology transfer compo-
nent.26 This interpretation, which is in line with the argument of this chapter,
also supports the view that instead of surcharges on the electricity price, taxes
should be used to finance the liabilities of renewables subsidization that are
inherited from the first phase of the EEG. In this way, also the EEG’s huge re-
gressive distributive effects (see, e.g., Frondel, Sommer, and Vance 2015) could
be alleviated.
25 Cost-efficiency of CO2-emissions has gained much importance w.r.t. the subsidization so re-
newables in Germany. Consequently, the EEG has been subject to a fundamental reform in
2017 through which tariff auctions (tenders) have become an important element of the subsi-
dization mechanism. Since renewables technology had been promoted successfully until then
this change only seems logical from the perspective of this chapter.
26 Among these are the former chancellery minister Bodo Hombach (2013) and the former min-
ister of the environment Jürgen Trittin in a TV-debate in October 2017.
Part III
A P R E R E Q U I S I T E F O R L E A D E R S H I P
I N T R O D U C T O RY R E M A R K S T O PA RT I I I
“What appears at first blush to be a rather cosmic question more
suited to a metaphysical analysis is in actuality one that is central
to an ultimate understanding of the social relation we call leader-
ship. [...] one’s assumptions about whether humans are by nature
social or independent, selfish or altruistic, rational or irrational, or
incorrigible or capable of improvement, determines in great part
one’s view of leadership [...] as well as one’s proposed solution to
perceived challenges [...]”
Thomas Wren (2007, pp.5-6)
As pointed out by Wren’s quotation the assessment of the prospects of lead-
ership also depends on the underlying conception of man. The theoretical
approaches to leadership in Part I share the assumption that governments are
narrow payoff-maximizers. Correspondingly, the representative government
is an agent that shares attributes with the concept of a “homo oeconomicus”.
In a world of these narrow payoff-maximizing agents the problem of “crowd-
ing out” is omnipresent. Increased ambition in contributions by one party are
replied by a decline in others’ contributions.
If one assumes, however, that humans are a social animal having “social
preferences”, there is scope for a positive reaction to leadership (Buchholz
and Sandler 2017). One such “social preference” is reciprocity. The hope as-
sociated with “homo reciprocans” is that leadership efforts such as those de-
scribed exemplarily in Part II are reciprocated by increased ambition of others.
So the micro-foundations of human behavior are decisive for the success of
leadership. Therefore the question at hand is whether the concept of “homo
reciprocans” can be sustained.
This is of particular relevance for the global public good of climate protec-
tion. The approach of the Paris Agreement is built on the hope of reciprocal re-
actions to ambitious Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs hereafter).
NDCs are voluntary, non-binding commitments under international law. One
basic idea of this approach is that a good example given by one country sets
a benchmark for other countries and thereby induces a positive reaction ex-
pressed by higher efforts of other countries. The intention is to unleash a
dynamic process of increasing ambition (“ratcheting up”).
Consequently, Part III goes in search of reciprocity. Thereby it tries to come
to an answer to the question of whether pioneers can expect others to follow
their example by increasing their efforts - a prerequisite for successful lead-
ership. To this end, Chapter 5 summarizes the state of knowledge in the lit-
erature on reciprocity in experimental economics and international relations.
Chapter 6 subsequently investigates the stability of reciprocal patterns across
two social dilemma games using an online experiment.
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R E C I P R O C I T Y I N E C O N O M I C S A N D I N T E R N AT I O N A L
R E L AT I O N S
5.1 introduction
Can we expect reciprocity in global public good provision in the absence
of a central governing authority? The purpose of this chapter is to explore
whether there is reasonable hope that pioneering efforts may be reciprocated
by others which may help solving international public goods problems such
as climate change mitigation in an otherwise non-cooperative scenario. So, we
are going in search of reciprocity, taking stock of the literature. The approach
is a hybrid one: first we look at the micro-level of individual preferences in
economics and then try to find out whether there is evidence that these re-
sults can be transferred to the level of international relations (IR hereafter). In
other words, we match the ideas brought up by economists with the lessons
learned in international politics. In the end, we’re trying to draw a conclusion
whether these findings may be applicable to the example of raising ambition
in Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs hereafter) in the context of
the Paris Agreement. Accordingly, the remainder of this chapter will be as fol-
lows: Sections 2 and 3 briefly wrap up the evidence gathered by economists
and IR scholars while Section 4 offers a synthesis of the findings and inter-
prets them in the context of the NDCs followed by a conclusion.
5.2 economics and reciprocity
5.2.1 Background
In economics, there is a tradition of studying reciprocal behavior. In fact, even
the most fundamental market exchange is based on social cooperation, a re-
ciprocal relationship.27 For a long time, however, reciprocity has not been the
focus of economic research. The inspiration has rather been drawn from soci-
ology. In a seminal paper, Gouldner (1960) clarified the concept by defining
reciprocity as a pattern of mutually contingent exchange of gratifications and
as a moral norm that is rooted in folk belief and relates to the stability of so-
cial systems. Subsequently, economists referred reciprocity to a broad range
of economic outcomes like gift exchange in labor markets (Akerlof 1982), em-
27 Adam Smith describes this in the following way: “in a nation of hunters, if any one has a talent
for making bows and arrows better than his neighbor he will at first make presents of them,
and in return get presents of their game. By continuing this practice he will live better than
before and will have no occasion to provide for himself, as the surplus of his own labor does
it more effectually”(Smith, 1976, p.220 as cited by Ashraf, Camerer, and Loewenstein (2005,
pp.137-138)). This line of argumentation justifies the emergence of market exchange even in
primitive societies in the absence of a state that could intervene.
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ployee theft (Giacalone and Greenberg 1997), informal insurance (Coate and
Ravallion 1993) and public goods supply (Sugden 1984).
But the topic really has become important with the spread of experimental
economics. Simple games have provided valuable insights. In the ultimatum
game (Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze 1982), responders reject low offers
(less than 20 % of the surplus) with a large probability (Fehr and Schmidt
2006). This indicates negative reciprocity as small payments are penalized
with the rejection of the offer under the sacrifice of own material interests.
By contrast, gift-exchange games (Fehr et al. 1998) and trust games (Berg,
Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995) indicate positive reciprocity. In the latter, many
first movers send money which seems to trigger positive reactions by second
movers that give money back. The amount sent and the amount sent back are
frequently correlated both at the individual and the aggregated level. In addi-
tion, these simple one-shot interactions already show that there is a relatively
large proportion (between 40 and 60 %) of people who exhibit reciprocal be-
havior (Fehr and Gächter 2000).
5.2.2 Experimental Evidence on Reciprocity in the Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma
A convenient way to assess reciprocal behavior is to use the sequential pris-
oner’s dilemma. In this sequential version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game
players move one after the other. Correspondingly, the second player has the
means of reciprocally responding to the first player’s action. Clark and Sefton
(2001) show that a substantial fraction of second movers make use of this
opportunity. About 90% of the experimental subjects respond with defection
to the first mover’s defection whereas 58% use the cooperative action if the
first mover cooperated. Clark and Sefton (2001) consider this as evidence for
reciprocity, since the first mover’s choice is the key variable in predicting sec-
ond mover behavior. Cooperation, however, decreases with repetition of the
game and the extent of reciprocity diminishes with rising monetary costs of
cooperation. Miettinen et al. (2017) make use of the strategy method to de-
termine the reaction on cooperation as well as defection for every individual.
This allows to classify discrete behavioral types (see also Kosfeld 2019). The
largest group of players (47%) consists of free-riders or unconditional defec-
tors who always choose defection followed by conditional cooperators who
form the second largest group (38%). These players behave exactly reciprocal
to first-mover behavior. In addition, there are altruists who cooperate uncon-
ditionally and missmatchers who always counteract the first mover with 9%
and 6% respectively. This shows that a substantial fraction of subjects can be
classified as conditional cooperators in the sequential prisoner’s dilemma.
5.2.3 Experimental Evidence on Reciprocity and Public Good Supply
5.2.3.1 The Basic Setup
The workhouse model to study cooperation in experimental public goods
games is the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) in a linear version.
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Given that there are N players, the payoff of player i in a one-shot game
(or per period in a repeated game) with initial endowment yi is given by:
pii = yi − gi + α
N
∑
j=1
gj where g denotes individual contributions and α the
marginal per capita return (MPCR) of the public good. The MPCR is set in a
way (α < 1) that zero contributions are individually rational and full contri-
butions generate the largest aggregated payoffs (Nα > 1). Consequently, for
a parameter range of α that fulfills 1 > α > 1N , we obtain a social dilemma
situation.
From the beginning, a common result of public goods games has been that
the corner solution theoretically predicted for the usual parameterization does
not emerge. Contributions significantly exceed zero with about 40-60% of the
endowment on average (Ledyard 1995). At the same time, there is a declining
pattern of contributions in finitely repeated one-shot interactions whereas a
“restart” increases cooperation levels again. In repeated games, there is usu-
ally a sharp decline of contribution at the end of play (last period) referred to
a last round effect.
5.2.3.2 Conditional Cooperation
The beginning of the concept of conditional cooperation is most likely Croson
(1996) who compares individual contributions to those of others in a group
(and own expectations thereof). She reports that there is a strong positive
correlation to both, others’ contributions and to the beliefs about others’ con-
tributions. This indicates positive reciprocity and is contrary to a standard
crowding-out hypothesis. Subjects increase their contributions if others do so
or they expect others to do so.
Subsequently, the term conditional cooperation (CC) has emerged in the
late 1990s. This refers to the assumption that some subjects mirror the be-
havior of others: they cooperate if others do so while they do not if others
don’t cooperate. Sonnemans, Schram, and Offerman (1999) and Keser and
Van Winden (2000) gained insights by comparing partner and stranger condi-
tions. Sonnemans, Schram, and Offerman (1999) used a partner design with
a component of a perfect stranger matching: one player was exchanged by
another after a given number of periods while the remaining group composi-
tion is unchanged. Given subjects’ beliefs, they conclude that group members
contribute the more the more they expect others to contribute. This gives rise
to the assumption that it may be rational for selfish players to act strategically
and contribute much to encourage others to contribute more (to obtain a pos-
itive reaction). Indicators thereof are that the magnitude of contributions de-
pends on the number of periods remaining with the same group composition
(future looking behavior) and that subjects who will leave a group contribute
less than subjects who will stay. In a similar vein Keser and Van Winden (2000),
who find significantly larger contributions in a partner matching compared to
a stranger matching, interpret their results as evidence for conditional cooper-
ation, characterized by future-oriented (future relationship) as well as reactive
behavior (average behavior of the others). For the former, they report evidence
in the form of higher initial contributions, while they read a subject’s reaction
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Figure 5.1: Contribution paths for different behavioral types in Fischbacher, Gächter,
and Fehr (2001)
to a deviation from average contributions (adjustment towards the average)
as sign of the latter.
A major methodical innovation was introduced by Fischbacher, Gächter,
and Fehr (2001).28 They use a four player one-shot public goods game to clas-
sify a subject’s cooperation type using the strategy method. Subjects state an
unconditional contribution as well as a vector of conditional contributions
contingent on the average contribution of the three other players. This al-
lows to derive a reaction function for a subject’s contribution conditional on
the other subjects’ average contribution. Accordingly, it is possible to classify
subjects into four different categories according to their reaction function. A
conditional cooperator is someone who matches the others’ contributions to
a large degree (see Figure 5.1). Free riders are subjects that always give zero.
Triangle cooperators start by matching contributions up to a certain point
where their reaction function starts being negatively sloped. A last category
captures the remaining subjects (including unconditional cooperators)29. In
Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001) the fraction of conditional cooperators
is about half of the subjects, while one third can be classified as free-riders.30
Conditional cooperation is a cross-culturally robust phenomenon with a
varying fraction of conditional cooperators (Kocher et al. 2008; Herrmann and
28 A comparison of conditional cooperation patterns in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Public
Goods Game is given in Chapter 6 (Eichenseer and Moser 2019a).
29 Refinements of the classification method are proposed by Fallucchi, Luccasen, and Turocy
(2018) and Thöni and Volk (2018).
30 There is an on-going discussion whether conditional cooperation is related to confusion (see
e.g. Burton-Chellew, El Mouden, and West 2016; Goeschl and Lohse 2018).
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Thöni 2009) that can be observed from early on (Hett et al. 2018). The classifi-
cation based on Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001) actually has a good pre-
dictive power for repeated interactions. Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) show
that elicited conditional cooperation (strategy method) and expectations pre-
dict behavior in a repeated public goods game. In addition, the number of
subjects classified as conditional cooperators within a group positively and
significantly increases group contributions (De Oliveira, Croson, and Eckel
2015).
However, mapping most subjects’ contributions relative to the average con-
tribution of the remaining subjects reveals that their contributions are below
the 45 degree line when using the strategy method (e.g. Fischbacher, Gächter,
and Fehr 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter 2010). Subjects try to ”cheap ride” in
a repeated PG experiment which is referred to as ”selfish-biased conditional
cooperation” which means that contributions increase not fully proportionally
in others’ contributions (Neugebauer et al. 2009). Moreover, when individual
contributions instead of an average of others’ contributions are revealed, more
subjects align to a low contribution rather than to a good example of high con-
tributons (Hartig, Irlenbusch, and Kölle 2015).
5.2.3.3 Punishment
A channel to allow subjects to behave in a negative reciprocal way is to allow
them to punish those who acted unfriendly. A simple alteration of the public
goods game is to introduce costly, decentralized, punishment of other players,
such that “homo reciprocans has the opportunity to discipline those subjects
who are selfish or insufficiently motivated by positive reciprocity”(Fehr and
Gächter 1998, pp.855-856). Subjects can punish others at the expense of own
earnings such that simple payoff maximization would yield that no-one pun-
ishes (at least in a single interaction). However, Fehr and Gachter (2000) find
that punishment occurs both in situations where subjects interact repeatedly
with each other (partner matching) and in situations where subjects are ran-
domly rematched after each interaction (stranger matching). In both condi-
tions, the threat of decentralized punishment by other subjects induces very
high contribution levels and the groups succeed in maintaining them. By con-
trast, the within subject design allows to state that the same subjects reduce
their contributions steadily in the absence of punishment to almost full defec-
tion in the last period. Generally, the punishment (negative reciprocity) is the
larger, the larger a subject’s contribution deviates from the group’s average.
From an evolutionary perspective, a small fraction of people who punish
free-riding could induce selfish types to cooperate (Gintis et al. 2003). Thus,
do we see that the introduction of the possibility of punishment unequivo-
cally leads to an improvement in the amount of public good? Unfortunately,
this cannot be generally affirmed. The experiments by Herrmann, Thöni, and
Gächter (2008) reveal that an amelioration is present in places like Boston, Not-
tingham, Copenhagen and Bonn whereas it does not seem to work in places
like Samara, Athens, Istanbul and Riyadh. This can be attributed to the dif-
ferent degrees of antisocial punishment, i.e. punishing people who contribute
above average to the public good. In addition, Herrmann, Thöni, and Gächter
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(2008) are able to show that there is a positive correlation between antisocial
punishment and perceptions of the importance of norms of civic cooperation
and the rule of law.
Recently, Kirchkamp and Mill (2018) have investigated the impact of punish-
ment power on conditional cooperation - both for the role of having the power
to punish and for being under the threat of being punished. As both punish-
ment and conditional cooperation are variants of reciprocal behavior, they can
possibly be regarded as substitutes and it could be possible that the amount of
conditional cooperation decreases as subjects have the power to punish. How-
ever, this is not the case. If individuals have the possibility of punishing others,
they show a pattern of more conditional cooperation. The threat of being pun-
ished on the other hand has opposite effects. Regarding the extensive margin,
the number of free-riders increases and conversely the intensive margin of
conditional cooperation increases, i.e. the remaining conditional cooperators
react stronger to an increase in others’ contributions. In total, the effect of the
threat of punishment on conditional cooperation is positive. In a similar vein,
Weber, Weisel, and Gächter (2018) explore the relation between positive and
negative reciprocity in a strategy method setting. They find that subjects that
are classified as free-riders when using the method of Fischbacher, Gächter,
and Fehr (2001) cooperate only when punishment is possible whereas con-
ditional cooperators also cooperate in the absence of punishment. They find
no evidence that disposition towards positive (conditional cooperation) and
negative (punishment) reciprocity are correlated which means that there are
no remarkable differences in the punishment activity of conditional cooper-
ators and free-riders such that dispositional free riders “do not free ride on
punishment of others” (Weber, Weisel, and Gächter 2018, p.6).
5.2.4 Moral Wiggle Room, Image Concerns and Social Norms
There is the question whether individuals are actually intrinsically motivated
to behave reciprocally. The argument of the moral wiggle room signifies that
if there is in a given situation a plausible excuse for behaving less gener-
ous or fair which prevents a condemnation by others or oneself, this changes
the amount of social preferences observed. For example, people reduce the
amount of pro-social behavior if there is a chance that their decision was ran-
domly replaced by a computer.
A number of studies have found that the amount shared in a dictator game
declines significantly if there is a good situation-specific excuse that allows
to canvas the relationship between own actions and resulting outcomes for
others (see e.g. Dana, Weber, and Kuang 2007). In addition, the amount given
in dictator games varies depending on whether there is an audience,31 which
leads to the hypothesis of Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) that many people
find it important to be considered as fair by others. This is underlined by the
31 In public goods provision, observability increases contributions in one-shot games (Rege and
Telle 2004) but not in repeated interactions in which the opposite holds (Noussair and Tucker
2007). With regard to punishment, observability promotes moral punishment (Kurzban, DeSci-
oli, and O’Brien 2007).
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results of Lazear, Malmendier, and Weber (2012) who are able to show that a
significant amount of people are sorting out situations in which it is possible
for them to share, in this case a dictator game. This indicates that they share
reluctantly.
Correspondingly, the question is to what extent these arguments are also
valid in reciprocal settings. If one first looks upon the argument of the moral
wiggle room, the evidence at hand from trust games is inconclusive. Van der
Weele et al. (2014) consider second mover behavior in trust games. The au-
thors show that the introduction of an apology for not behaving reciprocally
does not have an impact on second mover behavior. By contrast Matthey and
Regner (2015) and Regner (2018) find that also reciprocal behavior is influ-
enced by the moral wiggle room. Malmendier, Velde, and Weber (2014) give
evidence for sorting out of conditions of positive reciprocity in a double dicta-
tor game experiment albeit to a lesser extent than in a classical dictator game.
It can therefore not be ruled out that reciprocal behavior is not only caused
by internal motives such as a preference for fairness or generosity but also
by motives such as self-signaling (which are depending on the decision situa-
tion) and also external motives such as social approval or disapproval (which
refer to image concerns). As well, social norms and rules have an impact on
reciprocity. There is evidence that people who follow rules in general (’rule
followers’) have a higher propensity to behave reciprocally in the trust game
(Kimbrough and Vostroknutov 2016).
5.2.5 Models of Reciprocity
Up to this point, we have more or less agnostically pursued the question of ev-
idence for reciprocity in experimental economics. If one approaches the ques-
tion of how the mechanisms involved can be presented theoretically, there
is at least a distinction to make between models that assume a preference for
outcome-based fairness and models that account for intentions of the decision
makers. The earliest and maybe most prominent one of the intention-based
models is the model by Rabin (1993) that builds upon psychological game
theory. In a two player setting its basic assumption is that players would sac-
rifice own material well-being to reward kind intentions and punish unkind
intentions. Accordingly, players form beliefs about the other player’s actions
and hold beliefs on the other player’s beliefs about own actions. To measure
kindness, Rabin (1993) sets up a function fi that measures kindness of player
i towards j and f ′j as perceived fairness of j towards i. Kind actions are de-
scribed by a positive value of the kindness function whereas negative values
are indications of treating the other player badly. Utility of player i is then
given by the additive separable function: Ui = xi + f ′j (1+ fi). This model has
been further developed and many variants exist, for example for sequential
games in Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) who incorporate updating of
beliefs. In addition, there are a number of outcome-based models like inequity
aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or the Equity, Reciprocity and Compe-
tition model of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) that can rationalize reciprocal
behavior though they remain silent on the decision-makers’ intentions. Some
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models like Charness and Rabin (2002) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006, for
extensive form games) combine intentions and distributional concerns. Fur-
thermore, there are models in which the kindness towards another player
depends on the other player’s type (Levine 1998) or the own emotional state
(Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad 2007). In addition, a relatively new line of lit-
erature asks whether people have some kind of norm-dependent utility such
that they receive utility following societal norms like the norm of reciprocity
(e.g. Kimbrough and Vostroknutov 2016). This focus on norms certainly also
forges a link back to early models of reciprocity like Sugden (1984).
He formulates a model based on a “reciprocity principle” in which people
in a public goods game feel a moral obligation to either follow an adapted
version of a Kantian “categorical imperative” (choose a contribution level that
they would prefer that every member of the group makes) or (if others con-
tribute less) stick to at least to the minimum contribution of the group. Conse-
quently, an individual maximizes utility subject to a “moral constraint” that
includes an obligation for reciprocal behavior.32
5.3 reciprocity in international relations
5.3.1 Reciprocity in International Relations Theory
After this brief review of the development on reciprocity in the field of eco-
nomics, we now turn to examine the extent to which reciprocity is inherent in
IR. There are two schools of thought in political science that allow to bridge
the gap to the findings of behavioral economics. A direct linkage is the work
of Elinor Ostrom who promoted the integration of elements of behavioral eco-
nomics like reciprocity into economically minded rational choice theory (Os-
trom 1998). Likewise, theorists like Axelrod described reciprocity as a mean
of achieving cooperation among egoists by formalizing the argument through
an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (Axelrod 1981).
A further, possibly less obvious starting point is the liberal school of in-
stitutionalism. In a seminal paper, Robert Keohane (1986) has described the
immanent meaning of reciprocity for liberalist institutionalism as follows. The
starting point is the often prevailing motive of anarchy in international rela-
tions theory in conjunction with the question of why this does not result in a
“war of all against all” in a Hobbesian sense. Rather, his overall diagnosis is
limited cooperation in an environment that is characterized by sovereignty of
individual countries on the one hand and the lack of centralized enforcement
mechanisms on the other hand. A major point of his reasoning is that this co-
operation can be traced back (also referring to Axelrod (1981)) in large parts to
reciprocity which represents an appropriate remedy - probably the most effec-
tive one - in achieving cooperation among egoists (Keohane 2005). Keohane
(1986) distinguishes two different kinds of reciprocity also in order to avoid
the term getting ambiguous. The first kind of reciprocity “diffuse reciprocity”
32 In contrast to later approaches like the work by John Roemer, the model of Sugden (1984)
relies on Nash optimization. In addition, it entails a component (the minimum contribution)
that prevents exploitation of Kantian behavior.
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is something that happens in the sphere of individual actors. This form of
reciprocity is characterized by the fact that it is not always clear whether it is
an exchange of equivalent values and moreover the sequence of the exchange
is less obvious. It can probably be best described as a kind of conformity to
standards of behavior or norms that are generally accepted. By contrast, “spe-
cific reciprocity” refers to the contingent exchange of equivalent items in a
pre-specified sequence. Consequently, it is a much more formalized kind of
reciprocity. For diffuse reciprocity Keohane (1986) makes it very clear that a
sense of obligation is a necessary precondition with the actors involved to
make it work.
If preconditions like powerful common interests, a shadow of the future
(the fear of future retaliation) or international regimes are met, there is a
chance of transferring diffuse reciprocity into specific reciprocity. Concur-
rently, successful specific reciprocity may create trust (see also Rathbun 2011,
on trust and diffuse reciprocity)33 and lead to diffuse reciprocity in other
domains. Specific and diffuse reciprocity therefore mutually interrelate. Pros-
perous institutions thus are rooted on both grounds as ”the successful func-
tioning of institutions depends heavily on the operation of reciprocity, both
specific and diffuse” (Keohane and Martin 1995). Likewise, membership in
international organizations promotes cooperation as it reinforces and insti-
tutionalizes reciprocity. Thereby regimes that incorportate reciprocity delig-
itimize defection (Axelrod and Keohane 1985).
5.3.2 Social Preferences, Norms and Values of the Electorate
Besides the somewhat “rationalized” form of reciprocity described at the be-
ginning of this section, there is a discussion in IR research of whether there is
a more intrinsic form of reciprocity and, on a more general level, the question
of as to what degree norms and ethics are an important ingredient of foreign
policy attitudes. In doing so, scholars make reference to the findings of behav-
ioral economics and social psychology and the evidence on departures from
pure selfishness. At the same time, this branch of IR research reproaches its
sharpest critics from the realist school, who oftentimes treat states as if they
were black boxes solely governed by the “national interest”, that even their
constructs are not free of norms, morals and cultural influences which consti-
tute the micro-foundations of the national interest (Kertzer et al. 2014). More-
over, attitudes of elites to domestic and foreign policy are related such that
the term national interest is conceived differently depending on the decision
maker’s position on the political spectrum (Rathbun 2007).
As Kertzer et al. (2014) points out, the debate about to what extent social
preferences and norm orientations in the electorate do and shall carry over to
foreign policy has been hold for a long time between realists and liberals. On
part of the realists, scholars like Morgenthau complain about an intoxication
from moral abstractions stating that moral principles could not be applied to
33 Rathbun (2011) points out that generalized trust can be regarded as kind of anarchic social cap-
ital which facilitates diffuse reciprocity and alleviates the fear of free-riding and opportunism
which allows decision makers to commit to multilateralism and international institutions.
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states while others like Mearsheimer point out that decision makers would
not be influenced by them. Liberals on the contrary state that the electorate
would be capable of a thoughtful opinion on international affairs.
The norm of reciprocity is sometimes a mean of justifying political decisions
such as the Byrd-Hagel resolution in the US Senate that hindered a ratifica-
tion of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. The question arises, however, as to what
extent reciprocal behavior in the population in economic experiments also
relates to public foreign policy attitudes and attitudes towards international
environmental treaties in particular. Bechtel and Scheve (2013) use survey ev-
idence from France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States
to link conditional cooperation in a strategy method public goods game to
public support for different kinds of climate agreements. They find that con-
ditional cooperators are more sensitive to the number of participants in the
agreement and the share of emissions covered by the agreement, i.e. their
support increases more powerful if more countries are involved. Bechtel and
Scheve (2013, p.13763) consider this finding supportive of the view that “ the
sensitivity of public support to design features reflects underlying norms of
reciprocity”. Tingley and Tomz (2014) conduct a survey on Amazon Mechani-
cal Turk among United States citizens to explore the willingness to act recipro-
cally. They find that most US citizens have an attitude of positive reciprocity
when other countries cut their emissions i.e. respond positively while they
would not advocate to increase emissions if others did.34 In addition, there
seems to be public support for a reciprocal response based on trade sanctions
or blaming and shaming in reaction to an increase in emissions by another
country (especially when the polluters violate a treaty).
5.3.3 Empirical Examples and Evidence for Reciprocity
But is there evidence for reciprocal behavior between nations? For bilateral
interactions, Frank et al. (2018) use a Goldstein time series on ICEWS event
data on cooperation and non-cooperation between countries. They come to
the conclusion that for a considerable number of pairs of bilateral interactions
reciprocal patterns can be detected which they interpret as evidence for reci-
procity to be a widespread mechanism in international relations. Reciprocal
reactions are also present in (military) conflict situations and were observed
for example in superpower relations between the United States and the So-
viet Union (Goldstein 1991), the Bosnia Conflict (Goldstein and Pevehouse
1997), the Middle East (Goldstein et al. 2001) and between India and Pakistan
(Rajmaira 1997). For international trade, reciprocal behavior has been widely
described by Keohane (1986) and further empirical descriptions for US trade
relations in the GATT system have been documented by Rhodes (1989). More-
34 Similarly, Beiser-McGrath and Bernauer (2019, p.248) argue that in their experimental setting
“information on other countries failing to reduce their emissions does not undermine support
for how international agreements are designed” However, there is possibly a difference to pol-
icymakers as a sample of high-level policy elites in the US showed that policymakers become
less willing to join international (trade) agreements as the expectation of defection increases.
In addition, policymakers are averse to making false promises even if there is no enforcement
device (Hafner-Burton, LeVeck, and Victor 2017).
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over, reciprocal norms for international trade have been institutionalized in
the GATT and the WTO (Bagwell and Staiger 1999). Governments use a quasi-
matching scheme for concessions in tariff reductions and more formally, recip-
rocal principles are applicable to renegotiation and tariff increases. Dluhosch
and Horgos (2013) furthermore empirically show that tit-for-tat diplomacy
in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism has a positive impact on trade
openness.
Reciprocity is also a main mechanism in the domain of international law.
Simma (2008) describes how reciprocity is involved in the law making pro-
cess and the emergence of customary international law. The claims put by
states that initiate the process of law-making depend on the expectation of
the acceptance of claims by other states in a similar position. In addition,
expectations of reciprocity may bring about mutual restraint and encourage
self-limitation of the actors involved. Furthermore, Simma (2008) argues that
reciprocity was governing every international agreement especially with re-
gard to the reservations, termination and suspension of multilateral treaties
and the observance of law. Parisi and Ghei (2003, p.107) describe by citing ar-
ticle 21 of the Vienna Convention of 1969 that this convention establishes that
any reservation that has been set up with respect to another party changes
“those provisions to the same extent for that other party in its relations with
the reserving State” which can be conceived as a reciprocity constraint that
closely resembles specific reciprocity. Parisi and Ghei (2003) interpret this ar-
ticle as effectively removing all incentive for unilateral defection. Reciprocal
principles, moreover, apply for example to the mutual recognition and en-
forcement of judgments, the granting of copyright to foreign authors in the
Bern Convention and the accepting of the compulsory jurisdiction of the In-
ternational Court of justice.
Since the 19th century diplomatic privileges and immunity have been grant-
ed on the basis of reciprocity which is also rooted in the Vienna Convention of
1961 (Hestermeyer 2009). Even the expulsion of diplomats is commonly based
on the reciprocity principle. As well, travel visas are negotiated on the basis of
reciprocity. Czaika, Haas, and Villares-Varela (2018) analyze a panel dataset
(DEMEG VISA) on bilateral visa restrictions and find that visa reciprocity is
a very stable pattern (a lower degree of visa reciprocity may be an indicator
of power asymmetries). Also international agreements oftentimes explicitly
refer to the principle of reciprocity. This, for example, was the case in the
negotiation of the Basic Principles Agreement between Nixon and Brezhnev in
1972 (Keohane 1986). In addition arms control during the cold war resembles
a specific form of reciprocity (Bernauer 2013).
Reciprocity may also explain the adherence to international law even in
times of war. Morrow (2007) analyzes a dataset on state conduct in the 20th
century. He finds that noncompliance is almost always mutual, stating that
when one side was not complying the other was responding in kind. In addi-
tion, joint ratification of laws is amplyfing a reciprocal response of democratic
actors giving rise to the assumption that enforcement of agreements on con-
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duct in times of war is achieved through reciprocity.35 While in the former
example one can speak of specific reciprocity, diffuse reciprocity is immanent
to many multilateral settings. In many instances, governments can do each
other a favor and create favor banks, i.e. they are kind in the hope that others
return the favor when needed. Mikulaschek (2018) for example shows that
EU member states with a temporal UN security council membership receive
higher fractions of the EU budget which the authors attribute to an exchange
with the promotion of security interests. Another example for diffuse reci-
procity is development aid and voting behavior in the United Nations General
Assembly. Rather than a vote buying tit-for-tat strategy (specific reciprocity),
the evidence speaks more in favor of strategic loyalty and diffuse reciprocity
(Brazys et al. 2017).
In climate policy, high hopes have been put on reciprocity recently. A central
point of reference to the Paris Agreement has been that parties should submit
plans for Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). These are voluntary,
non-binding commitments under international law. Even though comparabil-
ity has not always been given, it represents an effort to ensure transparency
about expected contributions. These contribution plans comprise a framework
of five-year cycles 36that follow the idea of “pledge and review”: countries
first communicate or update their NDC which is followed by an aggregated
information synthesis that feeds global stockages that inform on the progress
made.37 Based on this information, countries can decide upon new NDCs
and a new cycle starts. There is hope of establishing something that can be
described as “soft reciprocity” where leadership efforts are reciprocated by in-
creased ambition of others (Falkner 2016). From this point of view, NDCs are
institutional arrangements that could make reciprocal behavior more likely.
The next section will elaborate whether this hope of reciprocal reactions that
trigger a “ratcheting up” of ambition seems reasonable.
5.4 an application to ndcs in climate policy
5.4.1 Reciprocity and Motivations
When one tries to apply the evidence both from the field of (behavioral) eco-
nomics and research on IR to the application of NDCs in climate policy one
may state at first that a broad body of research documents reciprocal behav-
ior. Simple economic experiments quite strikingly show the human motiva-
35 Such reciprocal considerations are also present in the electorate. In a survey experiment Chu
(2019) examines the attitude of US residents to the treatment of prisoners of war and the
interplay with information on obligations under international humanitarian law. The results
suggest that preferences are shaped by the behavior of the conflicting party which leads to
reciprocal preferences (especially among those who believe that humane treatment of prisoners
was a legal obligation).
36 Although the Paris Agreement does not include a settlement whether to use five or ten years
cycles the provision exists that the governing body shall consider common time frames (Müller
and Ngwadla 2016).
37 These global stockages on the one hand, reviews whether the pledges have been kept
“backward-looking track” and on the other hand projects the level of aggregated contributions
“forward-looking track” (Müller and Ngwadla 2016).
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tion to act in a reciprocal or conditionally cooperative manner. Given that in
a simplified form, the climate change problem can be represented by a Pris-
oner’s Dilemma (Keohane and Oppenheimer 2016) the evidence suggests that
a large fraction of people would choose cooperation as a response to cooper-
ation if the game was played sequentially (Clark and Sefton 2001; Miettinen
et al. 2017). A similar pattern holds for the representation through a public
goods game (see Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr 2001, for example).
Regarding the mechanisms that motivate reciprocal behavior, the explana-
tion of outcome based social preferences as a ground for reciprocal behavior
may be well tied to a lab context where different actions commonly result
in a departure from equal payoffs. In international climate policy the states
involved, however, differ in so many relevant dimensions of comparison (not
only their GDP) from the outset such that there are well reasoned doubts
whether inequality aversion provides a central motivation for reciprocal be-
havior. The idea of intention-based reciprocity, on the other hand, seems plau-
sible. This means that friendly behavior of the counterpart is encountered by
a friendly reaction and vice-versa for hostile behavior. Similarly, the idea that
there exists a norm of reciprocity that people follow seems quite reasonable.
In particular, if all actors consider the topic or public good to be important
and feel a sense of obligation to address the issue, it is quite likely that they
feel a requirement to follow the norm of reciprocity. This also forges a bridge
to the literature in political science, that uses this sense of obligation as a
precondition for diffuse reciprocity.
5.4.2 Specific or Diffuse Reciprocity?
Using the framework by Keohane (1986) and following the division into dif-
fuse and specific reciprocity, one has to realize that specific reciprocity in the
domain of carbon dioxide mitigation through the pledge and review process
seems quite unlikely. Lamp (2018) argues that already the UNFCCC principle
of common but differentiated responsibility can at best be regarded as a form
of diffuse reciprocity as it creates a moral obligation for all participants to
make contributions to the common goal of climate change mitigation. Like-
wise, the Paris agreement’s pledge and review mechanism is characterized by
diffuse reciprocity (and a lack of specific reciprocity). The commitments made
in the NDCs are often written in a vague tone and a strict enforcement institu-
tion is simply not present such that Lamp (2018) argues that the concept could
be described as a very diffuse notion of reciprocity. This in a certain sense may
resemble the nature of the underlying problem. Unlike, for example in con-
trolling the depletion of the ozone layer through the Montreal Protocol, the
problem is more complex and a prescription of certain substances (such as
banning CO2) conditional on a ban in other countries as well, such that be-
havior is reduced to a quasi binary decision, is quite unlikely. So this very
clear-cut form of reciprocity which is inherent in international law and which
one can observe in many domains of international policy as for example the
prohibition of weapons of war, provisions on the treatment of prisoners of
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war, the submission to international jurisdiction, international trade or visa
regulations probably cannot be applied here.
5.4.3 Positive Reciprocity
Accordingly, the hopes are based on diffuse reciprocity within the scope of
the pledge and review process. When pursuing the question whether it is
likely that this process results in diffuse reciprocity we have to reason about
the motivations of countries to act reciprocally. Subsequently, we need to clar-
ify how reciprocity can be expressed. i.e. describe the scope of action before
we discuss factors that might facilitate or impede diffuse reciprocity. Follow-
ing Keohane’s sense of obligation it is first of all important that the countries
involved consider climate policy to be an urgent issue. At this point, the in-
volvement of civil society is a crucial element. Public pressure to follow (or
not fall behind) the example of countries that set a good example may be use-
ful in achieving positive reciprocity. Regarding intrinsic reciprocity, there are
no signs that political decision makers act fundamentally less positive recip-
rocal as compared to students in the lab as discussed previously. Also from a
strategic perspective it seems reasonable to be of good intentions and act in a
positive reciprocal manner. Countries interact on many different levels and are
often dependent on the goodwill of others and a crowding out of others’ con-
tributions can lead to reputational losses. Or, as Keohane and Oppenheimer
(2016, p.274) put it “Proceeding by small steps to build confidence and gen-
erate patterns of reciprocity is not a timid, second-best strategy. Instead, it is
essential, because in world politics authority is divided, national preferences
vary and there is pervasive suspicion that states seek self-interested gains at
the expense of others.”
As a result, there is at least some scope for positive reciprocity. A strength of
the pledge and review approach is the flexibility such that the mechanism for
ratcheting up38 the NDCs allows for a dynamic response to others’ changes
in successive rounds (Lamp 2018). However, an important prerequisite for
positive reciprocity to work is that transparency about others’ contributions
prevails and that they are verifiable such that for pledge and review to be
successful a highly effective review mechanism is needed (Keohane and Vic-
tor 2016). This allows to check whether pledges of other parties were credibly
implemented. To date, there are doubts whether the current structure is ade-
quate for a timely analysis and review (Jacoby, Chen, and Flannery 2017).
In addition, a problem of a more general nature is that the contributions
may relate to a multiplicity of dimensions like greenhouse gas mitigation,
technology transfers, adaptation aid or joint projects with developing coun-
tries. Hence contributions are difficult to compare and it is difficult to set
them off against each other. Some contributions are not listed either and one
cannot expect positive reciprocity for contributions no one knows of.
38 The Paris Agreement demands countries to go beyond previous NDCs up to their highest
possible level of ambition.
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5.4.4 Negative Reciprocity
Another question relates to the scope for negative diffuse reciprocity if oth-
ers do not live up to their promises. One possibility would be to cut own
contributions in this case. For many decision-makers in western democracies
this option does not sound very promising as the response of public opin-
ion would be quite devastating. Survey evidence of Tingley and Tomz (2014)
show that even US citizens would not argue for an increase in emissions in
this case. In addition, this collective punishment would also affect countries
that are still contributing. Increasing own emissions would “undermine the
entire effort of collective goods provision” (Bernauer 2013, p.429). Alternatives
would be to apply a direct punishment. Such punishment could for example
comprise ostracizing those countries from global club goods such as interna-
tional trade. Such sanctions do not only impose costs to the punished country
but also impose costs for the punisher which creates a second order public
good problem. From experimental economics we know that many humans
would be willing to bear monetary costs in order to punish those that didn’t
act cooperatively. However, there is a substantial threat of damaging these
club goods and initiating a downward spiral of negative reciprocity. Such a
downward spiral would also be stimulated by the fact that other countries
would be undiscerning to this issue-linking and react by countervailing mea-
sures themselves in a tit-for-tat manner. And analogously to the literature in
experimental economics, antisocial punishment is not unlikely to occur.
A remaining option consists in a naming and shaming approach, to ex-
pose those states publicly that do not adhere to their promises or do not
cooperate at all thereby punishing them by damaging their reputation. Being
stigmatized as a non-cooperating country “could hurt the state with respect
to issues in which it has clear interests”(Keohane and Victor 2016, p.273). The
pledge and review system could thereby be conceived as an instrument to put
moral pressure on the actors involved. Applying the argument of the moral
wiggle room, however, sophisticated players could anticipate this and find a
plausible excuse not to enter or leave the pledge and review process of the
Paris Agreement.
5.5 conclusion and outlook
Concluding, we can speak of a broad range of instances of reciprocal behav-
ior and theories on reciprocity in both economics and international relations
research. In economics, simple games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the
Public Goods Game provided valuable insights on positive and negative reci-
procity. The evidence is large enough so that one can speak of a “homo recip-
rocans” that shows behavioral patterns that can be described as conditional
cooperation. The next chapter will provide us with an experiment that investi-
gates how stable this behavioral type is across games. Regarding international
relations, both theoretical approaches as well as empirical examples and em-
pirical evidence demonstrate the relevance of reciprocal behavior.
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Regarding the application to climate policy and NDCs, we can state that
there is scope for positive reciprocity while negative reciprocity may be con-
sidered problematic. But is an upward trend feasible? Basically, as previously
described, there is reason to assume that countries may react positively to the
efforts of others. Whereas for many governments it is not so easy to increase
their own emissions as a reaction to others failing to meet their promises. In
addition, climate summits offer much scope for restarts of cooperation such
that downward trends could be mitigated. Problematic for reciprocal reac-
tions is on the one hand that the contributions may relate to a multiplicity of
dimensions and on the other hand that some contributions are not listed in
the NDCs and consequently cannot be replied.
On a meta level, however, the more important question is whether relying
on diffuse reciprocity is the ultimate end in this endeavor. Finally, the Paris
Agreement is an ongoing process (Keohane and Oppenheimer 2016). Maybe
there is a way of implementing elements of specific reciprocity such as the
proposal (see Cramton, Ockenfels, and Tirole 2017, for example) of (national)
taxes on greenhouse gases in combination with border tax adjustments that
apply to imports from those countries that do not implement a tax on green-
house gases themselves .
6
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6.1 introduction
Regarding reciprocity as a prerequisite for successful leadership, the previous
chapter pointed out the contribution of behavioral economics to establish the
behavioral relevance of another type beyond the purely payoff-maximizing
“homo oeconomicus”, named “homo reciprocans”, who represents a large
fraction of the population.40
If a researcher needs to determine behavioral types of subjects in the lab,
there are essentially two methods available to him. On the one hand, he can
use the method introduced by Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001) which
relies on a conditional contribution vector elicited by the strategy method
in a one-shot public goods game (FGF hereafter).41 This method is typically
based on a set of 22 questions.42 On the other hand, a simple sequential pris-
oner’s dilemma (SPD hereafter), for which only three questions are sufficient,
can be used for type classification as well (Miettinen et al. 2017; Kosfeld 2019;
Eichenseer and Moser 2019b). For a researcher, the question arises whether us-
ing the simpler method is sufficient for type classification as it may save time
and reduce cognitive load for the participants. To the best of our knowledge,
there exists no systematic comparison of classification congruence between
these two procedures.
Consequently, the aim of this chapter is to assess the stability of classifica-
tions across games thereby contributing to the literature on the within subject
stability of cooperation preferences (Blanco, Engelmann, and Normann 2011;
Volk, Thöni, and Ruigrok 2012). To this end, we compare the types assigned
by SPD to those assigned by FGF in its latest refinements (Fallucchi, Luccasen,
and Turocy 2018; Thöni and Volk 2018). The remainder of this chapter will be
as follows: Section 2 describes the experimental design and procedures. Sec-
tion 3 presents and discusses our results. Section 4 provides as short summary
and concludes.
39 This chapter is a slightly modified version of Eichenseer and Moser (2019a).
40 See also, for example, Fehr and Gächter (2000), Dohmen et al. (2009), and Kosfeld (2019).
41 This method is by now the most commonly used one and, for example, labeled as “P-
Experiment” in Fischbacher and Gächter (2010).
42 As a second-mover, subjects are typically asked to specify their contribution conditional on
the other players’ average contribution for integers in the interval [0, 20]. This results in 21
questions plus an unconditional contribution question for the role as first-mover.
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6.2 design and procedures
6.2.1 Protocol
The experiment was programmed in LimeSurvey and conducted on Amazon
Mechanical Turk (MTurk henceforth) in December 2018 using a sample of
MTurk experienced US residents. In total, 232 participants took part in the
experiment earning $2.85 on average with an average completion time of ap-
proximately 13 minutes. About half of the subjects (120) played SPD first,
while the other half (112) was doing the FGF task first. Subsequently, the
participants completed a short questionnaire on age, gender, and education.
Instructions for the experiment can be found in Appendix B.
6.2.2 Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma (SPD)
In the SPD we have two players, indexed by i = 1, 2. Each player can choose
between actions SEND (S) and KEEP (K). Choices are elicited by using the
strategy method such that Player 2 can condition his choice on the action
of Player 1. Figure 8.1 depicts the structure of the game in extensive form
including the resulting final payoffs in POINTS (worth $0.05 each). The social
optimum is reached when Player 1 chooses S and Player 2 responds with
action S as well. However, maximizing their own payoffs means that Player
2 will choose action K at both decision nodes and Player 1, who anticipates
this behavior, chooses K at the beginning. This is the unique subgame-perfect
equilibrium of this game. Hence, the decision situation resembles a sequential
prisoner’s dilemma.
P1
P2
(20 , 20)
S
(0 , 30)
K
S
P2
(30 , 0)
S
(10 , 10)
K
K
Figure 6.1: Payoff structure of the sequential prisoner’s dilemma
All subjects state decisions for both being Player 1 and 2 (strategy method).
They are randomly allocated to one of these roles at the end of the experi-
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ment and paid accordingly. The set of strategies, Xi, in this game for Player 2
is given by Xi = {SS, KK, SK, KS}.43 Based on the participants’ conditional sec-
ond mover’s choices, we can classify subjects as altruists (unconditional coop-
erators), conditional cooperators (cooperate only if the first-mover cooperates),
free-riders (never cooperate), and mismatchers (counteract the other player) as
depicted in Table 6.1.
Cooperation type Strategy
Conditional cooperator (CC) (SEND, KEEP)
Selfish (SF) (KEEP, KEEP)
Altruist (AL) (SEND, SEND)
Mismatcher (MM) (KEEP, SEND)
Table 6.1: Cooperation types in SPD
6.2.3 Sequential Public Goods Game (FGF)
For the conditional contributions task in FGF, we used an adapted version of
the procedure of Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001). Four players, indexed
by i = 1, 2, 3, 4, play a sequential public goods game in which one player
makes his contribution after observing the other three players’ rounded av-
erage contribution when they were moving simultaneously beforehand. The
resulting payoff of player i with initial endowment yi = 20 POINTS is given
by:
pii = yi − gi + α
4
∑
j=1
gj
where gi ∈ [0, 20] denotes individual contributions and α = 0.4 is the marginal
per capita return (MPCR) of the public good. Choices are elicited by using the
strategy method such that every player i makes a choice both for being one
of the three first-movers (unconditional contribution) and being a second-mover
(contribution table). As a second-mover, subjects condition their contribution gi
on the average contribution (rounded to the next integer) of the first-movers
which results in a conditional contribution path. Subjects are randomly as-
signed roles of first- and second-movers at the end of the experiment. For the
type classification, only the contribution table of a subject is considered. The
classification of Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001) results in four types: a
conditional cooperator whose contributions increase with other players’ contri-
butions, a selfish type who never cooperates, a triangle cooperator with hump-
shaped contributions, and the remaining subjects who do not fit either one of
the classifications.
43 The first action is played when Player 1 chooses SEND and the second action is played when
Player 1 chooses KEEP.
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Recently, there have been two proposals to refine the classification based on
Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001): (i) the method of Thöni and Volk (2018),
which is based on the Pearson correlation coefficient and (ii) the method of
Fallucchi, Luccasen, and Turocy (2018), which is based on hierarchical cluster-
ing. We will describe the behavioral types resulting from both refinements in
Section 6.3.2. They have in common that they entail a behavioral type whose
description comes close to the altruist in SPD: the unconditional cooperator
(UC) in Thöni and Volk (2018) and the unconditional high type (UHC) in
Fallucchi, Luccasen, and Turocy (2018).
6.3 results
6.3.1 Contribution Paths in FGF by SPD Type
As a first step in our data analysis, we provide a visual inspection to see
whether there is a systematic relationship between behavioral types in SPD
and contribution paths in FGF which follow from the subjects’ conditional
contributions. Figure 6.2 depicts contribution paths in FGF by SPD type.44
Figure 6.2: Contribution paths by SPD classification in FGF
There are considerable differences between types. Compared to subjects classi-
fied as “selfish” in SPD, contributions of “conditional cooperators” (CC) have
a decisively steeper slope in the contributions of others, i.e., they match others’
contributions to a larger degree. In addition, subjects classified as “altruist” in
44 We excluded the mismatcher type in this graph, since it is a rare empirical phenomenon (9 of
232 subjects) whose behavior is difficult to interpret.
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SPD have the highest intercept which reflects that they give most when others
give nothing. In line with expectations, “selfish” types have, on average, the
lowest conditional contributions for every level of average contributions of
others.
Contribution
OLS(1) OLS(2) Tobit(1) Tobit(2)
Conditional cooperator 4.573∗∗∗ 0.174 7.688∗∗∗ 3.394∗∗∗
(0.499) (0.350) (1.003) (1.021)
Altruist 6.426∗∗∗ 3.781 10.299∗∗∗ 8.432∗∗
(1.798) (2.410) (2.796) (3.639)
Mismatcher 3.545∗∗∗ 2.339∗ 6.970∗∗∗ 7.415∗∗∗
(0.999) (1.278) (1.455) (2.142)
Avg. contr. of others (ACO) 0.665∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗ 0.970∗∗∗ 0.720∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.045) (0.034) (0.061)
Conditional cooperator X ACO 0.440∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.074)
Altruist X ACO 0.265∗ 0.148
(0.142) (0.182)
Mismatcher X ACO 0.121 -0.075
(0.144) (0.188)
Constant -3.071∗∗∗ -0.358∗∗ -10.007∗∗∗ -7.115∗∗∗
(0.359) (0.170) (1.017) (0.933)
Observations 4872 4872 4872 4872
Subjects 232 232 232 232
R2 0.483 0.518
Pseudo R2 0.114 0.118
Note: Cluster-robust standard errors (on the subject-level) are in parentheses. Tobit re-
gressions account for 1,646 left-censored and 346 right-censored observations. ACO
abbreviates “average contributions of others”. The ‘selfish’ type serves as a reference
category.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 6.2: Regression Table - Contribution paths
In Table 6.2, we examine whether this visual interpretation can be sup-
ported statistically. Columns OLS(1) and Tobit(1) assume a common slope of
all types in the average contribution of others (ACO) - and only different inter-
cepts - whereas OLS(2) and Tobit(2) take different slopes for different SPD
types into account. The Tobit regressions consider observations censored at 0
and 20. Both regressions OLS(2) and Tobit(2) indicate that conditional coop-
erators show a significantly larger reaction to others’ contributions compared
to the reference category of selfish types. This corresponds to the graphical
findings reported in Figure 6.2. Moreover, the coefficient of the intercept - the
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unconditional contribution - is largest for the altruist type and significantly
different from the reference category of selfish types in the regressions OLS(1),
Tobit(1), and Tobit(2).
6.3.2 Relationship between Classification Methods
We now investigate the relationship between the discrete behavioral types
classified by SPD and FGF in the refinements of Thöni and Volk (2018) and
Fallucchi, Luccasen, and Turocy (2018). The refinement of Thöni and Volk
(2018) of FGF (FGF-T hereafter) resembles a theory-driven approach and is
based on the Pearson correlation coefficient. It distinguishes the five behav-
ioral types depicted in Table 6.3.
Type Behavior
Free-rider (FR) Zero contributions.
Conditional cooperator (CC) Monotonically increasing pattern in others’ contributions.
Unconditional cooperator (UC) Constant contributions irrespective of what others do.
Triangle cooperator (TC) “Hump-shaped” contributions.
Other Undefined contribution pattern.
Table 6.3: Cooperation types in Thöni and Volk (2018)
In our sample, we can categorize 184 out of 232 subjects (79.3%) as conditional
cooperators (CC) using the FGF-T refinement.45 Conditional cooperators also
constitute the largest group in SPD with a share of 57.8%. The second largest
group are selfish types that account for 33.6% of all subjects in SPD and 13.8%
in FGF-T. In both games, these two categories cover the vast majority of sub-
jects. Table 6.4 reports the number and percentage of subjects falling into each
possible combination of the two methods in a contingency table.
Behavioral type FGF− T
B
eh
av
io
ra
l
ty
pe
SP
D
FR CC UC TR Other Total
Sel f ish 27 44 1 5 1 78
(11.64%) (18.97%) (0.43%) (2.16%) (0.43%) (33.62%)
CC 4 125 2 2 1 134
(1.72%) (53.88%) (0.86%) (0.86%) (0.43%) (57.76%)
Altruist 1 8 2 0 0 11
(0.43%) (3.45%) (0.86%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (4.74%)
Mismatcher 0 7 2 0 0 9
(0.00%) (3.02%) (0.86%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (3.88%)
Total 32 184 7 7 2 232
(13.79%) (79.31%) (3.02%) (3.02%) (0.86%) (100.00%)
Table 6.4: Types in SPD and FGF (Refinement of Thöni and Volk 2018)
45 This is close to the 80.6% CC share reported in the US sample of Kocher et al. (2008).
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Comparing the classification of SPD and FGF-T, we see that slightly more
than half of all subjects (125 of 232) are classified as CC according to both
methods, while 11.6% are classified as selfish types in both games (27 of 232).
Overall, only around 13.8% of the subjects (32 of 232) are classified in a cat-
egory different from selfish or CC according to at least one of the methods.
The results of a χ2-test suggests that the characteristics of both methods are
not independent (p < 0.001). Hence, we can reject the null-hypothesis that
there is no relationship between the two classification methods.
Conditional relative frequencies allow us to get a better picture of the type
stability across games. About 93.3% of the subjects who are classified as CC
in SPD, are also classified as CC according to FGF-T. However, individuals
classified as “selfish” in SPD, are classified as “selfish” according to FGF-T
only in around 34.6% of the cases. This indicates that SPD performs well in
identifying subjects who have a consistent pattern of conditional cooperation
across games, while this does not hold for selfish types.
Conversely, starting from FGF, subjects classified as CC according to FGF-T,
are in around 67.9% of the cases also CC in SPD, and those who are classified
as “selfish” according to FGF-T are in around 84.4% of the cases also “self-
ish” in SPD. This means that FGF is better suited to identify types who are
classified as “selfish” in both games compared to SPD.
Type Behavior
Own maximizers (OWN) Zero contributions.
Strong conditional cooperators (SCC) Match others’ contributions exactly.
Weak conditional cooperators (WCC) Increasing contributions, less than one-for-one.
Unconditional high contributors (UCH) Contribute fully irrespective of what others do.
Other Undefined contribution pattern.
Table 6.5: Cooperation types in Fallucchi, Luccasen, and Turocy (2018)
These findings are robust when changing to the refinement of Fallucchi,
Luccasen, and Turocy (2018), which is based on hierarchical clustering and re-
sembles a data-driven approach (FGF-F hereafter). The FGF-F categorization
splits the CC category and distinguishes between weak conditional coopera-
tors (WCC) and strong conditional cooperators (SCC). The type classification
of FGF-F is depicted in Table 6.5. In our experimental sample, there has not
been a distinct cluster of “Other” types and, hence, we only consider four
behavioral types.
Table 6.6 presents the contingency table of types. Again, a χ2-test shows
that the type classifications are not independent (p < 0.001), indicating a sig-
nificant relationship between the two methods. If we look at the conditional
relative frequencies, we see that conditional on being classified as CC type in
SPD, the relative frequency is 88.8% to be classified as either WCC or SCC
according to FGF-F. By contrast, a subject classified as selfish in SPD is only
selfish in 39.7% of the cases according to FGF-F.
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Behavioral type FGF− F
B
eh
av
io
ra
l
ty
pe
SP
D
OWN WCC SCC UCH Total
Sel f ish 31 37 10 0 78
(13.86%) (15.95%) (4.31%) (0.00%) (33.62%)
CC 11 45 74 4 134
(4.74%) (19.40%) (31.90%) (1.72%) (57.76%)
Altruist 1 2 6 2 11
(0.43%) (0.86%) (2.59%) (0.86%) (4.74%)
Mismatcher 0 6 3 0 9
(0.00%) (2.59%) (1.29%) (0.00%) (3.88%)
Total 43 90 93 6 232
(18.53%) (38.79%) (40.09%) (2.59%) (100.00%)
Table 6.6: Types in SPD and FGF (Refinement of Fallucchi, Luccasen, and Turocy
2018)
Starting from FGF-F, a subject sorted in the group of selfish types accord-
ing to FGF-F, is also selfish in SPD in 72.1% of the cases. By contrast, the
relative frequency of being CC in SPD is only 65.0% when being classified
as either WCC and SCC according to FGF-F. When distinguishing between
WCC and SCC, we observe that in the group of those who are classified as
WCC according to FGF-F, only 50% are also classified as CC in SPD, whereas
in the group of those who are classified as SCC, almost 80% are classified as
CC in SPD. Thus, the distinction between WCC and SCC predicts the relative
frequency of being CC in SPD quite well. Likewise, the relative frequency of
being selfish in SPD is highest for OWN maximizers, followed by WCC and
SCC types.
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 illustrate the respective intersections between SPD and
FGF - for CC and selfish types - graphically by using Venn diagrams. The
solid circles represent the respective sets of CC and selfish types according
to SPD, while the dashed circles represent these types according to the FGF
classification. The intersection of both circles illustrates the set of subjects who
are of the same type according to both methods. In Figure 6.4 (left), the WCC
and SCC types are pooled as conditional cooperators.
The fact that the overlap between selfish types in SPD and FGF is quite
small leaves room for further research. One hypothesis would be that the FGF
method underestimates the share of selfish types. Confused types, who do
not understand the rules of the game completely, may act as if they were co-
operative types in FGF (see Detemple, Kosfeld, and Kröll 2019). Assuming
that the SPD imposes fewer cognitive load on subjects would allow for the
hypothesis that the share of confused types is lower in this game and, conse-
quently, the share of selfish types should be higher in SPD compared to the
FGF method. This might explain why many of the selfish types in SPD behave
cooperatively in FGF.
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Figure 6.3: Venn diagrams of SPD and FGF-T (Refinement of Thöni and Volk 2018)
Figure 6.4: Venn diagrams of SPD and FGF-F (Refinement of Fallucchi, Luccasen, and
Turocy 2018)
6.4 summary and conclusion
We provided an online experiment, in which we investigated the consistency
of two methods for classifying different cooperation types. With regard to dis-
crete behavioral types, our results indicate that SPD performs very well in
identifying subjects with a stable pattern of conditional cooperation. Given
that a subject is of CC type in SPD, the probability is 93.3% to be classified as
CC as well according to FGF-T (refinement of Thöni and Volk 2018) and 88.8%
according to FGF-F (refinement of Fallucchi, Luccasen, and Turocy 2018), re-
spectively. We further observe that the distinction between WCC and SCC is
helpful for identifying CC types in SPD more precisely, since the likelihood
for being “selfish” in SPD is considerably higher for WCC types compared
to SCC types. Considering contribution paths in FGF, subjects classified as
conditional cooperators in SPD match others’ contributions to a significantly
larger degree compared to selfish types. This is captured in the significantly
larger slope of their conditional cooperation path.
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On this basis, we can conclude that if a researcher’s objective is is to iden-
tify those subjects in a group who are, with a high probability, conditional
cooperators in both games, the simple method of the SPD is well suited for
this task. If, on the other hand, the focus is on identifying selfish types, we
cannot offer a clear conclusion. We observe many “selfish” subjects in SPD
who show cooperative behavioral patterns in FGF. However, based on the hy-
pothesis that there is a larger share of confused types in FGF, who act as if
they were CC types, the simpler game (SPD) is not necessarily a weak tool
for identifying selfish types, but may be more accurate in measuring the true
fraction of selfish types in the population (see Detemple, Kosfeld, and Kröll
2019).
Part IV
L E A D E R S H I P I N P U B L I C G O O D S E X P E R I M E N T S
I N T R O D U C T O RY R E M A R K S T O PA RT I V
The preceding Part III has raised expectations that we may indeed see a pos-
itive reaction to pioneering activities. In particular, Chapter 5 has described
that there is evidence for reciprocal behavior in experimental economics as
well as in international relations. Chapter 6 has then demonstrated that this
preference for reciprocity expressed through conditional cooperation is quite
stable within subjects across social dilemma games. Consequently, an impor-
tant prerequisite for successful leadership seems to be present.
The question is whether we might expect that there are leaders that pre-
cede by setting a good example. In addition the interplay between leaders
and followers may be decisive in whether there is ultimately an improvement
through leadership. These questions are addressed in part IV. Chapter 7 offers
a literature review that aims at exploring main results of leading-by-example
in public goods experiments. Based on a systematic literature analysis, I exam-
ine whether leadership increases contributions to a public good and outline
factors that foster or impede leadership success. To understand how leader-
ship becomes effective, followers’ reactions as well as leadership behavior are
examined in more detail. Besides public goods games that shed light on free-
riding behavior, also coordination games will be considered. Finally, I briefly
discuss the external validity in the context of global public goods.
Subsequently,46 Chapter 8 considers a situation where leadership might be
very important. In the experimental dynamic public goods game considered
subjects can reinvest their profits from cooperation. They start with an en-
dowment of 2 Euro and could end up with around 34 Eur in the case of full
cooperation. Such a situation might resemble for example research and devel-
opment joint-ventures which generate either cost reductions or larger profits.
Such technological cooperation is a cornerstone of growth in developed coun-
tries. In a similar vein, much hope rests on technological development in inter-
national climate policy. Jointly developed improved green technologies offer
the scope to reduce the cost burden borne to mitigate climate change. Chapter
8 explores how leadership expressed through leading-by-example affects such
a dynamic public goods game. The findings suggest that leadership has a pos-
itive impact on final wealth of the groups as well as on reducing inequality
within groups as measured by the Gini index.
46 Chapter eight including this summary is based on Eichenseer and Moser (2019b).
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7
L E A D I N G - B Y- E X A M P L E I N P U B L I C G O O D S G A M E S :
W H AT D O W E K N O W ?
7.1 introduction
“We must lead the world, by deed and by example.”
Barack Obama (2007, p.4)
About a year before winning the pre-election campaign against Hillary Clin-
ton, Barack Obama made a point for visionary leadership to cope with global
problems like transnational terrorism, failed states and climate change (Obama
2007). In particular, he stressed that leading does not mean solving the prob-
lems on one’s own, but rather setting a good example. Likewise, many con-
sider leadership as an important factor that might ameliorate the problem of
free-riding and coordination failures (Arce M. 2001). Correspondingly, desires
for and expectations of leadership are high when it comes to mutual global
challenges like managing global migration flows, financial market stability,
peacekeeping or the preservation of international organizations and institu-
tions.
Consequently, there is a long tradition of studying leaders and leadership47
in the humanities that can be traced back to ancient political philosophers
like Plato (Wren 2007). Extensive literature on leaders and leadership has
developed in political science, sociology, psychology and management (see
Ahlquist and Levi 2011; Bass and Riggio 2006; Hartley 2012; Stogdill 1974; Van
Vugt and De Cremer 1999; Zehnder, Herz, and Bonardi 2017, for reviews). In
economics, a renewed focus has been laid on leadership starting with Varian
(1994) and Hermalin (1998) and especially in environmental economics the
question of leadership in mitigating climate change is an important one (see
Schwerhoff 2016, for a review). Quite recently, also a significant body of re-
search worth of review has developed in experimental economics that focuses
on the effects of leadership in social dilemma situations starting with Moxnes
and Van der Heijden (2003), Güth et al. (2007) and Levati, Sutter, and Van der
Heijden (2007). This is of particular importance, since most of the literature
on leadership is largely based on theoretical considerations and case studies.
The aim of this survey is to collect, categorize and evaluate the evolved
literature in experimental economics and present a selection of results sys-
tematically. The emphasis will be laid on the workhorse model to study such
social dilemmas: the linear public goods game in the laboratory. The remain-
der of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the methodology,
structures the topics in the literature and distills the main research questions
47 To separate the terms, a simple and straightforward definition of a leader as being someone
with followers was given by Hermalin (1998) whereas leadership can be described as an in-
fluence relation between leaders and followers to approach group or societal objectives (Wren
2007).
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which are considered in the sections following. Section 7 concludes with a
discussion of the external validity of the findings and a conclusion.
7.2 methodology and topics in the literature
7.2.1 Search Strategies
In order to cover the experimental literature on the topic, a targeted search
of the existing literature has been used. Based on the work found, main
topics and research questions are identified. A first search was conducted
in February 2017 on Repec/IDEAS by using combinations of the keywords
{sequential; leadership} + {social dilemma; public goods; contribution} +
{experiment}. This first search yielded 337 potential results. After removing
obvious duplicates, I checked whether the study considers an experimental
public goods or closely related game. An initial assessment thereof was made
based on reading the abstract. In addition, I chose to restrict the literature to
the experimental economics literature. Over the past decades, common stan-
dards for conducting economic experiments have been established such that
one can expect that they follow a comparable protocol. This means, for exam-
ple, that the experiments are incentivized. Experimental economics literature
in specific means, that the paper has been published in an economic journal
or at least one of the authors has a background in economics.
After applying these criteria and controlling for obvious duplicates, the first
search encompassed 61 studies. This Repec search served as a basis for the
literature database. Searches on google scholar and a targeted evaluation of
the quoted literature helped to track and broaden the literature. Addition-
ally, I used Mendeley suggestions and a keyword alert on google scholar to
check for new papers. An additional check for literature were the references
in Ahlquist and Levi (2011) and Schwerhoff (2016).
7.2.2 Topics in the Literature and Research Questions
Given the corpus of literature identified, it is remarkable that most experimen-
tal economic work conceives leadership as leading-by example. Accordingly,
the focus will be placed on this aspect of leadership in this review. In ad-
dition, the voluntary contribution mechanism and other linear public goods
games with summation technology represent a majority of the studies. In con-
sequence, this survey will also be based on linear public goods games in large
parts. Other public goods games in the lab and field experiments will be con-
sidered in Section 6. As far as leading-by-example is regarded, three main
research questions can be established that cover most of the studies:
Is leadership effective? (RQ1)
The first building block is the question whether leadership is effective at all
in bringing contribution levels closer to the social optimum (RQ1).48 It has
48 RQ1: Section 3 for linear public goods games with summation technology & section 6 for other
public goods games.
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become common practice in the literature to model leadership by modifying
the timing of contributions away from a simultaneous game in which every-
body contributes at the same time towards sequential play in which followers
can observe the actions or contributions of leaders. In its plain version, this
setting offers the opportunity of leading-by-example. Related to this issue are
factors that might moderate or foster the effectiveness of leadership such as
endogenous and exogenous leadership, formal power of the leader, leading
by words, uncertainty and conditional commitments.
How do followers react to leadership? (RQ2)
If one considers leadership as an influence relation between leaders and fol-
lowers, the two remaining questions of research will be the behavior of fol-
lowers and leaders and their mutual influence. The starting point and second
building block is the behavior of followers (RQ2; section 4). It encompasses
the reaction (curve) of followers, the reaction to different kinds of leadership,
and to which degree a leader has influence on the beliefs of followers.
What do we know about leader behavior and motivations? (RQ3)
Likewise studies that may help getting further insights in leader behavior are
subsumed in the third building block (RQ3; section 5) which in particular
involves the question of who is a good leader (type), the motivation and self-
selection of leaders and the interaction with monetary incentives and costs).
To answer RQ1, i.e. to measure leadership effectiveness, we need to distin-
guish between different technologies of aggregation. A technology of aggre-
gation describes how individual contributions are aggregated to the total
amount of public good provided (Sandler 2015). Depending on which tech-
nology of aggregation is employed, agents face a problem of coordination or a
problem of free-riding or both. The first and most common contribution tech-
nology considered is the summation technology. In this case the total amount
of public good corresponds to the sum of individual contributions which is
referred to as a classical problem of free-riding. This is discussed for linear
public goods games in Section 3. In Section 6, leadership in weakest-link pub-
lic goods games, threshold public goods games and summation technology
public goods games that offer predicted interior Nash equilibria will be exam-
ined.
7.3 leadership effectiveness in the linear public goods game
with summation technology
7.3.1 Leading by Example and Strategic Incentives
The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism
Given a summation technology, the most prevalent experimental setup is the
voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM, hereafter) in a linear version. In a
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game with N players, the payoff of player i in a one-shot game (or per period
in a repeated game) with initial endowment yi is given by:
pii = yi − gi + α
N
∑
j=1
gj (1)
where gi denotes individual contributions and α the marginal per capita re-
turn (MPCR) of the public good. The MPCR is set in a way (α < 1) that
zero contributions are individually rational and full contributions generate
the largest aggregated payoffs (Nα > 1). Consequently, for a parameter range
of α that fulfills 1 > α > 1N , we obtain a social dilemma situation with the
corner solution of zero contributions being the unique Nash equilibrium.
A simple and elegant solution to test a plain version of leading by example
is to give subjects the opportunity of leading by modifying the structure of
the game. One player is selected to be a first mover and the others contribute
subsequently after observing the first mover’s decision which renders the
possibility of giving a salient example for the first mover. The most basic
implementation is to select a person at random to move first.
Figure 7.1: A sequential game with one leader
In the case of a linear public good game with the usual parameters used
in the lab and assuming only purely payoff maximizing players, a simple
backwards induction argument yields that the zero contribution prediction, a
corner solution, would not change through this implementation of leadership.
However, the pattern will change if we assume that a fraction of the pop-
ulation shows reciprocal behavior (i.e. gj (gi) increasing in gi). For the first
mover equation (1) can be rewritten as:
pii = yi − (1− α)gi + α
N−1
∑
j=1
j 6=i
gj(gi). (2)
Taking the first derivative w.r.t. gi gives:
∂pii
∂gi
= α (1 +
N−1
∑
j=1
j 6=i
∂gj
∂gi
)− 1. (3)
Thus, assuming a strategic leader like Cartwright and Lovett (2014) , we ob-
tain the corner solution of full investment (i.e. ∂pii∂gi > 0) by the first mover
if:
N−1
∑
j=1
j 6=i
∂gj
∂gi
>
1− α
α
. (4)
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In case of a two player game and an MPCR of α = 0.75, this yields ∂gj∂gi >
1
3
when we assume a similar reaction of all followers while for a four player
game and the usual MPCR of α = 0.4, the average ∂gj∂gi has to be larger than
1
2 . This simple sketch for a one-shot game shows that a sufficient recipro-
cal response of followers (or an expectation thereof) gives incentives for first-
movers to invest - even if they have no preference for reciprocity themselves
i.e. stick to the standard assumptions. On behalf of the followers that act re-
ciprocally, one may assume that their investment increases if the first mover
sets an example by choosing an exemplary contribution relative to the simul-
taneous game where they can only form expectations.
As the linear public goods game with a summation technology is the stan-
dard public goods model in the laboratory, there are several studies that test
whether sequential play yields an improvement compared to simultaneous
play.
7.3.2 Exogenous Leadership
Exogenous leadership means that a player is determined by chance or by
the experimenter to move first. Regarding efficiency (total contributions), the
results of exogenous leadership are mixed at first sight. Significant positive ef-
fects are reported by Moxnes and Van der Heijden (2003),49 Güth et al. (2007),
Levati, Sutter, and Van der Heijden (2007), Pogrebna et al. (2011), Dannen-
berg (2015) and McCannon (2018), insignificant effects by Haigner and Wakol-
binger (2010), Gächter and Renner (2018), Sahin, Eckel, and Komai (2015) and
Gürerk, Lauer, and Scheuermann (2018) while Rivas and Sutter (2011) report
a significant negative effect of sequential play. This has evoked the motivation
to compute an overall effect size by using a plain meta-analysis.
Studies must meet the following inclusion criteria to be considered in the
meta-analysis: (a) there must be at least one exogenous sequential treatment
in which one leader first chooses his contribution and there must be a control
treatment in which all players contribute simultaneously. In addition (b), the
game needs to be a linear public goods game with summation technology and
complete information. Moreover (c), the game needs to be a lab experiment.
From the compilation of literature attained by the searches described in
Section 2.1, 11 studies meet these criteria. I mailed a data request to all authors
of those studies in Juli 2017 and a reminder in August 2017. Many of the
authors responded immediately and I sent a final request to the remaining
authors in 2018. After dropping studies from the list for which no data could
49 Moxnes and Van der Heijden (2003) consider a public bad experiment which is closely related
to the VCM. In addition, they restrict the choice set of the first-mover. To take account of this,
only second-mover decisions and investments in the non-damaging good will be considered
here.
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be obtained,50 this left a total of 9 studies considered.51 The analysis was
conducted using metan (Bradburn, Deeks, and Altman 1999).
To account for a small sample size, an adjusted uniform effect size measure
has been used. Hedges adjusted g is calculated (Bradburn, Deeks, and Altman
1999, p.12) as:
g =
x¯T − x¯C
σ
(
1− 3
4(nT + nC)− 9
)
(5)
where x¯T and x¯C denote means and nT and nC the number of subjects in treat-
ment (T) and control (C). The pooled standard deviation of the two groups σ
is given by:
σ =
√
(nT − 1)σ2T + (nC − 1)σ2C
(nT + nC − 1) (6)
where σT and σC indicate standard deviations in treatment and control, re-
spectively.
Figure 7.2: Forest plot for exogenous leadership
50 No data could be obtained for Haigner and Wakolbinger (2010) and McCannon (2018).
51 These studies include: Moxnes and Van der Heijden (2003), Güth et al. (2007), Levati, Sut-
ter, and Van der Heijden (2007), Pogrebna et al. (2011), Rivas and Sutter (2011), Dannenberg
(2015), Sahin, Eckel, and Komai (2015), Gächter and Renner (2018) and Gürerk, Lauer, and
Scheuermann (2018).
7.3 leadership effectiveness 108
If we compile the collected evidence in a common effects meta-analysis (a
forest plot is depicted in Figure 7.2),52 we see that the overall effect of exoge-
nous leadership is positive with a standardized mean difference of 0.377. A
test of the null hypothesis of no leadership effect (D = 0) can be rejected at
the 1% level (z = 2.60, p = 0.009) thus indicating a significant treatment ef-
fect for exogenous leadership. A I2 value of 4.2% indicates that heterogeneity
between studies of exogenous leadership is rather low. Both Egger’s test and
Begg’s test are insignificant thus rendering no indications of a publication
bias.53
So we can already state that the synopsis of all studies suggests that ex-
ogenous leadership leads to an improvement in the laboratory experiments
considered. In the next step we augment the analysis by additional factors
that might either foster or moderate the effect of leading-by-example.
7.3.3 Voluntary Leadership
One of these factors is voluntary (endogenous) leadership: the question is
whether it makes a difference whether a person decides by oneself to be a
leader (endogenous leadership) or whether the leader is exogenously deter-
mined by the experimenter. Compared to no leadership at all, higher contri-
butions in endogenous leadership are reported by Haigner and Wakolbinger
(2010) (significant), Rivas and Sutter (2011) (significant), Dannenberg (2015)
(significant) and Cappelen et al. (2016) such that the evidence so far supports
the claim that a voluntary leader improves contributions compared to having
no leader at all. Comparing exogenous and endogenous leadership, group
contributions are higher when leadership is voluntary (endogenous) which is
reflected in the studies of Haigner and Wakolbinger (2010), Rivas and Sutter
(2011) (significant) and Dannenberg (2015).
7.3.4 Formal Authority
Another modification of the simple framework considered is formal authority
of the leader. In this case, the leader can underpin the contribution norm he
created as a first mover by punishing players that do not follow the norm
or (depending on the experiment considered) reward others that follow the
norm. Formal authority is considered in the literature by the power to exclude
(ostracize) players from the public goods game (Güth et al. 2007; Levati, Sut-
ter, and Van der Heijden 2007), monetary punishment by the leader (Gürerk,
Lauer, and Scheuermann 2018) and the possibility of the leader to reward
(Sutter and Rivas 2014; Gürerk, Lauer, and Scheuermann 2018).
52 As Rivas and Sutter (2011) use data from Güth et al. (2007) for the control treatment, the
method of splitting the control treatment (see Chapter 16.5.4 of Higgins and Green 2011, for
an overview on possible approaches) has been used to mitigate the unit of analysis problem.
As a robustness check, results from the alternative method of pooling groups are reported in
Appendix C.
53 As the sample size is small with nine observations we can, however, not conclude that there is
no publication bias as the tests may be under-powered.
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Correspondingly, the question is whether leadership is more effective if it
is accompanied by formal authority. At first the answer seems to be very clear,
formal authority improves efficiency compared to a leader without sanction-
ing devices. Contributions are substantially higher when leaders have exclu-
sion power (ostracism) compared to not having it (Güth et al. 2007; Levati,
Sutter, and Van der Heijden 2007). These treatments with strong leadership
(ostracism) have shown that backing up a leader’s (good) example with the
punishment option of excluding another group member promotes coopera-
tion. In the same vein, monetary punishment increases contributions (Gürerk,
Lauer, and Scheuermann 2018) compared to sequential play without a pun-
ishment option.
When comparing a reward option of the leader to exclusion or punishment
(“the carrot or the stick”), it is apparent that the reward option is less effective
compared to exclusion (Sutter and Rivas 2014)54 and punishment (Gürerk,
Irlenbusch, and Rockenbach 2009). Having the choice between reward and
punishment, a change from the former (rewards) to the latter (negative incen-
tives) results in an enduring increase in contributions as Gürerk, Irlenbusch,
and Rockenbach (2009) point out. A similar pattern emerges in the study of
Sutter and Rivas (2014) showing that leaders with an option to reward follow-
ers are less effective than leaders with a sanctioning device through exclusion.
Obviously, reward and punishment often work in increasing cooperation
(see, for example, Fehr and Gachter 2000 and Andreoni, Harbaugh, and Vester-
lund 2003). The question is whether there is a particular effect of central-
ized punishment, i.e. a situation in which only the leader has the option to
punish. Gürerk, Lauer, and Scheuermann (2018) suggests that this is not the
case. A leader equipped with reward or punishment power does not yield an
improvement compared to the effects of rewards or punishments without a
leader in increasing contributions55.
7.3.5 Additional Factors
Words vs Actions
Moreover, in addition to leading by example via actions, leadership can also
take the shape of leading by words, i.e. non-binding commitments which are
considered by Pogrebna et al. (2011) and Dannenberg (2015). Regarding the
question, whether announcements (words) are equally effective in increasing
contributions as actions, there is contradicting evidence. Pogrebna et al. (2011)
find that non-binding announcements and binding commitments are equally
effective. In contrast, the experimental results of Dannenberg (2015) show that
leading by example is much more effective than leading by words (both for
exogenous and endogenous leadership).
54 In Rivas and Sutter (2008) data from Güth et al. (2007) is used for the comparison with exclu-
sion.
55 In this comparison every subject has the option to punish in sequential play whereas only the
leader can punish in the leadership treatment.
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Rotating Leadership and Voting
What would happen if there was a change of the leader every round? Güth
et al. (2007) consider exogenous leaders that either remain in their position for
all rounds played or that are randomly re-determined in every round. They
find that there are no significant differences between those two modes of play.
And what happens if subjects elect the leader or vote whether the institu-
tion of leadership should sustain after they have played the game for several
rounds? This question is explored by the experiments of Güth et al. (2007),
Levati, Sutter, and Van der Heijden (2007) and Sutter and Rivas (2014). In
Güth et al. (2007) every team member can vote either who shall be the leader
(rotating leadership treatments) or whether to have a leader at all (fixed lead-
ership treatments) after having played the game for 16 rounds. Leadership is
only implemented if a leader is elected unanimously. Güth et al. (2007) can
show that having a leader triggers contributions and that especially those
subjects are more likely to be elected that contributed a large amount to the
public good.56 Levati, Sutter, and Van der Heijden (2007) also find that there
will be higher contributions if a leader is appointed. However, Levati, Sutter,
and Van der Heijden (2007) find no significant relation between an individ-
ual’s contributions beforehand and the probability of being elected to be the
leader. Sutter and Rivas (2014) observe that groups were more successful in
appointing a leader if they had been more cooperative beforehand.
Leadership and Information
A source of leadership in addition to moving first and giving an example may
also be that a leader has an information advantage. Hermalin (1998) points
out that followers may believe that a leader has superior information on the
options to choose. Thus leadership can also be considered as information
transmission from a leader to followers.57 At the same time, Hermalin theo-
retically shows that the leader can also use this information strategically. In
this vein, Potters, Sefton, and Vesterlund (2007) have explored the question of
leaders’ influence when there is uncertainty about the value of cooperation. In
an environment in which the leader has private information about the returns
from contributing, leading-by-example increases contributions and earnings.
As suggested, the simple mechanism behind is that the leader can signal im-
portant information to the followers. Another source of uncertainty is that
there may be imperfect or no knowledge about individual capabilities and
benefits. Levati, Sutter, and Van der Heijden (2007) study an environment
with different endowments of the agents. Here, the presence of a leader in-
creases average contributions in case of full information about endowment
56 If groups failed to appoint a leader potential leaders themselves oftentimes prevented their
election because they were not willing to carry the “burden of leadership” (Güth et al. 2007,
p.1035) in the treatments without formal authority of the leaders.
57 Vesterlund (2003) shows theoretically that sequential donations yield an improvement if there
is imperfect knowledge about the quality of a charity.
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asymmetries. However, leadership is almost ineffective if participants do not
know the distribution of endowments58.
Alternative Move Structures
In addition to the sequential game with one leader depicted in Figure 7.1,
there are other possible move orderings. Cartwright, Lovett, and Stepanova
(2017) consider a game in which a leader is preceded by a first follower as
depicted in Figure 7.3. Compared to the game with one leader, average con-
tributions are significantly larger at the 10 % level. The same holds true when
the first-follower game is compared to a fully sequential game.
Figure 7.3: A sequential game with one leader and a first-follower
In a fully sequential game, players move one after the other (Figure 7.4). Figu-
ières, Masclet, and Willinger (2012) compare simultaneous play to such a fully
sequential game and their results indicate in groups of four that a fully se-
quential game yields significantly (10 % level) higher contributions compared
to a simultaneous game. However, this only holds true if there is information
on the contributions of those prior in the sequence. Thus, sequentiality alone
does not increase contributions but observability of all others’ prior contribu-
tions does.
Figure 7.4: A fully sequential game
Haigner and Wakolbinger (2010) and Sutter and Rivas (2014) also consider
a treatment in which one subject contributes after three others have already
chosen their contribution publicly. One may interpret such a setting either
as having three leaders or as having one leader that contributes last (Figure
7.5). Compared to simultaneous play, there are no significant differences in
average contributions.
Figure 7.5: A sequential game with three leaders
58 Sutter (2016) offers a more detailed discussion on leadership and uncertainty.
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Closely related to the alternative move structures is the setting of Helland,
Hovi, and Sælen (2018) who start the game with one exogenously chosen
leader (see Figure 7.1) which serves as the control treatment. They modify it
by giving the first mover the opportunity of contributing in a third stage after
the three followers (see Figure 7.6) which they refer to as “implicit condition-
ality”. In two accompanying treatments the leader makes either a binding or a
non-binding pledge in stage one about his contribution in stage three having
the opportunity of conditioning it on the followers’ contributions.59 Analyzing
the data in the online appendix of Helland, Hovi, and Sælen (2018) suggests
that leading with conditional commitments (either implicit, non-binding or
binding pledge) offers no significant enhancement in average contributions
compared to a plain version of leading by example (as depicted in Figure 7.1)
given that all agents have the same initial endowments and returns to the
public good.
Figure 7.6: A sequential treatment with one leader that can contribute first and last
Group Size
With regard to the generalization of the results, it is worth knowing whether
the findings obtained in relatively small experimental groups also hold true
in the context of larger groups. Unfortunately, this issue is barely addressed
in the area of linear public goods games with leadership. In a fully sequential
setting, Figuières, Masclet, and Willinger (2012) only detect small insignifi-
cant differences in average contributions when varying the group size from
four to eight players. Generally, there is a declining pattern of contributions in
the sequence (“fading reciprocity” and “vanishing leadership”). Nevertheless
there is a smaller decline in larger groups thus rendering almost the same
average contribution. In the smaller groups of four players, however, average
contributions are significantly larger than in simultaneous play (10% level),
while there is no significant difference for larger groups of eight players. In
a closely related game, the investment game, Komai and Grossman (2009)
investigate the effectiveness of one player taking a leadership position and
increasing the number of players from three to nine. The experimental results
obtained suggest that group size decreases the effectiveness of leading by ex-
ample in free-riding problems. This may be due to the incentives of leaders
and followers. A leader becomes more pivotal with an increase in group size
while a follower becomes more marginal, giving rise to free-riding incentives.
59 Together with heterogeneity in returns to the public good (αi) and the initial endowment
(yi) this renders a 3X3 factorial design with Helland, Hovi, and Sælen (2018) having nine
treatments plus one control.
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Accordingly, followers in the nine player game more often don’t follow the
leader’s example compared to the three player game. However, as the exper-
iment does not include a treatment without leadership, it remains an open
question whether leadership improves cooperation in larger groups if there is
one leader moving ahead. Even though, the evidence obtained by Komai and
Grossman (2009) suggests that leadership may be more ineffective in larger
groups.
7.4 follower behavior
7.4.1 Eliciting Follower Behavior by the Strategy Method
In the following we try to refine the analysis. While the previous section has
turned to the question whether and under what circumstances leadership can
increase cooperation within a group and thus lead to an improvement in indi-
viduals’ welfare, we now seek to further examine the effect of leadership. In
this section, the focus is primarily on the followers’ reaction. How do follow-
ers react to a leader’s contribution? Section 5 finds answers for the question
what makes leaders successful and how they recruit themselves.
A first straightforward approach to examine follower behavior is to apply
the strategy method. Experimental subjects are requested to state their con-
tribution conditional on a given hypothetical contribution level of the leader.
This procedure is continued for the whole set of actions available to the leader.
The scheme is incentive compatible as the hypothetical decision is actually
implemented given the leader’s realized decision. The procedure is similar
to Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001) with the difference that there is one
leader (Figure 7.1) instead of three in Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001) as
depicted in Figure 7.5. Thereby followers face uncertainty about other follow-
ers’ contributions which are unknown to them in a game with four players.
A major benefit of the strategy method is that the follower’s whole con-
tribution path is revealed. By contrast in a usual one shot interaction only
the reaction to a single leader contribution is disclosed. Likewise, the leader
is more salient with the strategy method as he has the followers’ unrivaled
attention. In the repeated game, the other followers’ contributions of the pre-
vious period otherwise also provide a reference point that players may align
themselves with.
Figure 7.7 describes the average contribution paths of followers as deter-
mined by the strategy method for different constellations. In the studies of
Cartwright and Lovett (2014) and Frackenpohl, Hillenbrand, and Kube (2016)
a game with four players and a MPCR of 0.4 and 0.8 are considered whereas
Gächter et al. (2012) examine a game with two players and an MPCR of 0.67.
The red dashed 45◦-line indicates a perfect matching of the leader’s contri-
butions. If the followers’ average contribution path lies below this line, this
indicates that they contribute less than leaders and vice versa. In all four cases
presented, it is evident that follower contributions are for the most part dis-
tinctly below that line. Hence, they contribute less than the leaders. Moreover,
the followers’ revealed reciprocity is not always sufficient to make a leader
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with a positive contribution better off compared to the case where he con-
tributes zero. This is indicated by the green dashed line (”Min”). The slope
of this line refers to equation (4) and the intercept is given by the conditional
contribution of follower(s)’ when the leader gives zero. If the average contri-
bution path of followers lies above this line, the leader fares better when he
contributes an amount larger than zero and accordingly vice versa for the case
that the followers’ contribution path lies below the green dashed line.
Figure 7.7: Followers’ average contribution paths (strategy method)
In the studied examples, the latter is the case for Gächter et al. (2012) and
Cartwright and Lovett (2014) with an MPCR of 0.4, whereas it pays for the
leader to contribute fully in Cartwright and Lovett (2014) with an MPCR of
0.8. In Frackenpohl, Hillenbrand, and Kube (2016) the followers match the
green dashed line almost perfectly thus providing an incentive for the leader
to invest his whole endowment in the public good.
Regarding second movers’ motivation to act reciprocally, Teyssier (2012)
shows that subjects who are sufficiently advantageous-inequity averse have a
higher probability of being a perfect conditional cooperator i.e. contribute the
same as the leader.
7.4.2 Contribution Ratios in the Repeated Game
The observation made with the strategy method that leaders contribute more
to the public good than followers is also reflected in the repeated game. In
most cases considered, there are significantly larger contributions of leaders
(e.g. Rivas and Sutter (2011) and Gächter and Renner (2018)). This picture
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solidifies considerably if we consult more studies. This is illustrated in Figure
7.8. For this purpose a contribution ratio (CR) is defined as
CR =
gF
gL
(7)
where gF and gL state the average contributions of followers and leaders.
Only very sporadically followers contribute more than leaders (Pogrebna et
al. 2011 and one treatment in Gürerk, Lauer, and Scheuermann 2018). In the
majority of cases, however, the leaders’ average contributions are considerably
higher compared to the followers.
Note: For the public bad experiment of Van der Heijden and Moxnes (2013), investments in the non
damaging good are considered. For Güth et al. (2007), Levati, Sutter, and Van der Heijden (2007) and
Sutter and Rivas (2014) only periods that do not include a voting procedure (periods 1-16) are considered.
Figure 7.8: Contribution ratios
7.4.3 Reciprocity in the Repeated Game and Followers’ Beliefs
As the strategy method has already indicated, followers react positively to
the leader’s contribution with an increase in their contributions. This is also
reflected in the repeated game. Overall, there is a high positive correlation
between leaders’ and followers’ contributions (e.g. Güth et al. (2007) and
(Figuières, Masclet, and Willinger 2012)). Moreover, changes in the leader’s
contribution level have a huge impact on followers’ behavior. Regression co-
efficients that state the marginal increase of a follower’s contribution if the
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leader increases his contribution by one unit suggest that a variation in the
leader’s contribution actually does not translate in a 1:1 variation of followers’
contributions, although there is certainly a huge impact on the contribution
decisions (e.g. regression coefficients of 0.73 in Arbak and Villeval (2013), 0.40
in Dannenberg (2015) and 0.55 in Préget, Nguyen-Van, and Willinger (2016)).60
In a game with more than two players, reciprocal consideration may not
only be a reaction to the leader’s actions, but also to the other followers. In
round 1 of a repeated public goods game a subject can only form beliefs about
the contributions of other followers. The more the game progresses the more
a subject can also condition reciprocity on other followers’ past contributions.
Consequently, it is interesting to see whether the pattern of imperfect condi-
tional cooperation observed in section 7.4.1 is also transferable to repeated
games.
Contributions and expectations relative to the leader
Contributions and expectations over rounds
Only leadership treatments are considered, in Cappelen et al. 2016 leadership without compensation.
Figure 7.9: Follower expectations (beliefs) and contributions and leader contributions
Two studies have a measure of followers’ beliefs: Gächter and Renner (2018)
ask subjects what they think all others would on average contribute and Cap-
pelen et al. (2016) ask followers about their belief on other followers’ aver-
60 Frackenpohl, Hillenbrand, and Kube (2016) show that the reaction is different in a “take”
compared to a “give” frame. In the “take” frame followers contribute 0.38 tokens for a marginal
increase of one token by the leader, whereas it is on average about 0.54 tokens in the “give”
frame.
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age contribution. The studies differ as in Gächter and Renner (2018) leaders
are randomly selected (exogenous leadership) and groups remain the same
in the course of the experiment whereas Cappelen et al. (2016) use random
re-matching after each round and endogenous leadership. Using data from
all rounds of the game and mapping average followers’ contributions to a
leader’s contribution, we can see in the upper half of Figure 7.9 that in both
studies follower contributions are in most cases below the red dashed line of
equal contributions of a leader and the followers. Typically, followers’ beliefs
rise in leader contributions. For this reason Gächter and Renner (2018) call
the leader ”belief manager”. Also Cappelen et al. (2016) state that followers’
beliefs about others’ contributions are strongly correlated with the leader’s
contribution. Moreover, the dotted green line of follower expectations is typ-
ically in between, especially in Cappelen et al. (2016) on the right hand side
of Figure 7.9. If one looks at this graph in the upper right corner, one could
hypothesize that followers expect other players’ imperfect conditional coop-
eration relative to a leader’s contribution. They react to this by being imper-
fectly conditionally cooperative relative to their expectation. The mechanism
may be the same as in level-k thinking. Looking at the contributions in the
course of the game in the lower half, we recognize as well that followers’ ex-
pectations are below leaders’ contributions but above their own contributions
on average.
Regarding a leader’s influence in a fixed group over the course of a game
Gächter and Renner (2018) state that especially in early stages of the game,
the leader has a major impact on the expectations of experimental subjects.
Leaders shape the followers’ original beliefs and contributions. In the further
course of the game, however, the followers place more emphasis on other
followers’ past behavior than on the leader’s current action. So the leader
tends to lose his importance at least to a certain extent.
7.5 leader behavior
7.5.1 Do Leaders Fare Well?
Regarding the leader, the question at hand is how they fare in terms of ma-
terial payoffs. Leaders usually fare worse than followers as we have seen in
Figure 7.8 (contribution ratio). In the majority of cases, they contribute more
to the public good and consequently receive lower absolute payoffs. Gächter
and Renner (2018, p.330) call it the “leader curse”.61 The experimental results
of Chapter 8 in a dynamic public goods game indicate that - despite this fact
- leaders are not worse off compared to the average participant in a simulta-
neous treatment. Thus the simultaneous game without a leader provides a
second noteworthy comparison.
61 This empirical phenomenon also emergence theoretically in the presence of reciprocal prefer-
ences as illustrated by a short theoretical example in Appendix E.
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Accordingly, the corresponding question is how the leader’s payoffs gener-
ally relate to those of the average player in a simultaneous public goods game.
For this purpose, we define payoffs relative to simultaneous (PRS) as:
PRS =
piL
piS
(8)
where piL and piS denote leaders’ average payoffs in the sequential treatment
and average payoffs of individuals in the simultaneous treatment respectively.
Figure 7.10 contains this measure for several studies. It turns out that lead-
ers’ payoffs are in general quite comparable to those of an average player in a
simultaneous treatment. However, having the choice between leading and not
leading, a subject would in most cases be better off choosing to be a follower
as Figure 7.8 revealed. Consequently, one has to ask what motivation people
have to take this role in voluntary (endogenous) leadership.
Note: Average leader payoffs are always compared to an average player in the simultaneous treatment
(without punishment/reward and without self-selection into the simultaneous treatment). For Güth et
al. (2007), Levati, Sutter, and Van der Heijden (2007) and Sutter and Rivas (2014) only periods that do not
include a voting procedure (periods 1-16) are considered.
Figure 7.10: Leader payoffs relative to simultaneous
7.5.2 Willingness and Motivation to Be a Leader
When given the alternative between leading and not leading, only few sub-
jects volunteer to be the leader: about a quarter choose to lead when facing the
binary option to lead by example or not to lead (Haigner and Wakolbinger
2010; Arbak and Villeval 2013; Cappelen et al. 2016). Given the additional
option to lead by words, only 13 Percent choose to lead by example and 43
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Percent want to lead by words (Dannenberg 2015). Given that leading by ex-
ample is costly, the question is what motivates those at all who agree to do
it?
Arbak and Villeval (2013) attribute this to three possible motivations: Indi-
viduals may assume that they are better off compared to situations without
leadership such that there are personal gains based on a positive reaction of
the followers. This is indicated by the fact that leadership behavior is condi-
tional on the perceived responsiveness of the followers. In the first stage of
the experiment of Arbak and Villeval (2013) subjects can give donations to
a charity in some treatments. If the charitable donations are public informa-
tion and leaders see that they are matched with less charitable participants,
leaders reduce their contributions in the public goods game (2nd stage of the
experiment). Hence leaders reduce their contribution because low charitable
giving in stage one may serve as a signal that followers are less responsive
or less generous which could be interpreted as a sign of strategic leadership.
Another motivation could be altruistic, i.e. voluntary leadership at personal
cost. The experiment of Arbak and Villeval (2013) shows that there is a strong
positive correlation between charitable behavior and the probability of decid-
ing to lead. In addition, frequent leaders contribute substantially more than
others which is driven mainly by men as females contribute almost the same
amounts in both roles (leader/follower). Related to this is a third source of
motivation - maintaining a positive self-image. Arbak and Villeval (2013) inter-
pret leading as a signal for social rank. Clues are that male subjects are more
likely to apply for leadership in general and revise contributions sharply if
not selected.
In addition, the behavioral type of a player is also crucial in the decision
whether or not to lead by example. Préget, Nguyen-Van, and Willinger (2016)
show that the probability to lead by example is significantly increased if some-
one is a conditional cooperator. Moreover, the experiment of Cappelen et
al. (2016) shows that a material compensation for being a leader increases the
willingness to be a first mover significantly from 23% without compensation
to 63.4% with “moderate compensation” to 94.4% with “high compensation”.
This goes hand in hand with a steep increase in the share of free-riders that
would volunteer to be a leader.
7.5.3 Leader Contributions
What determines the size of a leader’s contribution? As Gächter et al. (2012)
point out, a high contribution of the leader may signal that he is cooperatively
inclined but on the other hand also might be a strategic decision (as shown in
equation (4)) expecting followers to be reciprocal enough such that the leader
contribution is a good investment.
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One shot public goods games using the strategy method offer first insights.
Gächter et al. (2012) show that those subjects who are more reciprocal62 as fol-
lowers contribute more as leaders, even after controlling for optimism. Nev-
ertheless, as leaders’ beliefs on followers’ contributions are highly correlated
with their own second mover decision, part of their contribution may steam
from a false consensus effect. In the same vein, Teyssier (2012) finds that there
is a significant positive correlation between leaders’ contribution and their be-
lief about followers’ contributions. Moreover, the less risk averse leaders are,
the more they contribute.63
In repeated games, an often observed pattern is that voluntary (endoge-
nous) leaders contribute more in absolute terms than imposed ones (see e.g.
Dannenberg 2015; Rivas and Sutter 2011; Haigner and Wakolbinger 2010). In
addition, Van der Heijden and Moxnes (2013) show in a public bads game
that the costs of leading also matter for a leader’s contribution. If leaders
have no costs of acting socially they set “better” examples, i.e. invest less in a
public bad, but are also much less influential.64 In a similar vein, Cappelen et
al. (2016) study compensation for leaders. They find that a high compensation
decreases leader contributions compared to no compensation or a moderate
compensation. This reflects a "social crowding out effect" as selfish types are
attracted to be leaders. An approach that studies quite the opposite is Centor-
rino and Concina (2013). They auction the leadership position and find that
subjects indeed bid positively (around 23 of the subjects) to compete for the
role of a leader despite having no monetary incentives. The higher the bid,
the higher the first contribution to the public good. This could indicate that
high bids are chosen by those who are the more cooperative leaders. This ex-
perimental result is quite surprising given that usually only a quarter of the
subjects choose to be leaders when it is costless. To sum up, the results of Cap-
pelen et al. (2016) and Centorrino and Concina (2013) indicate that the costs
or benefits of leading induce a self-selection of cooperative or selfish types in
this position.
7.6 leadership effectiveness in other public goods games
7.6.1 Summation Technology Public Goods Games with Interior Equilibrium
The considerations so far have focused on the linear public goods game with
summation technology and predicted corner solutions. Nevertheless, many
theoretical considerations are based on settings in which the payoffs or the
utility and costs are arranged in a way that interior solutions emerge as the
predicted solution. An example for such an experimental public goods game
62 Gächter et al. (2012) come up with a new classification criterion for conditional cooperation:
a subject (follower) is denoted as a conditional cooperator if reciprocity is strong enough to
induce a selfish leader to invest parts (weak conditional cooperator) or all of the endowment
(strong conditional cooperator).
63 Gächter et al. (2012) find no significant correlation between risk-aversion and leader contribu-
tions, however, compared to Teyssier (2012) they have no incentivized measure of risk-aversion.
64 Van der Heijden and Moxnes (2013) observe that followers react more strongly to leaders who
have higher costs such that average investments in the public good remain unchanged.
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is Bracha, Menietti, and Vesterlund (2011) who introduce a convex and piece-
wise linear cost function which results in the prediction of an interior equilib-
rium. In their two player setting, average contributions are larger in sequen-
tial play compared to simultaneous play. Bracha, Menietti, and Vesterlund
(2011) explain this result by reciprocity considerations (treatments without
fixed costs).
In the theoretical literature, a first mover advantage is discussed for interior
solutions, i.e. in such a setting leaders have no incentive to proceed by large
contributions because of crowding out of followers. They rather stick to com-
mitting to low initial contributions thereby realizing a first-mover advantage.
Under these circumstances, the theoretical literature predicts that the amount
of public good provided is smaller under simultaneous play than under se-
quential play. This results in a comparison between a Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium and a Stackelberg equilibrium. Varian (1994) and Cornes and Sandler
(1996) both show that given preferences with standard properties the amount
of public good provided in an interior Stackelberg equilibrium (sequential
game) is lower than in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium (simultaneous game).65
Gächter et al. (2010) allow for a first-mover advantage. They modify the
linear public goods game discussed in equation (1) by introducing decreasing
marginal returns from the shared account (public good). In addition, there is
heterogeneity in the returns from the public good between the two players
in the game. They examine two different parameterizations: one in which
a first-mover advantage is theoretically predicted (i.e. the first-mover could
commit to zero contributions in the sequential game) and one with the general
prediction of a standalone allocation in which only the player with the high
returns contributes. In both settings, a sequential protocol with either the
agent with the high or the one with the low returns moving first is compared
to a simultaneous protocol. In general, considering both settings, there seems
to be no first-mover advantage even when it is predicted. On the contrary,
the player with the higher returns from the public good as first mover has a
tendency to fare worse compared to being the second mover or being in the
simultaneous game. Second movers seem to oppose unfair outcomes even if
this means foregoing monetary payoffs. Comparing total contributions under
sequential and simultaneous play there are no significant differences except
for the case when the player with the highest returns moves first. In this
case, contributions are significantly lower in sequential play compared to a
simultaneous play.
Consequently, as a first mover advantage does not really materialize it is
unclear whether such an ordering really emerges, especially the one in which
the player with the high returns from the public good moves first. Nosenzo
and Sefton (2011) give an answer to this question. Allowing subjects to en-
dogenously choose their contribution stage they find that subjects avoid the
setting in which the agent with a high return of the public good moves first
65 However, if followers either have social preferences (e.g. inequity aversion), act reciprocally or
the leader’s contributions changes the follower’s beliefs, one can assume a positive response to
leadership (upward sloping response curves) as shown by Buchholz and Sandler (2017). Hence
even leaders with standard preferences would have some incentive to proceed by setting a
good example.
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(and can commit to a low contribution). The largest fraction of subjects prefers
to contribute in the second stage even though the theoretical prediction would
be for both players to opt for contributing first.
7.6.2 Weakest Link Public Goods Games
A weakest link game is a variant of a public goods game in which the min-
imum contribution of the players involved determines the total amount of
public good available to all. It resembles a collective action problem as play-
ers have to coordinate. At the same time, no free-riding incentives emerge as
free-riding would bring provision levels to zero (Sandler 2015). Examples for
weakest-link aggregation can be found in disease control or financial stability
(Kaul et al. 2003).
Weber, Camerer, and Knez (2004) compare a weakest link public goods
game in which three players move one after the other (fully sequential) with
information about contributions of those prior in the sequence to one in which
players contribute simultaneously. Minimum choices in the weakest-link pub-
lic goods game are significantly higher in the fully sequential treatment (see
Figure 7.5) compared to the sequential treatment giving rise to increased effi-
ciency under sequential play.
In a more classical leader follower relation, Cartwright, Gillet, and Van Vugt
(2013) study the effect of one player going ahead in groups of four. The leader
is either selected at random (exogenous leadership) or a volunteer (endoge-
nous leadership) such that there are two leadership treatments. The results in-
dicate that there is no statistically significant difference between the two, such
that moving from exogenous to endogenous leadership seems to have little
effect. Comparing treatments with leadership to a simultaneous treatment of
equal sized groups of four shows that groups in the leadership treatments do
better in coordination. Minimum contributions are larger and subjects earn
more indicating an increase in efficiency. In addition, coordination levels im-
prove over time (dynamic improvement).66 Cartwright, Gillet, and Van Vugt
(2013) observe a positive reaction of followers when the leader proceeds with
a large contribution. Choices of followers are positively correlated to those of
the leader. However, there are not so many leaders that choose to contribute a
lot such that leadership could unleash its full effect of improving coordination
in some groups.
For a six player weakest link game, Sahin, Eckel, and Komai (2015) ex-
amine two forms of leadership, leading by example and leading by words.
There is either a first mover that can choose the level of contributions which
is observed by five other players that move simultaneously afterwards (com-
mitment) or a first mover that makes suggestions (cheap talk). Compared to
simultaneous play, both of them, cheap-talk or commitment, equally improve
efficiency. There is no statistically significant difference in the two modes of
leadership in reducing coordination failures. Raised ambition by the leaders
either in the form of cheap talk or commitment has a positive impact on
66 However, leadership does not yield an improvement in efficiency compared to groups of three
contributing simultaneously.
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the followers’ contributions. Sahin, Eckel, and Komai (2015) interpret this as
strong evidence for conditional cooperation.
7.6.3 Threshold/Step Level Public Goods Games
In a step level or threshold public goods game, a public good is only provided
when a minimum level of contributions, a provision point, is met. For instance,
charities may have properties of step-level public goods (Normann and Rau
2015) or threshold public goods. Erev and Rapoport (1990) consider a simple
binary version of a threshold public goods game in which a minimum of three
of five group members have to contribute. A simple backwards induction ar-
gument yields that a fully sequential move structure in which players move
one after the other has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of provi-
sion in which earlier players contribute little or nothing compared to those
later in the sequence. By contrast in a simultaneous version there are multiple
equilibria including inefficient ones without provision. The empirical results
of Erev and Rapoport (1990) indicate that fully sequential play is indeed more
efficient in providing the public good compared to simultaneous play. How-
ever, not all subjects follow the game theoretic prediction of exploiting later
movers.
Enriching the setting with treatments that include a refund if the provision
point is not met, Coats, Gronberg, and Grosskopf (2009) similarly find that
(fully) sequential play increases efficiency compared to simultaneous play for
a given refund rule in groups of four. Within treatments of sequential play,
however, a refund does not significantly increase efficiency while this is the
case in simultaneous play. Related to that, Coats and Neilson (2005) also study
possible motivations of first movers and state that their behavior supports
beliefs in reciprocity of those later in the sequence.
Adding a second step level in some of the treatments, Normann and Rau
(2015) study a two player game under simultaneous and sequential play. Once
again, higher efficiency has been achieved in the sequential treatments. In
addition, second movers punish low contributions by giving little themselves,
acting reciprocally and thereby deviating from their best response such that
exploitation by earlier movers is limited.
Summing up, moving fully sequential unequivocally increases the provi-
sion of step level public goods. However, there is still an experiment missing
to test what happens if followers move simultaneously after a leader has made
his decision. This question is dedicated to future research.
7.6.4 Field Experiments
Obviously, it is also worth knowing what happens when one goes beyond
studying students’ behavior in the lab. There are two experiments that probe
the effectiveness of leading-by example in a lab in the field setting.
Jack and Recalde (2015) study in a rural area of Bolivia whether elected
authorities have a larger impact on local public good provision when mov-
ing ahead compared to randomly selected citizens or no leadership at all. A
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main finding is that democratically elected local authorities are effective in
moving ahead whereas randomly selected community members have little
effect. Especially local authorities in a leader position give more to the pub-
lic good which increases the likelihood that followers follow the example set.
Controlling for individual information about the quality of the public good,
Jack and Recalde (2015) state that uninformed followers are more responsive
to leading by example of authorities in the community, but also informed
community members are responsive to the example set. This indicates that
in addition to signaling the value of the public good, local authorities also
trigger a reciprocal reaction of followers.
Focusing on the effects of cultural heterogeneity between Hindu and Mus-
lim citizens in India on public good provision, Keuschnigg and Schikora
(2014) test the interaction with leading by example in an experimental public
goods game in groups of four players. The results indicate that leadership
does not improve the level of cooperation. On the contrary, leading-by exam-
ple in culturally heterogeneous groups leads to a deterioration of the level
of public good provided. Keuschnigg and Schikora (2014) attribute this to
the lack of conditional cooperation and poor leadership in mixed groups. By
contrast, cultural heterogeneity has no effects on simultaneous play.
7.7 external validity and conclusion
Finally, we take up the question that forges the bridge to the introduction: To
what extent do economic experiments give insights that are relevant for the
provision of global public goods? A basic prerequisite to pursue this question
is a critical glimpse on the external validity of laboratory experiments. So, to
what degree can we apply the findings from the lab to real global public good
contexts?
A first point that is likely to raise concern is the question of whether ex-
perimental subjects in the lab, most of them college and university students,
differ in how they make decisions compared to policy makers in international
relations. The fundamental question is whether elites do exhibit very different
characteristics compared to other populations (Hafner-Burton et al. 2017). To
this end the literature in experimental political science is informative. Using a
sample of US policy and business elites with decades of experience on average
in international diplomacy or policy strategy, LeVeck et al. (2014) show that
elites are not more self-interested in an ultimatum game compared to under-
graduate students and by contrast are significantly more prone to reject low
offers and make significantly higher initial offers. Penalizing small payments
with the rejection of the offer under the sacrifice of own material interests
indicates negative reciprocity. Therefore, elites do not necessarily behave less
reciprocally than students. In a similar vein, Dannenberg, Sturm, and Vogt
(2010) who elicit Fehr and Schmidt (1999) inequality aversion parameters for
a group of subjects involved in climate negotiations, most of them employed
by national governments, come to the conclusion that inequality aversion was
of considerable importance for policy makers (Dannenberg, Sturm, and Vogt
2010).
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A second potential point of concern is whether the structure of the games
considered resembles global public goods concerns. An answer is that the
aggregation technologies considered reflect those described for many global
public goods. Summation technologies come into play when it does not mat-
ter who contributes, but only the total amount contributed. This is for exam-
ple the case for carbon dioxide mitigation (Kaul et al. 2003) but also for UN
peacekeeping operations (Sandler 2017b). Examples for weakest-link aggrega-
tion can be found in disease control or financial stability (Kaul et al. 2003). By
contrast, charities may have properties of step-level public goods (Normann
and Rau 2015) and decisions by the UN security council and other commit-
tees resemble a threshold public good problem. Of course, a setting in the lab
always resembles to some degree triviality or artificiality of the experimental
situation, but concurrently experiments help advance and aggregate knowl-
edge and give us a more comprehensive understanding (McDermott 2002).
As in a theoretical model, the aim is to uncover fundamental mechanisms at
work in a simplified world.
Wrapping it up, we have seen that leading by example indeed yields an
amelioration in many contexts, especially if the leader has some kind of for-
mal authority and in settings of voluntary leadership. Followers typically em-
ploy an imperfect matching strategy as they contribute only a fraction of the
leader’s contribution. Thereby, they succeed in exploiting the leader to some
degree as leaders contribute more and consequently receive lower payoffs.
Nevertheless, leaders are important as they have a big impact on followers’
beliefs, especially in the beginning. Moreover, they are on average not worse-
off than the participants in a simultaneous game. Still, they earn less than
followers. Consequently, only a fraction of around a quarter of all experimen-
tal subjects would opt to lead by example. We can find possible motivations
to become a leader mainly in altruistic thinking and self-image concerns be-
sides strategic considerations. Oftentimes, leaders’ contributions are related
to their expectation of followers’ contributions and also to their risk-aversion.
In public goods games with interior equilibrium, followers’ reciprocity often-
times prevents a first-mover advantage where it is theoretically predicted. In
addition, leadership brings an improvement in weakest-link and threshold
public goods games as well. Generally, we can state that leading-by-example
crucially depends on the example set by the leader as well as conditional
cooperation of the followers. Leadership can only be successful if both are
present.
8
L E A D E R S H I P I N D Y N A M I C P U B L I C G O O D P R O V I S I O N :
G R O W T H A N D I N E Q U A L I T Y 6 7
8.1 introduction
Are leaders important for the progress of societies? Jones and Olken (2005)
find evidence for this claim regarding national leaders and show that they are
an important determinant for economic growth. In general, economic growth
in developed countries is often linked with cooperation processes such as the
development and spread of new technologies and knowledge. The develop-
ment of these technologies requires in many cases the joint efforts of several
actors. In a similar vein, much hope rests on technological development in
international climate policy. Jointly developed improved green technologies
offer the scope to reduce the cost burden borne to mitigate climate change. A
key question here is whether “leading-by example” (Hermalin 1998) fosters
cooperation. In experimental economics, a common tool to analyze coopera-
tion problems are static public goods games (PG games henceforth).
Most of the time, cooperation, however, is not a one-time affair. Instead,
stakeholders commonly interact many times with each other and dynamic
dependencies exist such that contributions in former rounds have an impact
on the public good supply in the current round. An example for a dynamic
dependency is an endowment carryover which generates scope for endogenous
growth and inequality. Such an environment enables individuals to reinvest
cooperation profits from the previous round into further cooperation. For ex-
ample, several actors like countries or companies invest in research and devel-
opment (R&D) joint-ventures which generate either cost reductions or higher
profits. These cooperation gains subsequently can be reinvested in further co-
operation in the next round. A similar pattern holds for public infrastructure
or, in a broader context, the evolution of societies (Gächter et al. 2017).
We are interested whether leading-by-example yields an amelioration in pub-
lic good supply considering such a dynamic environment with endowment
carryover. In our setup, leading-by-example means that a group member de-
cides first and other group members can observe his or her decision right
before they make their own decision. Hence, the leader has the opportunity
of preceding by setting a (good) example. We use a plain setting with a ran-
dom subject being determined as a leader (exogenous leadership). The imple-
mentation that is probably most close to ours is that of Güth et al. (2007). In
their fixed treatment, one of four group members is randomly selected to be
the leader and remains in that position. This exogenous procedure offers a
simple and clear-cut treatment.68 We designed the dynamic dependency in a
67 This chapter is a slightly modified version of Eichenseer and Moser (2019b).
68 Furthermore, at least in a static game, there seems to be no differences with respect to contri-
butions between a fixed and a rotating leader (see Güth et al. 2007).
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way that is close to that of Gächter et al. (2017), having the following features:
(i) there is no consumption until the last round, i.e., the entire wealth can be
reinvested at the beginning of a new round and (ii) endogenous endowments
are determined by previous contributions. As a result, this variant of a public
goods game allows for both, endogenous growth and endogenous inequality.
With our experiment we contribute both to the literature on leadership in
public goods experiments (see Chapter 7 for a review) and the literature on
dynamic public goods games (e.g., Sadrieh and Verbon 2006; Battaglini, Nun-
nari, and Palfrey 2016; Rockenbach and Wolff 2017; Gächter et al. 2017). Our
results indicate that a positive effect of leading-by-example is present in a dy-
namic setting with endowment carryover. Moreover, the presence of a leader
also significantly reduces the within-group inequality. Regarding the litera-
ture on leadership in public goods games, we provide a further contribution
by establishing a link between behavioral types of the leader and leadership
success, which complements existing research (e.g., Gächter et al. 2012). Using
a sequential prisoner’s dilemma for classification (Kosfeld 2019; Eichenseer
and Moser 2019a), we show that an important predictor for the success of a
group is the behavioral type of the leader.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a
brief review of the related literature followed by Section 3 which describes
the experimental design. Section 4 gives an overview on hypotheses and re-
search questions whereas Section 5 presents and discusses the results of the
experiment. Section 6 concludes the chapter.
8.2 literature review
Many classical examples of public goods have in common that they entail
a dynamic dependency which can be modeled by a carryover (Cadigan et
al. 2011) which is depicted in Table 8.1, e.g. they provide streams of benefits
in the long run (stock-level carryover), their provision becomes more efficient
with experience (marginal per capita return (MPCR) carryover) or coopera-
tion benefits can be reinvested (endowment carryover). Consequently, it is
important to know whether major results of static public goods also hold for
dynamic variants, which are often closer to reality.
In experimental economics, an emerging literature has attempted to fill this
gap in the past years. Sadrieh and Verbon (2006) analyze an environment
where social output today determines production possibilities tomorrow (en-
dowment carryover), and social output is distributed unequally. Noussair and
Soo (2008) study a dynamic public goods game with a MPCR carryover: the
return on contributions is a function of decisions in previous rounds. This
characteristic leads to the effect that, in most cases, the usual pattern of de-
clining contributions over time does not turn up. Cadigan et al. (2011) in-
vestigate whether subjects’ behavior in a PG game with a stock level carry-
over comes close to the qualitative predictions of Markov Perfect Equilibria.
Gächter et al. (2017) and Rockenbach and Wolff (2017) both investigate the ef-
fects of punishment in a dynamic public goods game with endowment carry-
over. While punishment in a static setting is usually very successful, there are
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Endowment MPCR Stock Level
Previous outcomes
affect future endow-
ments.
“Learning-by-doing”:
productivity depends
on the contributions in
previous stages.
Durable public goods
or bads.
E.g., profits from the
use of public infrastruc-
ture; R&D cooperation.
E.g., better trained staff
in public administra-
tion; renewable ener-
gies.
E.g., public and social
capital; environmental
pollution.
Table 8.1: Types of Carryover
drawbacks in a dynamic setting. Punishment results in fewer resources avail-
able for the punished ones, which could be invested in further cooperation.
In consequence, it reduces the potential for future cooperation gains (Rocken-
bach and Wolff 2017). To sum up, it is not obvious that standard recipes to
improve cooperation do really work well in a dynamic setting.
This question also holds for leading-by-example. To the best of our knowl-
edge, there exists no paper in the experimental literature that explores the
effect of leadership in a dynamic public goods game. Restricting our atten-
tion to experiments in which a leader is exogenously determined and does
not enjoy formal power or superior information, we can summarize previous
results in static public goods games as following: exogenous leadership sig-
nificantly increases contributions to the public good in Moxnes and Van der
Heijden (2003), Güth et al. (2007), Levati, Sutter, and Van der Heijden (2007),
Pogrebna et al. (2011), Dannenberg (2015), and McCannon (2018) while in-
significant effects are reported in Haigner and Wakolbinger (2010), Gächter
and Renner (2018), Sahin, Eckel, and Komai (2015), and Gürerk, Lauer, and
Scheuermann (2018). A significant negative effect is reported in Rivas and
Sutter (2011). We can therefore state that in the majority of cases, exogenous
leadership yields an improvement in public good contributions.69
Leaders that set a good example have a positive impact on followers. A
common observation from static PG experiments is that leaders’ and follow-
ers’ contributions are correlated to a large degree (see, for example, Arbak
and Villeval 2013). In addition, leaders also greatly shape the followers’ ex-
pectations (Gächter and Renner 2018). However, the literature also shows that
followers systematically contribute less than leaders (see, for example, Güth
et al. 2007; Haigner and Wakolbinger 2010; Rivas and Sutter 2011; Arbak and
Villeval 2013; Dannenberg 2015; Cappelen et al. 2016; Gächter and Renner
2018). As a result of “selfish-biased” conditional cooperation (Neugebauer
et al. 2009), leaders are relatively worse off giving rise to a “leader’s curse”
69 Larger effects of leadership usually show up when it is endogenous (Rivas and Sutter 2011;
Haigner and Wakolbinger 2010), when the leader is endowed with formal power (Güth et
al. 2007; Levati, Sutter, and Van der Heijden 2007; Gürerk, Irlenbusch, and Rockenbach 2009;
Sutter and Rivas 2014), or when the leader has an informational edge (Potters, Sefton, and
Vesterlund 2005; Levati, Sutter, and Van der Heijden 2007).
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(Gächter and Renner 2018). Regarding the question of who makes a good
leader, Gächter et al. (2012) try to give an answer by classifying subjects in a
one-shot strategy method setting. They elicit within-subject leader and (con-
ditional) follower contributions as well as their beliefs. The main finding is
that subjects that would behave conditionally cooperative as followers, give
significantly more if they are leaders, even after controlling for optimism. As a
result, groups perform best when led by weak or strong conditional coopera-
tors in this strategy method setting. We are interested whether these findings
are reflected in a dynamic public goods game with endowment carryover.
This is a setting where cooperation really pays off: in our experiment subjects
start with 2 EUR and could end up with around 34 EUR each, if all subjects
cooperated fully in all rounds of the public goods game. At the same time, a
leader only has the possibility of proceeding by setting a good example if fol-
lowers reciprocate to a sufficiently high degree as this determines a leader’s
contribution capabilities in the next round.
8.3 experimental design and procedures
To this end, our experiment consists of two parts. Part I, which is a sequen-
tial prisoner’s dilemma, is the same for all subjects. We use this decision task
to classify subjects’ cooperation types. In part II of the experiment, subjects
performed a dynamic public goods game which was either played simultane-
ously without leader (NOLEAD) or sequentially with a leader who moved first
(LEAD). We use a between-subject design, hence, subjects either participated
in NOLEAD or in LEAD.
8.3.1 Part I
Eliciting conditional cooperation types
Before entering one of the two main treatments (NOLEAD or LEAD) we
elicit conditional cooperation types of all subjects by a sequential prisoner’s
dilemma.70 We matched the subjects in groups of two people and both players
are endowed with 1 Euro.
First, Player 1 decides whether to send his Euro to Player 2 (choose action
S) or keep the Euro for himself (choose action K). After observing his choice,
Player 2 can decide, conditionally on the choice of Player 1, whether to send
1 Euro (action S) or keep it (action K). If the Euro is sent to the other player, it
doubles. Therefore, a social optimum is reached when both players send their
Euro. However, maximizing their own payoffs means that none of the two
players send their Euro. Hence, the decision situation of part I resembles a
sequential prisoner’s dilemma. Figure 8.1 depicts the payoff structure of this
game.
70 This method is used for example by Miettinen et al. (2017) and described in further detail in
Kosfeld (2019) and Eichenseer and Moser (2019a).
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P1
P2
(2 € , 2 €)
S
(0 € , 3 €)
K
S
P2
(3 € , 0 €)
S
(1 € , 1 €)
K
K
Figure 8.1: Payoff structure of the sequential prisoner’s dilemma
All subjects state their decisions for being either Player 1 or 2 (strategy
method). They are randomly allocated to one of these roles at the end of
the experiment and paid accordingly. In addition, we asked them how many
percent of participants they consider to choose the cooperative action when
Player 1 cooperates/defects in order to elicit their beliefs about the other play-
ers’ behavior.71 The set of strategies, Xi, in this game for Player 2 is given by
Xi = {SS, KK, SK, KS}. Based on the participants’ conditional second mover’s
choice, we can classify subjects as altruists (unconditional cooperators), con-
ditional cooperators (cooperate only if the first-mover cooperates), free-riders
(never cooperate) and mismatchers (play the opposite of the other player) as
shown by Table 8.2.72 73
Cooperation type Behavior & Strategy
Conditional cooperator (CC) Cooperates only if the other player also cooperates; SK
Selfish (SF) Never cooperates (free-rider); KK
Altruist (AL) Always cooperates; SS
Mismatcher (MM) Does the opposite of the other player; KS
Table 8.2: Cooperation types
71 We did not incentivize this task in order to keep cognitive load at a moderate level.
72 In our experiment, we only had one subject who we classified as mismatcher. Since this subject
responded to cooperation with selfish behavior, we also classified him as a selfish type for our
further analysis.
73 A balancing table, reporting the distribution of types across treatments, can be found in Ap-
pendix D (see Table D.1).
8.3 experimental design and procedures 131
8.3.2 Part II
Simultaneous treatment (NOLEAD)
In the main part of our experiment, subjects play a dynamic public goods
game in one of two treatments (between-subject design), either NOLEAD or
LEAD. The earnings of a given round serve as the endowment for the next
round.
Period 1 2 3 4
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Table 8.3: Structure of periods and rounds
In both conditions, subjects are randomly assigned to groups of four peo-
ple, which stay the same for one period consisting of seven rounds. After
each period, subjects are randomly rematched. In total, the game is played
for four periods (see Table 8.3). In round 1 of every period, each participant
i, with i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, is endowed with E1i = 20 Taler (exchange rate 1 Euro
= 10 Taler), which he can either keep for himself in his “private account” or
contribute to the public good labeled as a “group account” (gi denotes the in-
dividual contribution to the group account). The MPCR for the group account
is 0.375 which means that the group account has a return of 1.5.
Hence, the earnings at the end of round 1 are given by:
E2i = E
1
i − g1i +
1.5
4
4
∑
j=1
g1j
which serve as the endowment in round 2. Consequently, the endowment for
round t is given by:
Eti = E
t−1
i − gt−1i +
1.5
4
4
∑
j=1
gt−1j
and the final payoff of a period is given by the endowment after round 7,
which is:
pii = E7i − g7i +
1.5
4
4
∑
j=1
g7j .
In each round of a period, subjects simultaneously make their decisions with-
out knowledge of other participants’ contributions prior to taking their own
contribution decision in NOLEAD. After each round, they are informed how
many Taler the other group members contributed individually and about their
and the others’ new endowment. After finishing a period, subjects are ran-
domly rematched to new groups of four. One of the four periods is randomly
chosen for payment.
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Sequential treatment (LEAD)
Treatment LEAD is similar to treatment NOLEAD, except that one subject
is randomly allocated to the role of a leader at the beginning of a period.
This participant (leader) moves first in all rounds of a period. In each round
the other subjects (followers) are informed about the leader’s contribution
and subsequently simultaneously decide upon their own contributions. In ev-
ery period a new leader is randomly selected. Everything else is identical to
NOLEAD.
8.3.3 Participants and Procedures
The experimental sessions were conducted in the Regensburg Economic Sci-
ence Lab (RESL) in February 2018 using zTree (Fischbacher 2007) for program-
ming and Orsee (Greiner 2015) for recruitment. 92 participants (45 men and
47 women; mean age: 23), most of them enrolled in business administration,
economics, or a related subject, took part in four experimental sessions with
a minimum of 20 and a maximum of 24 subjects per session. Before enter-
ing the lab, participants were randomly assigned to a cabin with a computer.
For both parts of the experiment, we provided participants with written in-
structions as well as a verbal summary that was read aloud (instructions are
available in Appendix D). Subjects were not aware of the content of part II of
the experiment before finishing part I. We paid participants in Euro in private
at the end of the experiment. In total, the experiment lasted about 75 minutes
and generated average earnings of about 14.12 EUR per subject (including a
show-up fee of 4 EUR).74
8.4 hypotheses and research questions
8.4.1 Wealth
Under the assumption of selfish, payoff-maximizing players, the unique equi-
librium of the simultaneous game, NOLEAD, is that all players contribute
zero in each round (consider the online appendix of Gächter et al. 2017, for
a formal proof). A simple backwards induction argument also renders zero
contributions in each round as the unique equilibrium of the sequential game
LEAD (hence, we abstain from providing a formal proof here). Therefore, zero
contributions, and thus, no difference in final payoffs should emerge in both
treatments assuming only selfish players.
However, in the presence of a substantial proportion of subjects whose pat-
terns of behavior can be described as reciprocal types that exhibit conditional
cooperation (Keser and Van Winden 2000; Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr
2001), this does not necessarily hold anymore. Ambrus and Pathak (2011) set
up such a model and adopt it to a static public goods game. Their main idea
is that in an environment where both selfish and reciprocal types exist, the
74 In part I of the experiment, payoffs were given in EUR. For part II, we use Taler as experimental
currency unit (ECU) with an exchange rate of 1 Euro = 10 Taler.
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selfish types can induce reciprocal types to choose non-zero contributions. As
conditional cooperators are backward-looking in determining their contribu-
tions, selfish players can influence future contributions of reciprocal players
positively by contributing a large amount. The more rounds that are left, the
higher the influence of these contributions. It is therefore in the interest of
selfish players to contribute, especially in early rounds of a period, as this
causes a positive reaction of the reciprocal players affecting the remaining
rounds. In the course of a period, this incentive for selfish players diminishes,
which leads to a decreasing pattern of their contributions. The intuition be-
hind this mechanism is the assumption that selfish players maximize their
material payoffs and that reciprocal players’ payoffs additionally depend on
a concave reciprocity function. The function itself is non-decreasing in other
players’ contributions and is embedded in the payoff function of a reciprocal
player. This payoff function is maximal when a specific target contribution
is reached - which depends on the other players’ contributions and the reci-
procity function. Additionally, there is the assumption of no overreciproca-
tion, which means that one unit of contribution by any player does increase
the value of the reciprocity function by not more than 1. This in turn, leads to
a decreasing marginal impact of contributions over the course of the game.75
This driving force in the model of Ambrus and Pathak (2011) is also reason-
able in our dynamic setting with endowment carryover. In addition, higher
contributions by selfish players have a positive impact on contribution capa-
bilities of the reciprocal types, thus, constituting a second incentive for them
to contribute in early rounds.
The sources of a possible positive impact of leadership are twofold. First,
due to their exposition, the initial contribution of a leader offers a chance for
amelioration: it gives clues for everyone else about the distribution of types
and the degree of optimism the leader has over the occurrence of coopera-
tion. Reciprocal types are no longer solely dependent on their expectations
about the contributions of others, instead the leader’s first contribution is set-
ting a salient example. The leader acts as a “belief manager” (Gächter and
Renner 2018). As early contributions determine later contribution capabilities,
the (positive) sign that the leader can give here might have a big impact. Sec-
ond and likewise, the leader can give a positive signal inducing conditional
cooperators to reciprocate in other periods by his particular visibility. Conse-
quently, even a selfish type has a larger incentive to contribute when selected
to be the leader. This is also true for the very last round of a given period: a
selfish leader has incentives to make a positive contribution in the last period,
since reciprocal types may respond to his contribution. In the simultaneous
game this is not the case. Selfish types should choose a contribution of zero
in the last round. Taken together, this gives rise to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Assuming a substantial fraction of conditional cooperators, we expect
non-negative contributions in both treatments. In addition, we expect that contribu-
tions in LEAD are larger than in NOLEAD, resulting in higher final earnings.
75 Consider the appendix of Ambrus and Pathak (2011) for a formal proof.
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8.4.2 Inequality
As described in Section 8.2, followers typically contribute less than leaders.
Followers adopt an imperfect matching strategy and donate systematically
less compared to the leaders, displaying signs of imperfect or selfish-biased
conditional cooperation. In our dynamic setting, this effect would intensify
round by round, so that the leader would be impoverished relative to the fol-
lowers. Compared to NOLEAD, larger inequality would be the result. This
leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2a. LEAD leads to higher average within group inequality compared to
NOLEAD.
An alternative view would insist that due to the leader’s influence (Gächter
and Renner 2018), the followers may have a more homogeneous contribution
pattern than subjects in NOLEAD. Despite the discrepancy between a leader’s
and his followers’ contributions, this would give rise to reduced inequality
compared to NOLEAD which consequently yields the following alternative
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2b. LEAD leads to lower average within group inequality compared to
NOLEAD.
So in summary, we have two competing hypotheses. Accordingly, it is un-
decided to us a priori whether leadership (LEAD) leads to an increase or
decrease in inequality within a group compared to NOLEAD.
8.4.3 Leader Types
Similar to the one-shot-game scenario of Gächter et al. (2012), we also expect
cooperative types to be the better leaders with respect to average final earn-
ings of a group. Due to a kind of “false consensus effect” and their social
preferences, we expect them to make higher initial contributions. In addition,
we especially expect conditional cooperators to promote cooperation by giv-
ing the group the right signals for cooperation. In the spirit of the model
of Ambrus and Pathak (2011), we expect strategic leadership of selfish types
with a declining pattern of their contributions.
Hypothesis 3. Within LEAD we expect that groups work best when led by coopera-
tively inclined individuals.
8.5 results
In this section we present the results of our experiment. First, we focus on
the effect of leadership by comparing both treatments. This mainly involves
answering the question of whether leadership has an impact on the wealth of
group members and inequality within groups. For each of the two questions,
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we also consider the influence of the behavioral type of the leader. Further-
more, we want to know whether leadership reduces the number of individ-
uals that are likely to find themselves in a sucker position, not benefiting
from any cooperation gains. We define a criterion which we call mutual benefit
from cooperation. We have mutual benefit from cooperation within a group
and round as long as all group members strictly improve their earnings at the
end of a round compared to the previous round, in absolute terms.76
In the last part of the analysis, we focus on treatment LEAD only, to get
a deeper insight about the underlying mechanisms of successful leadership.
We try to find out whether the followers’ behavior is also dependent on their
behavioral types, with regard to their reaction on a leader’s contribution. Fur-
thermore, it is our goal to reveal what makes leaders successful. In particular,
we investigate whether we can observe the predicted pattern of decreasing
relative contributions of selfish leaders, and thus strategic leadership behav-
ior. We conclude with illustrative examples of successful and less successful
leadership.
Overall, our results suggest that leadership is an important driver for the
success of a group with respect to higher wealth, less inequality and more
inclusive growth (mutual benefit). Especially the behavior of the leader in the
first round(s) is crucial for the further course of the group. Moreover, we find
that the cooperation type of the leader matters a lot: groups led by coopera-
tively inclined types have, on average, a significantly larger final endowment.
The leader himself, however, is, on average, not better off than the partici-
pants in the simultaneous treatment NOLEAD. So it is mainly the followers
who profit from leadership.
8.5.1 Wealth
Regarding the question of whether group members are better off in the end,
when they are in a group with a leader, Figure 8.2 (left) depicts average en-
dowments at the end of each round by treatment.
Figure 8.2: Average endowment at the end of each round
76 More formally: there is mutual benefit at the end of round t− 1, as long as Eti > Et−1i holds for
all i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. In this sense mutual benefit can also be seen as a stricter version of the Pareto
criteria.
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We find a significant treatment effect when we compare final earnings of par-
ticipants at the end of round 7 (p=0.025, clustered two-sided two-sample t-
test). Participants in the sequential treatment LEAD earn, on average, about 89
Taler compared to 65 Taler average earnings in NOLEAD at the end of round
7 - which is an increase of around 37%. In addition, Table 8.4 reports random-
effects models, in which we estimated the treatment effect of LEAD on final
earnings in different specifications (period controls are always included). In
this regression table, we use the information from part I of the experiment, re-
garding the cooperation type of the leader, and we also investigated the effect
of a violation of the mutual benefit criterion already after round 1.
Endowment (end of round 7)
(1) (2) (3)
LEAD 23.847∗∗ -10.780 -33.224∗∗∗
(10.511) (8.342) (6.712)
LEAD X CC leader 54.339∗∗∗ 57.315∗∗∗
(13.505) (12.562)
LEAD X AL leader 24.365∗∗ 23.365∗
(11.929) (13.159)
No mutual benefits after R1 -65.028∗∗∗
(6.485)
Constant 60.439∗∗∗ 58.545∗∗∗ 103.191∗∗∗
(8.297) (8.406) (8.063)
Period controls YES YES YES
Observations 368 368 368
Subjects 92 92 92
R2 overall 0.024 0.075 0.217
Note: Random effects regression with period controls. Cluster-robust stan-
dard errors (on the subject-level) are in parentheses. In columns (2) the
and (3) the variable “LEAD” can be interpreted as LEAD treatment times
a selfish leader.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 8.4: Regression Table - Final endowment
It becomes apparent that the leader’s cooperation type is essential (see also
Figure 8.2 (right)). Leadership with a conditional cooperator as first-mover
improves earnings a lot (more than an altruist) while a selfish leader worsens
the outcome (although not significantly).77 We will discuss this in more detail
in Section 8.5.4.2. If there are no mutual benefits of cooperation in round 1,
this has persistent effects on final outcomes (see column (3) of Table 8.4). The
77 We used a Wald test for comparing the coefficients.
8.5 results 137
coordinating role of leadership is also reflected in the fact that the presence
of a leader delays the first violation of the mutual benefit condition, as we will
show in the further part of the analysis (see Section 8.5.3). Our results can be
summarized as follows:
Observation 1. Our findings suggest that leadership has a positive impact on final
wealth. In addition, the behavioral type of the leader has a major impact. The members
of groups led by a conditional cooperator are best off, on average. Furthermore, if there
are no mutual benefits of cooperation in round 1, this has persistent negative effects
on final outcomes.
8.5.2 Inequality
A natural question in connection with a dynamic public goods game with
endowment carryover is that of inequality. In our setting, inequality can en-
dogenously arise through different contributions of the group members to the
public good. According to Hypothesis 2a, leaders suffer some kind of curse.
They are, so to speak, exploited by the followers. This pattern should lead to
rising inequality. However, as reflected in Hypothesis 2b, previous research
also states that leaders have a great influence on the followers’ expectations
and contributions (see, for example, Gächter and Renner 2018). Thus, if a
leader has a huge impact on the followers, it can be expected that the con-
tributions to the public good will become more even which would result in
less within-group inequality. A common measurement for inequality is the
Gini index that we compute for every group and round (a value of 0 refers to
complete equality, whereas a value of 1 refers to complete inequality).
Figure 8.3: Average Gini coefficient at the end of each round by treatment
Figure 8.3 depicts the Gini index for both treatments. In addition, we use a
random-effects regression where the Gini coefficient of a group is the panel
variable and the rounds are the time variable (see Table 8.5).
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GINI coefficient
(1) (2) (3)
LEAD -0.037∗∗∗ 0.003 0.011
(0.013) (0.018) (0.018)
LEAD X CC leader -0.058∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.019)
LEAD X AL leader -0.041 -0.040
(0.026) (0.026)
No mutual benefits after R1 0.028∗∗
(0.013)
Constant 0.099∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016)
Period controls YES YES YES
Round controls YES YES YES
Observations 644 644 644
Groups 92 92 92
R2 overall 0.193 0.246 0.277
Note: Random effects regression with period and round controls.
Cluster-robust standard errors (on the subject-level) are in parenthe-
ses. In columns (2) and (3) the variable “LEAD” can be interpreted as
LEAD treatment times a selfish leader.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 8.5: Regression Table - GINI coefficient
With respect to within group equality, we can report a significant positive
treatment effect. Within group inequality is lower in LEAD and this effect is
significant (see column (1) in Table 8.5). Again the leader’s type does matter
a lot. A conditional cooperator as a leader has a significant effect in reducing
inequality as measured by the Gini index, while the effect for other leader
types is insignificant (see column (2) in Table 8.5). We also see that groups that
achieve no mutual benefit in round 1, have a significantly higher inequality. In
general, we observe that inequality rises with each round in both treatments
of the dynamic public goods game. We can summarize our results as follows:
Observation 2. Leadership has a positive impact on reducing inequality within
groups as measured by the Gini index. This effect is mainly driven by the conditional
cooperators. If there are no mutual benefits of cooperation in round 1, this increases
inequality significantly.
8.5.3 Mutual Benefit across Rounds
As we have seen in the previous parts, having at least one group member
that does not strictly improve his or her endowment already in round 1 has a
persistent effect, resulting in lower final earnings for all group members.
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Figure 8.4: First emergence of no mutual benefit
Figure 8.4 depicts the first violation of the mutual benefit criterion by treat-
ments. On average, at least one subject within a group does not strictly im-
prove for the first time after 2.75 rounds in NOLEAD, compared to 3.75 rounds
in LEAD (p=0.0289, two-sided two-sample t-test).
Round of first violation of MB
(1) (2)
LEAD 1.000∗∗∗ 0.186
(0.351) (0.384)
LEAD X CC leader 1.243∗∗∗
(0.388)
LEAD X AL leader 0.689∗
(0.405)
Constant 2.609∗∗∗ 2.571∗∗∗
(0.361) (0.360)
Period controls YES YES
Observations 368 368
Subjects 92 92
R2 overall 0.055 0.088
Note: Random effects regression with period and round
controls. Cluster-robust standard errors (on the group-
level) are in parentheses. In column (2) the variable
“LEAD” can be interpreted as LEAD treatment times a self-
ish leader. MB is an abbreviation for mutual benefits.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 8.6: Regression Table - Violation of mutual
benefit
The sequential treatment delays the first violation of the mutual benefit crite-
rion, on average, by one round. As Figure 8.4 indicates, at least one individual
8.5 results 140
does not strictly improve in NOLEAD after the first round in more than 60%
of the cases. By contrast, in LEAD only in about 30% of the cases the criterion
for no mutual benefit is met after the first round. Moreover, in NOLEAD, there
is a second peak in round 6, whereas in LEAD this second peak occurs only
in round 7. This indicates that typical last round effects, driven by free-rider
behavior, occur earlier in NOLEAD compared to LEAD. In Table 8.6 we can
see that the sequential treatment LEAD has a significant effect on deferring
the first appearance of a situation where at least one subject of the group has
no benefits from cooperation (the dependent variable is the round in which
at least one group member does not strictly improve for the first time). Con-
trolling for the type of the leader (column (2) of Table 8.6), we find that it is
the conditional cooperators that have a positive impact when selected to be
leaders. Thus, we can summarize our findings as follows:
Observation 3. Leadership can be a useful tool in preventing an early violation
of the mutual benefit condition, highlighting the leader’s role in coordinating others’
contributions. The sequential treatment LEAD delays the first occurrence of the event,
that at least one individual does not strictly improve, on average, by one round. The
behavioral type of the leader is again crucial in this context.
8.5.4 Further Analysis of the LEAD Treatment
In this section we want to take a closer look behind the mechanisms of effec-
tive leadership and investigate why some groups in LEAD are more successful
than others. We begin by analyzing the followers’ reactions and then proceed
by looking at the leaders’ behavior.
8.5.4.1 Follower behavior
The followers’ reaction is decisive for successful leading-by-example. Only if
they respond adequately, it will be ensured that leadership (i) is successful in
terms of the final endowments for the group members, and additionally, (ii)
that the leader does not fare worse either.
We consider the reactions to a leader’s contribution both relative to a sub-
ject’s own endowment and in absolute terms. Focusing on absolute contri-
butions first, Table 8.7 (left) indicates that for every Taler a leader gives in a
round, followers give on average 0.822 Taler to the public good. Additionally,
follower type heterogeneity leads to different reactions. Although all types re-
act positively to higher contributions of the leader, this reaction is particularly
pronounced for followers that were classified as conditional cooperators and
altruists, as the coefficients in Table 8.7 reveal. Selfish follower types match a
Taler given by the leader by only 0.56 Taler, which is much less compared to
the amount given by conditional cooperators and altruists. A similar pattern
emerges for relative contributions (see Table 8.7 (right)).
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Contribution
(1) (2)
Leader contribution (LC) 0.822∗∗∗
(0.056)
LC X SF type 0.560∗∗∗
(0.095)
LC X CC type 0.837∗∗∗
(0.056)
LC X AL type 0.909∗∗∗
(0.085)
Constant 1.526 1.830∗
(1.235) (1.087)
Period controls YES YES
Round controls YES YES
Observations 1008 1008
Subjects 47 47
R2 0.781 0.791
Note: OLS regression with period controls.
Cluster-robust standard errors (on the subject-
level) are in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Relative Contribution
(1) (2)
Rel. leader contribution (RLC) 0.835∗∗∗
(0.027)
RLC X SF type 0.639∗∗∗
(0.101)
RLC X CC type 0.853∗∗∗
(0.024)
RLC X AL type 0.869∗∗∗
(0.080)
Constant 0.021 0.033
(0.037) (0.036)
Period controls YES YES
Round controls YES YES
Observations 1008 1008
Subjects 47 47
R2 0.701 0.711
Note: OLS regression with period controls. Cluster-
robust standard errors (on the subject-level) are in
parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 8.7: Regression Table - Matching of leader contribution (absolute and relative)
This high rate of matching a leader’s contribution further illustrates why the
behavior of the leader matters a lot, since even selfish types react positively
on the amount spent by the leader. Our result is summarized in Observation
4:
Observation 4. In general, followers react positively to a leader’s contribution,
matching it to a large degree, both in absolute and in relative terms. The type of
the follower plays a major role as selfish followers exhibit a much smaller reaction.
8.5.4.2 Leader behavior
We have already pointed out that leadership is beneficial. In the next step we
will go more into detail to explain the mechanisms behind successful leader-
ship. Overall, a high early contribution by the leader in round 1 of a period
has a large impact on final earnings in round 7 of the respective period.
Figure 8.5 depicts the relationship between a leader’s first contributions
and final wealth. We see a pattern of increasing final wealth of a group when
the leader contributes much in the beginning. However, we can observe that
there is a large heterogeneity between leader types for the 20 Taler bracket.
There are many selfish leaders that contribute their entire endowment in the
beginning. But they are less successful than conditional cooperator leaders
who do the same.
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Figure 8.5: Leader’s first contribution and final group earnings
Figure 8.6: Leader’s contribution pattern over rounds by type
Figure 8.6 indicates why this is the case. We see that while conditional coop-
erators have the lowest average initial leader contribution of all types, they
are persistent in contributing. That makes CC types successful. By contrast,
we discover signs of strategic leadership by selfish types. They start with
relatively high contributions in the first two rounds, revising them sharply
afterwards. What came to our mind was a strategy that the New York Times
(Gleick 1986) described as a “tranquilizer strategy” for the repeated prisoner’s
dilemma: to lull the opponent for a few moves and then try to exploit him.
We find evidence for this claim in our data as selfish types contribute more
in the beginning when they are leaders. In round 1 of LEAD, 61.54% of the
leaders, which we classified as “selfish”, contributed their whole endowment
of 20 Taler. However, only 21.74% of the selfish followers also contributed this
amount. In treatment NOLEAD by comparison, 25.00% of the selfish types
contributed 20 Taler in round 1. A behavior that can probably be explained
by a false consensus effect, is the one shown by those subjects classified as al-
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truists. When they are leaders, they start with very high relative contributions
in the beginning, but display a faster decline than the CC types afterwards.
Endowment (end of round 7)
(1) (2) (3)
Is leader -26.540∗∗ -25.703∗∗ 24.404
(12.829) (12.884) (27.012)
Leader first contr. 7.566∗∗∗ 8.351∗∗∗
(Leader1st) (1.332) (1.433)
Leader1st X Is Leader -3.567
(2.539)
Constant 80.073∗∗∗ -15.345 -26.520∗
(11.066) (13.489) (15.160)
Period controls YES YES YES
Observations 192 192 192
Subjects 48 48 48
R2 overall 0.029 0.194 0.196
Note: Random effects regression with period controls. Cluster-
robust standard errors (on the subject-level) are in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 8.8: Regression Table - Final endowment (only
LEAD)
In columns (2) to (3) of Table 8.8 we can see that a leader’s first contribution
has a large effect on final wealth. Column (2) indicates that for each Taler
the leader gives in round 1, the final endowment of every group member
(including the leader) increases by around 7.6 Taler, on average.
In general, being the leader is not necessarily good for the own payoffs
as column (1) of Table 8.8 reveals. Leaders face some kind of curse as their
earnings are lower than those of other group members.
Figure 8.7: Average endowment by treatment + leader/no-leader
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Figure 8.7 illustrates this circumstance graphically. However, leaders do not
fare worse than average participants in NOLEAD in the end. This, too, is
depicted in Figure 8.7. The leader himself in turn, does not lose money by
contributing more in round 1, but he profits less from each Taler compared to
the other group members as it can be seen by the interaction effect in column
(3) of 8.8. We can thus summarize our last finding as follows:
Observation 5. The leader type has a significant effect on final earnings of the group
members. The results suggest that leaders classified as conditional cooperators are
successful because they give persistently a larger fraction of their endowment over the
course of a period. In addition, the first contribution of the leader yields a high return
concerning final earnings. The leader is slightly better off than an average subject in
NOLEAD, but not significantly.
8.5.4.3 Examples of good and bad leadership
To illustrate the effect of good and bad leadership, we present some exem-
plary groups in this section. The black line in the graphs represents the leader
contributions, while the grey lines represents the follower contributions. Fig-
ure 8.8 depicts two examples of bad leadership. In the left part we see that the
leader stops contributing after three rounds, although the followers matched
him before (at least partly). This results in a breakdown of cooperation and
almost no further growth after round 3. In the right part we can observe a
leader who started with a medium contribution in the first round. After this,
the leader decreases his contribution in every subsequent round and the fol-
lowers mimic this behavior, resulting in a low final average endowment.
Figure 8.8: Bad leadership
Figure 8.9 shows two examples of good leadership. In both cases the leader
starts with a full contribution of 20 Taler in the beginning. In the left part we
can see that the leader only deviates in the last round from full contribution.
The same is true in the graph on the right part, where the leader sticks to
his plan of full contribution until round 6, although one group member is a
free-rider who only matches the leader partly.
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Figure 8.9: Good leadership
8.6 conclusion
Is leading-by-example a suitable tool in improving cooperation in dynamic
environments like research and development partnerships? In this chapter,
we provided an experiment investigating the effect of leadership in a dy-
namic public goods game with endowment carryover and, hence, endogenous
growth and inequality. The analysis of our experiment shows that leadership
indeed yields an improvement: We see larger contributions and consequently
higher earnings if groups have a leader. The leaders, however, benefit less.
They contribute more to the group pot than the followers, but receive lower
payouts. However, the average leader in LEAD is not worse off than an aver-
age player in NOLEAD. From a welfare perspective, it can thus be argued that
leading-by-example leads to a Pareto improvement. In addition, we observe a
significantly lower inequality in groups with a leader compared to NOLEAD.
As a measurement for inequality we use the Gini Index which also refers to a
utilitarian social welfare function that integrates individual inequity aversion
(Schmidt and Wichardt 2018). Assuming inequity averse agents, we can thus
report a further welfare improvement through leadership.
We also find that the leader’s contribution in the first round has a large
impact on the final results across all groups. For the groups, it pays off if
the leader prefaces by setting a good example in the form of a large initial
contribution. Based on a sequential prisoner’s dilemma, we elicited types
for conditional cooperation in part I of the experiment. Our results indicate
that groups work best when led by conditional cooperators. The mechanism
is quite interesting: it is apparently their perseverance in setting a good ex-
ample (contributing a high proportion of their income for a long time) that
makes conditional cooperator types successful. By contrast, we discover signs
of strategic leadership in the selfish types, with very high contributions in
the first two rounds followed by a sharp crash. In a similar vein, we see that
followers that are classified as conditional cooperators match a leader’s con-
tribution to a higher degree than selfish types.
R É S U M É
This thesis has set out to further explore the role of pioneers in social dilemma
situations both theoretically and empirically. High expectations have been
placed on leadership, in particular when dealing with global problems such
as the provision of global public goods. The question is: Does leadership meet
these expectations?
The theoretical Part I that sticks to the standard assumption of narrow
payoff-maximizing agents has shown that it depends on the kind of lead-
ership considered whether an amelioration of a social dilemma situation is
possible. Regarding pioneering behavior in coalition building, Chapter 1 has
poured some cold water on optimistic expectations. We have seen that par-
tial cooperation of one group reduces the likelihood that others are willing to
form a coalition, in particular if it is a large coalition that cooperates. More-
over, coalition building of a small group may even reduce the level of public
good supply.
Another kind of pioneering behavior discussed in Chapter 2 seems more
promising: the approach of technological innovation of a coalition and sub-
sequent free transfer of the technology to other countries. While the coun-
tries within the coalition cooperate at the innovation stage, they act non-
cooperatively when choosing their public good contribution (which is in con-
trast to Chapter 1). The prospects of such leadership are quite good: a costly
innovation of the coalition may increase both the level of public good supply
and the utilities of all countries involved given a sufficient scope of technolog-
ical diffusion and automatic spillovers, e.g. through international trade. But
there remains an incentive problem to adopt the innovation on behalf of the
recipients if technological diffusion is endogenous.
In a similar vein, Chapter 3 has focused on technological innovation. In this
chapter, an interesting effect materializes. Leadership expressed through the
move structure, i.e. a leader-follower (Stackelberg) game instead of a simul-
taneous (Nash) game is usually unfavorable for the level of public good pro-
vided (Varian 1994). Chapter 3, however, has shown that this needs no longer
be true when the leading country has the option to adopt a better technology.
In this case, advantageous leadership is feasible where public good supply
and utilities of both countries increase compared to simultaneous play.
Technology thus appears to be an interesting sphere for leadership. To get
an impression how such technological leadership and technology diffusion
may look like, Part II has studied the example of Germany’s feed-in tariff
for photovoltaic. It illustrates the magnitude of such pioneering efforts and
outlines the technological progress through learning-by-doing.
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Moving away from narrow payoff-maximizing agents, Part III and Part IV
have pursued the questions of the existence and possible implications of reci-
procity in a leader-follower relation. Both in the public discussion and the-
oretical literature reciprocity is regarded as a key to successful cooperation.
Given that followers have reciprocal preferences (i.e. react to an increase in
the leader’s contribution by increasing own contributions), the argument of
crowding-out looses its importance. In a leader-follower (Stackelberg) game
an increase in public good supply thus seems feasible compared to the bench-
mark of simultaneous play (Nash-Game) given sufficiently reciprocal prefer-
ences of the followers – even in the absence of reciprocal preferences of the
leader (see Buchholz and Sandler 2017).
Does that mean that reciprocity is the secret of successful leadership? This
thesis provided some evidence for this assertion. As a first step, Part III pur-
sued the question whether it seems reasonable to assume reciprocal behavior.
In this regard, Chapter 5 has shown that there is indeed empirical evidence for
reciprocity in the field of experimental economics as well as international rela-
tions. Moreover, reciprocal preferences are quite stable across social dilemma
games as the experimental investigation in Chapter 6 has pointed out. Con-
sequently, a basic prerequisite for successful leadership is given. Does this
materialize in an amelioration in public goods supply in experimental public
goods games? The answer is yes for most of the experiments portrayed in
the systematic literature review in Chapter 7 but also for the dynamic public
goods game in Chapter 8 of Part IV.
However, there remains an interesting aspect of leadership - the question
of “Why lead?”. In the classical world of narrow payoff-maximizing agents,
this question is obvious: the first mover attains a first-mover advantage. In
this world, the leader can commit himself to a low public good contribution
while the followers will have to give more in equilibrium. This is, however, in
contrast to the results in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8. What we can observe here
is that a first-mover advantage is either only present in a reduced form or in
many cases does not exist at all. On the contrary, in the voluntary contribu-
tion mechanism (VCM) which has a zero contribution prediction for narrow
payoff maximizing agents, leaders contribute distinctly more than followers.
Quite similarly, in a game with predicted interior equilibria and first-mover
advantage given agents without reciprocal preferences, this first-mover advan-
tage does not materialize. Why is this the case? This seems to be the flipside
of reciprocal preferences.
Reciprocity apparently alters the balance of power in the leader-follower
game. Without reciprocity, the leader is in a fortunate position and conse-
quently contributes less than the follower(s). In anticipation of a reciprocal
response of the follower(s) this game now turns. The first-mover position of
the leader becomes unfavorable – some even speak of a “leader curse”. The
leaders contribute more than the followers, the profits from cooperation are
unevenly divided among leaders and followers. It is the followers that benefit
most from sequential play. Followers’ reciprocity thus not only is a reliable
remedy to stand one’s ground in a strategically unfavorable position but it
also allows to exploit the leader to a certain extent.
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This impression gained from the empirical Part IV can also be illustrated by
a short theoretical example in Appendix E. In this example, the leader would
not contribute at all in the Stackelberg equilibrium if neither of the two play-
ers had reciprocal preferences and public good supply in consequence would
be the standalone allocation of the follower. Given a sufficiently reciprocal fol-
lower in this example, however, the leader contributes more than the follower
- even if he holds reciprocal preferences himself.
So, why lead? Why should one choose to be the leader? A first answer
might be that the leader does not fare worse compared to simultaneous play,
he only improves less. Consequently, it is better to swallow the bitter pill if
no one else did. Still, the question is who should do it. Maybe, it takes some
idealism to adopt this pioneering position, a sort of idealism that makes the
cake bigger even though the own piece of cake may be smaller than that of the
rest. The problem of leadership is ultimately not only a problem of finding
reciprocal followers, it is also a problem of finding idealistic leaders willing
to sacrifice relative gains for the common good.
Part V
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A P P E N D I X C H A P T E R 1 : D E R I VAT I O N O F T H E
T H R E S H O L D L E V E L I N P R O P O S I T I O N 1 3
Proof. It directly follows from eq. (18) in Chapter 1 that
∂GBI
∂ξ
=
w− eK − ξeK2
1+ ξeK1 + me
M
1
(1)
which is positive since eK1 > 0, e
M
1 > 0, e
K
2 < 0 and 1 − eK is a member
of K’s private consumption which is positive in the equilibrium EBI (k, m) by
definition. Inserting (21) into
∂uBKI
∂ξ
=
∂u(e(GBI , ξ), G
B
I )
∂ξ
= u2((ξeK1 + 1)
∂GBI
∂ξ
+ ξeK2 ) (2)
gives
∂uBKI
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=
u2((ξeK1 + 1)(w− eK) + ξmeK2 eM1 )
1+ ξeK1 + me
M
1
. (3)
Then an upper bound
¯
χ >
¯
ξ
B
(m) which has the properties required by
Proposition 11 exist since at ξ =
¯
ξ
B
(m) we have w− eK = 0. Hence, because
of eM1 > 0 and e
K
2 < 0, the numerator is of (30) is negative there so that
continuity implies that uBKI must also be falling for all ξ close to ¯
kB(m).
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A P P E N D I X C H A P T E R 6 : I N S T R U C T I O N S F O R T H E
E X P E R I M E N T
Basics
This online experiment will consist of two parts.
First, part 1 will be explained. After part 1 ends, you will receive instructions
for part 2. Your decisions in part 1 do not influence your payoff in part 2 and
vice versa.
In this study you will earn POINTS. Each POINT is worth 0.05 Dollar (20
POINTS = 1 DOLLAR). At the end of the study you receive your amount of
POINTS cashed out in Dollar.
In this study, you must answer control questions to ensure that you have un-
derstood the task correctly (there are five control questions in total). Only if
you answer them correctly you can complete this survey. The control ques-
tions require some small calculations. If you give a wrong answer to a control
question, you can try multiple times until you find the correct solution.
Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma (SPD)
You will be matched with one other random MTurker who also participates
in this study. One of you has the role of “Player 1” and the other one has
the role of “Player 2”. Each of you is endowed with 10 POINTS. You have
to decide whether you want to KEEP your 10 POINTS or whether you want
to SEND your 10 POINTS. If the POINTS are sent, they double for the other
player. The other MTurker has to make the same decision.
This game is played sequentially – i.e., the players make their decisions sub-
sequently (this is illustrated by the graph below).
First Player 1 (BLUE) makes a decision. Player 2 (RED) observes this decision
and makes a decision as well. In this study, you make a decision for both roles,
Player 1 and Player 2 (follow for this purpose simply the instructions on the
screens). At the end of the study, a random device determines the role of you
and the other MTurker. There are two possibilities: you are Player 1 and the
other MTurker is Player 2 or you are Player 2 and the other MTurker is Player
1. The combination of the decisions of you and the other MTurker determines
your payoff in this game, as shown in the graph below.
Conversion rate: 20 POINTS = 1 DOLLAR.
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Before starting with the actual decisions, you are asked to answer two short
control questions to make sure that you have understood all rules of the game
correctly.
Sequential Public Goods Game (FGF)
You will now be in a group of 4 MTurkers. Each MTurker must decide on the
division of 20 POINTS. You can put these 20 POINTS in a private account or
you can invest them fully or partially into a project. Any POINT that you do
NOT invest into the project, will automatically be transferred to your private
account.
Your income from the private account:
For each POINT you put in your private account you will earn exactly one
POINT. Nobody except you earns something from your private account.
Your income from the project:
The amount of POINTS contributed to the project by ALL group members,
will be increased by 60% and then equally split among all group members.
This means, each group member will receive the same income from the project.
Consequently, for each POINT invested in the project each group member (in-
cluding yourself) receives 1.6/4 = 0.4 POINTS.
Hence, for each group member the income from the project will be deter-
mined as follows:
Income from the project = sum of contributions to the project x 0.4.
For example, if the sum of all contributions to the project is 70 POINTS, then
you and all group members will get a payoff of 70 x 0.4 = 28 POINTS each
from the project. If the sum of contributions is 15 POINTS, then you and all
group members will get a payoff of 15 x 0.4 = 6 POINTS each from the project.
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Your total income:
Your total income is the sum of your income from the private account and
the project:
Income from the private account (= 20 - contribution to the project)
+
Income from the project (= 0.4 x Sum of contributions of all four players to
the project)
= TOTAL INCOME.
Conversion rate: 20 POINTS = 1 DOLLAR.
Your decisions:
In this part of the study, each participant has to make two types of decisions.
In the following we call them “unconditional contribution” and “conditional
table”:
With the “unconditional contribution” to the project you have to decide how
many of your 20 POINTS you want to invest into the project. You do not know
how much the other players will invest.
Your second task is to fill a “contribution table”. For each possible average
contribution of the other group members (rounded to the nearest integer),
you must specify how many POINTS you want to contribute to the project.
Thus, you can condition your contribution on the contribution of the other
group members.
In each group a random mechanism will select one group member. For the
randomly selected group member only the contribution table will be the
payoff-relevant decision. For the other three group members only the uncon-
ditional contribution will be the payoff-relevant decision. When you make
your unconditional contribution and when you fill out the contribution ta-
ble, you do not know whether you will be selected by the random mechanism.
Hence, you have to think carefully about both types of decisions because both
can be relevant to you. The combination of the decisions of you and the other
group members determines your payoff in this game.
C
A P P E N D I X C H A P T E R 7 : D I F F E R E N T S P E C I F I C AT I O N S
F O R T H E M E TA - A N A LY S I S
combining groups in order to get a single pairwise compari-
son
To combinine groups, the formulas from table 7.7a from Higgins and Green
(2011) have been applied such that:
nT = nt1 + nt2 (1)
is the sample size for the collapsed comparison and t1 and t2 indicate the
exogenous leadership treatments of Güth et al. (2007) and Rivas and Sutter
(2011), respectively78.
The mean of the combined group is given by:
x¯T =
nt1 x¯t1 + nt2 x¯t2
nt1 + nt2
(2)
whereas we can write the collapsed standard deviation as:
σT =
√
(nt1 − 1)σ2t1 + (nt2 − 1)σ2t2 + nt1nt2nt1+nt2
(
x¯2t1 + x¯
2
t2 − 2x¯t1 x¯t2
)
nt1 + nt2 − 1 . (3)
The data for the common control treatment were adopted from Güth et al. (2007).
meta-analysis using the combining groups approach
If we compile the collected evidence in a common effects meta-analysis79 (a
forest plot is depicted in figure C.1), we see that the overall effect of exogenous
leadership is positive with a standardized mean difference of 0.373. A test
of the null hypothesis of no leadership effect (D = 0) can be rejected (z =
2.58, p = 0.010) thus indicating a significant treatment effect for exogenous
leadership. A I2 value of 0.0% indicates that heterogeneity between studies
of exogenous leadership is very low. Both Egger’s test and Begg’s test are
insignificant thus rendering no indications of a publication bias80.
78 The notation is otherwise similar to chapter seven.
79 A common effects meta-analysis assumes a common effect based on studies that are quite
homogeneous, i.e. identical in important characteristics. As a robustness check, also a random
effect meta-analysis has been conducted using the combining groups approach. This yields no
change in the overall effect size, I2 measure or one of the test statistics reported. A forest plot
for the random effects meta-analysis is depicted in figure C.2.
80 As the sample size is small, we can, however, not conclude that there is no publication bias as
the tests may be under-powered.
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Figure C.1: Forest plot for exogenous leadership (common effects)
Figure C.2: Forest plot for exogenous leadership (random effects)
D
A P P E N D I X C H A P T E R 8
d.1 balancing table
Type Treatment
NOLEAD LEAD
Selfish 14 8
CC 26 31
Altruist 4 8
Mismatcher 0 1
Total 44 48
Pearson χ2(3) = 4.2424; p = 0.236
Table D.1: Number of different cooperation types across treatments
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 Instruktionen 
 
Herzlich willkommen zu diesem wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Experiment! Während des 
Experimentes haben Sie die Möglichkeit, eine Aufgabe auszuführen, welche in den 
nachfolgenden Instruktionen im Detail erklärt werden wird. Dabei können Sie einen nicht 
unerheblichen Geldbetrag gewinnen. Wie hoch Ihre Auszahlung letztendlich sein wird, hängt 
von Ihren Entscheidungen und den Entscheidungen der anderen Teilnehmer ab. Während des 
Experiments ist es Ihnen untersagt, mit den anderen Teilnehmern zu kommunizieren. Bitte 
lesen Sie die vorliegenden Instruktionen gründlich durch. Sollten Sie vorab oder während des 
Experiments noch Fragen haben, heben Sie bitte Ihre Hand und ein Experimentator wird zu 
Ihrem Platz kommen.  
 
Allgemeiner Aufbau 
Das Experiment besteht aus einem Teil 1 und einem Teil 2. Diese beiden Teile sind unabhängig 
voneinander – d.h. Ihre Entscheidungen in Teil 1 haben keinen Einfluss auf den Ausgang von 
Teil 2 und umgekehrt. Sie bekommen zunächst Instruktionen für Teil 1. Sobald dieser Teil 
abgeschlossen ist, bekommen Sie Instruktionen für Teil 2. Sowohl in Teil 1 als auch in Teil 2 
können Sie Geld verdienen. Ihr endgültiger Verdienst besteht aus der Summe Ihrer Verdienste 
aus Teil 1 und Teil 2. Zusätzlich bekommen Sie am Ende des Experiments eine 
Teilnahmeprämie von 4 EUR ausbezahlt. Diese bekommen Sie in jeden Fall, unabhängig von 
Ihren Entscheidungen im Experiment.  
Ihre endgültige Auszahlung wird sich also folgendermaßen zusammensetzen: 
Gesamtauszahlung = 4 EUR + Verdienst in Teil 1 + Verdienst in Teil 2 
Ihre Gesamtauszahlung beträgt also in jedem Fall mindestens 4 EUR.  
 
Teil 1 
In Teil 1 werden Sie mit einem zufällig ausgewählten Experimental-Teilnehmer aus diesem 
Raum gruppiert, welcher Ihr Mitspieler für diesen Teil ist. Einer von Ihnen bekommt zufällig 
die Rolle als „Spieler 1“ und der andere als „Spieler 2“. Jeder von Ihnen erhält nun 1 EUR vom 
Experimentator. Sie können sich nun überlegen, ob Sie diesen Euro BEHALTEN oder an Ihren 
Mitspieler VERSCHICKEN wollen. Wenn der Euro verschickt wird, verdoppelt er sich für Ihren 
Mitspieler. Ihr Mitspieler steht vor derselben Entscheidung wie Sie.  
Diese Entscheidungssituation findet sequentiell statt – d.h. die Spieler treffen Ihre 
Entscheidungen nacheinander. Dies ist in der unten angehängten Grafik auch noch einmal 
dargestellt.  
Zunächst trifft Spieler 1 (BLAU) eine Entscheidung.   Spieler 2 (ROT) kann diese Entscheidung 
beobachten und trifft dann ebenfalls eine Entscheidung. Sie treffen im Experiment sowohl für 
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 die Rolle als Spieler 1 als auch für die Rolle als Spieler 2 eine Entscheidung. Bitte folgen Sie 
dazu einfach den Anweisungen auf dem Bildschirm. Am Ende des Experimentes wird 
ausgelost, ob Sie oder Ihr Mitspieler die Rolle des „Spieler 1“ bekommen. Der andere 
bekommt automatisch die Rolle des „Spieler 2“. Durch die Kombination Ihrer Entscheidungen 
wird dann schließlich Ihre Auszahlung gebildet, wie in der unten angehängten Grafik 
dargestellt. Die Auszahlung für Spieler 1 ist hier in BLAU dargestellt und die Auszahlung für 
Spieler 2 ist in ROT dargestellt.  
 
 
 
Beispiel  
Spieler 1 entscheidet sich für VERSCHICKEN. 
Spieler 2 entscheidet sich für VERSCHICKEN wenn Spieler 1 VERSCHICKT und für BEHALTEN 
wenn Spieler 1 BEHÄLT.  
In diesem Szenario erhalten also beide Spieler jeweils 2 EUR.  
 
Beispiel  
Spieler 1 entscheidet sich für BEHALTEN. 
Spieler 2 entscheidet sich für VERSCHICKEN wenn Spieler 1 VERSCHICKT und für VERSCHICKEN 
wenn Spieler 1 BEHÄLT. 
In diesem Szenario erhält Spieler 1 3 EUR und Spieler 2 0 EUR.  
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 Teil 2 
Teil 2 besteht aus 4 Perioden und jede Periode besteht ihrerseits aus 7 Runden. Dies ist in der 
nachfolgenden Tabelle noch einmal verdeutlicht.  
Perioden 1 2 3 4 
Runden 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
In Teil 2 könne Sie Taler verdienen. Die Umrechnung beträgt dabei 
10 Taler = 1 Euro  
Am Ende des Experiments bekommen Sie die Ausstattung an Talern, die Sie besitzen, in EUR 
ausbezahlt. Für Ihre Auszahlung in Teil 2 wird eine zufällige Periode ausgewählt. Das heißt 
nur eine der vier Perioden ist relevant für Ihre Auszahlung. Sie wissen aber vorher nicht, 
welche dies ist, sondern erfahren dies erst am Ende des Experimentes.  
Zu Beginn jeder Periode werden Gruppen aus jeweils 4 Teilnehmern gebildet. Diese Gruppen 
sind fest für die komplette Periode – d.h. sie werden innerhalb einer Periode nicht mehr 
durchmischt. Jedes Gruppenmitglied wird entweder als A, B, C oder D bezeichnet. Für jede 
neue Periode werden Sie zufällig einer neuen Gruppe zugeordnet. Das heißt auch Ihre 
Bezeichnung (A, B, C oder D) kann sich ändern.  
 
Die Aufgabe 
Zu Beginn jeder Periode sind Sie mit 20 Talern ausgestattet. Sie können Ihre Ausstattung an 
Talern in jeder Runde ganz oder teilweise in ein Gruppenprojekt investieren (individueller 
Beitrag). Der Teil, den Sie NICHT investieren, wandert in Ihren Privattopf und diesen behalten 
Sie für sich. Die Investitionen aller 4 Gruppenmitglieder wandern in einen Gruppentopf. Der 
Inhalt des Gruppentopfs wird danach um 50 % erhöht und unter allen Gruppenmitgliedern 
gleichmäßig verteilt, unabhängig davon wie viel jeder Einzelne dazu beigetragen hat.  
Die neue Ausstattung eines Teilnehmers am Ende einer Runde wird dann folgendermaßen 
berechnet: 
Neue Ausstattung = Alte Ausstattung – individueller Beitrag + 
𝟏.𝟓∗𝐆𝐫𝐮𝐩𝐩𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐨𝐩𝐟
𝟒
 
 
Nach jeder Runde erfahren Sie Ihre neue Ausstattung. Zusätzlich sehen Sie auch wie viel die 
anderen Mitglieder in Ihrer Gruppe beigetragen haben und deren aktuelle Ausstattung (siehe 
Screenshot 1).  
 
Alle Beträge werden immer auf ganze Taler-Beträge gerundet. 
 
= Privattopf 
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 Für die weiteren Runden gilt, dass jeder Spieler einen beliebigen individuellen Beitrag zum 
Gruppentopf wählen kann, welcher jedoch maximal so groß sein kann wie die aktuelle 
Ausstattung an Talern. Im Gegensatz zu Runde 1 kann die Ausstattung an Talern in den Runden 
2 – 7 kleiner oder größer als 20 sein.  
 
Screenshot 1 
Der Startspieler  
Zu Beginn jeder Periode, wird ein Startspieler zufällig bestimmt. Dieser bleibt Startspieler für 
die komplette Periode – d.h. für die gesamten 7 Runden. Alle Gruppenmitglieder werden 
darüber informiert, wer der Startspieler ist (A, B, C oder D). Jede Runde besteht nun aus den 
folgenden zwei Abschnitten: 
1. Der ausgewählte Startspieler kann sich nun zuerst für einen individuellen Beitrag 
entscheiden (siehe Screenshot 2). Wenn Sie NICHT der Startspieler sind, klicken Sie 
einfach auf „OK“ um fortzufahren, während der Startspieler seinen individuellen 
Beitrag wählt (siehe Screenshot 3).  
2. Die anderen Spieler werden über den Beitrag des Startspielers informiert und können 
daraufhin ihren eigenen individuellen Beitrag wählen (siehe Screenshot 4).  
 
 
D.2 instructions for the lead treatment 160
 Ihre aktuelle Ausstattung wird Ihnen oben am Bildschirm angezeigt. Dies ist der Betrag, den 
Sie maximal wählen können. 
 
Typischer Bildschirm als Startspieler  
 
Screenshot 2 
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 Typischer Bildschirm bevor der Startspieler seine Entscheidung getroffen hat 
 
Screenshot 3 
Typischer Bildschirm nachdem der Startspieler seine Entscheidung getroffen hat 
 
Screenshot 4 
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 Ablauf im Experiment 
(i) Zu Beginn werden Sie gebeten eine Reihe von Kontrollfragen zu beantworten. Durch die 
Beantwortung dieser Fragen können Sie kein Geld verdienen. Diese Fragen sind lediglich 
dazu da, um sicherzugehen, dass Sie das Spiel und die Regeln korrekt verstanden haben. 
 
(ii) Danach erhalten Sie die Möglichkeit an einem Beispielrechner zu testen, welche 
Ausstattung Sie hätten, wenn Sie und die anderen Mitglieder in Ihrer Gruppe einen 
bestimmten Beitrag wählen würden (maximal 20 Taler, wie in Runde 1).  Ihren Beitrag 
können Sie unter „Ihr Beitrag“ mithilfe eines Schiebereglers einstellen und den Beitrag 
der anderen Gruppenmitglieder bei den Schiebereglern darunter. Sie können an diesem 
Beispielrechner verschiedene Kombinationen testen. Auch dieser Beispielrechner ist nur 
dazu da, sich mit dem Prinzip der Aufgabe vertraut zu machen und Ihre Eingaben hier 
haben keinerlei Einfluss auf den weiteren Verlauf des Experimentes. Beachten Sie bitte, 
dass Sie diesen Beispielrechner maximal für 180 Sekunden (= 3 Minuten) nutzen können. 
Danach geht das Experiment für Sie automatisch weiter (Sie können hier nicht aktiv 
weiter klicken). 
 
(iii) Nach der Testphase mit dem Beispielrechner beginnt die eigentliche Aufgabe und Sie 
starten mit der ersten Periode wie oben beschrieben. Jede Periode läuft genau gleich 
ab, allerdings werden in jeder Periode zufällig neue Gruppen gebildet.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Code für Teil 2:  471  
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 Instruktionen 
 
Herzlich willkommen zu diesem wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Experiment! Während des 
Experimentes haben Sie die Möglichkeit, eine Aufgabe auszuführen, welche in den 
nachfolgenden Instruktionen im Detail erklärt werden wird. Dabei können Sie einen nicht 
unerheblichen Geldbetrag gewinnen. Wie hoch Ihre Auszahlung letztendlich sein wird, hängt 
von Ihren Entscheidungen und den Entscheidungen der anderen Teilnehmer ab. Während des 
Experiments ist es Ihnen untersagt, mit den anderen Teilnehmern zu kommunizieren. Bitte 
lesen Sie die vorliegenden Instruktionen gründlich durch. Sollten Sie vorab oder während des 
Experiments noch Fragen haben, heben Sie bitte Ihre Hand und ein Experimentator wird zu 
Ihrem Platz kommen.  
 
Allgemeiner Aufbau 
Das Experiment besteht aus einem Teil 1 und einem Teil 2. Diese beiden Teile sind unabhängig 
voneinander – d.h. Ihre Entscheidungen in Teil 1 haben keinen Einfluss auf den Ausgang von 
Teil 2 und umgekehrt. Sie bekommen zunächst Instruktionen für Teil 1. Sobald dieser Teil 
abgeschlossen ist, bekommen Sie Instruktionen für Teil 2. Sowohl in Teil 1 als auch in Teil 2 
können Sie Geld verdienen. Ihr endgültiger Verdienst besteht aus der Summe Ihrer Verdienste 
aus Teil 1 und Teil 2. Zusätzlich bekommen Sie am Ende des Experiments eine 
Teilnahmeprämie von 4 EUR ausbezahlt. Diese bekommen Sie in jeden Fall, unabhängig von 
Ihren Entscheidungen im Experiment.  
Ihre endgültige Auszahlung wird sich also folgendermaßen zusammensetzen: 
Gesamtauszahlung = 4 EUR + Verdienst in Teil 1 + Verdienst in Teil 2 
Ihre Gesamtauszahlung beträgt also in jedem Fall mindestens 4 EUR.  
 
Teil 1 
In Teil 1 werden Sie mit einem zufällig ausgewählten Experimental-Teilnehmer aus diesem 
Raum gruppiert, welcher Ihr Mitspieler für diesen Teil ist. Einer von Ihnen bekommt zufällig 
die Rolle als „Spieler 1“ und der andere als „Spieler 2“. Jeder von Ihnen erhält nun 1 EUR vom 
Experimentator. Sie können sich nun überlegen, ob Sie diesen Euro BEHALTEN oder an Ihren 
Mitspieler VERSCHICKEN wollen. Wenn der Euro verschickt wird, verdoppelt er sich für Ihren 
Mitspieler. Ihr Mitspieler steht vor derselben Entscheidung wie Sie.  
Diese Entscheidungssituation findet sequentiell statt – d.h. die Spieler treffen Ihre 
Entscheidungen nacheinander. Dies ist in der unten angehängten Grafik auch noch einmal 
dargestellt.  
Zunächst trifft Spieler 1 (BLAU) eine Entscheidung.   Spieler 2 (ROT) kann diese Entscheidung 
beobachten und trifft dann ebenfalls eine Entscheidung. Sie treffen im Experiment sowohl für 
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 die Rolle als Spieler 1 als auch für die Rolle als Spieler 2 eine Entscheidung. Bitte folgen Sie 
dazu einfach den Anweisungen auf dem Bildschirm. Am Ende des Experimentes wird 
ausgelost, ob Sie oder Ihr Mitspieler die Rolle des „Spieler 1“ bekommen. Der andere 
bekommt automatisch die Rolle des „Spieler 2“. Durch die Kombination Ihrer Entscheidungen 
wird dann schließlich Ihre Auszahlung gebildet, wie in der unten angehängten Grafik 
dargestellt. Die Auszahlung für Spieler 1 ist hier in BLAU dargestellt und die Auszahlung für 
Spieler 2 ist in ROT dargestellt.  
 
 
 
Beispiel  
Spieler 1 entscheidet sich für VERSCHICKEN. 
Spieler 2 entscheidet sich für VERSCHICKEN wenn Spieler 1 VERSCHICKT und für BEHALTEN 
wenn Spieler 1 BEHÄLT.  
In diesem Szenario erhalten also beide Spieler jeweils 2 EUR.  
 
Beispiel  
Spieler 1 entscheidet sich für BEHALTEN. 
Spieler 2 entscheidet sich für VERSCHICKEN wenn Spieler 1 VERSCHICKT und für VERSCHICKEN 
wenn Spieler 1 BEHÄLT. 
In diesem Szenario erhält Spieler 1 3 EUR und Spieler 2 0 EUR.  
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 Teil 2 
Teil 2 besteht aus 4 Perioden und jede Periode besteht ihrerseits aus 7 Runden. Dies ist in der 
nachfolgenden Tabelle noch einmal verdeutlicht.  
Perioden 1 2 3 4 
Runden 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
In Teil 2 könne Sie Taler verdienen. Die Umrechnung beträgt dabei 
10 Taler = 1 Euro  
Am Ende des Experiments bekommen Sie die Ausstattung an Talern, die Sie besitzen, in EUR 
ausbezahlt. Für Ihre Auszahlung in Teil 2 wird eine zufällige Periode ausgewählt. Das heißt 
nur eine der vier Perioden ist relevant für Ihre Auszahlung. Sie wissen aber vorher nicht, 
welche dies ist, sondern erfahren dies erst am Ende des Experimentes.  
Zu Beginn jeder Periode werden Gruppen aus jeweils 4 Teilnehmern gebildet. Diese Gruppen 
sind fest für die komplette Periode – d.h. sie werden innerhalb einer Periode nicht mehr 
durchmischt. Jedes Gruppenmitglied wird entweder als A, B, C oder D bezeichnet. Für jede 
neue Periode werden Sie zufällig einer neuen Gruppe zugeordnet. Das heißt auch Ihre 
Bezeichnung (A, B, C oder D) kann sich ändern.  
 
Die Aufgabe 
Zu Beginn jeder Periode sind Sie mit 20 Talern ausgestattet. Sie können Ihre Ausstattung an 
Talern in jeder Runde ganz oder teilweise in ein Gruppenprojekt investieren (individueller 
Beitrag). Der Teil, den Sie NICHT investieren, wandert in Ihren Privattopf und diesen behalten 
Sie für sich. Die Investitionen aller 4 Gruppenmitglieder wandern in einen Gruppentopf. Der 
Inhalt des Gruppentopfs wird danach um 50 % erhöht und unter allen Gruppenmitgliedern 
gleichmäßig verteilt, unabhängig davon wie viel jeder Einzelne dazu beigetragen hat.  
Die neue Ausstattung eines Teilnehmers am Ende einer Runde wird dann folgendermaßen 
berechnet: 
Neue Ausstattung = Alte Ausstattung – individueller Beitrag + 
𝟏.𝟓∗𝐆𝐫𝐮𝐩𝐩𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐨𝐩𝐟
𝟒
 
 
Nach jeder Runde erfahren Sie Ihre neue Ausstattung. Zusätzlich sehen Sie auch wie viel die 
anderen Mitglieder in Ihrer Gruppe beigetragen haben und deren aktuelle Ausstattung (siehe 
Screenshot 1).  
 
Alle Beträge werden immer auf ganze Taler-Beträge gerundet. 
 
= Privattopf 
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 Für die weiteren Runden gilt, dass jeder Spieler einen beliebigen individuellen Beitrag zum 
Gruppentopf wählen kann, welcher jedoch maximal so groß sein kann wie die aktuelle 
Ausstattung an Talern. Im Gegensatz zu Runde 1 kann die Ausstattung an Talern in den Runden 
2 – 7 kleiner oder größer als 20 sein.  
 
Screenshot 1 
 
Die Spieler  
In jeder Runde wählen alle Gruppenmitglieder (A, B, C und D) ihren individuellen Beitrag 
simultan. (Ein typischer Entscheidungsbildschirm ist in Screenshot 2 dargestellt). Das heißt, 
alle Gruppenmitglieder erfahren immer erst am Ende eine Runde, welches Gruppenmitglied 
wieviel zum Gruppentopf beigetragen hat.  
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 Ihre aktuelle Ausstattung wird Ihnen oben am Bildschirm angezeigt. Dies ist der Betrag, den 
Sie maximal wählen können. 
 
Typischer Bildschirm eines Spielers bei der Wahl des individuellen Beitrags  
 
Screenshot 2 
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 Ablauf im Experiment 
(i) Zu Beginn werden Sie gebeten eine Reihe von Kontrollfragen zu beantworten. Durch die 
Beantwortung dieser Fragen können Sie kein Geld verdienen. Diese Fragen sind lediglich 
dazu da, um sicherzugehen, dass Sie das Spiel und die Regeln korrekt verstanden haben. 
 
(ii) Danach erhalten Sie die Möglichkeit an einem Beispielrechner zu testen, welche 
Ausstattung Sie hätten, wenn Sie und die anderen Mitglieder in Ihrer Gruppe einen 
bestimmten Beitrag wählen würden (maximal 20 Taler, wie in Runde 1).  Ihren Beitrag 
können Sie unter „Ihr Beitrag“ mithilfe eines Schiebereglers einstellen und den Beitrag 
der anderen Gruppenmitglieder bei den Schiebereglern darunter. Sie können an diesem 
Beispielrechner verschiedene Kombinationen testen. Auch dieser Beispielrechner ist nur 
dazu da, sich mit dem Prinzip der Aufgabe vertraut zu machen und Ihre Eingaben hier 
haben keinerlei Einfluss auf den weiteren Verlauf des Experimentes. Beachten Sie bitte, 
dass Sie diesen Beispielrechner maximal für 180 Sekunden (= 3 Minuten) nutzen können. 
Danach geht das Experiment für Sie automatisch weiter (Sie können hier nicht aktiv 
weiter klicken). 
 
(iii) Nach der Testphase mit dem Beispielrechner beginnt die eigentliche Aufgabe und Sie 
starten mit der ersten Periode wie oben beschrieben. Jede Periode läuft genau gleich 
ab, allerdings werden in jeder Periode zufällig neue Gruppen gebildet.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Code für Teil 2:  471  
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E
R E C I P R O C I T Y A N D L E A D E R S H I P : A T H E O R E T I C A L
E X A M P L E F O R T H E L E A D E R ’ S C U R S E
the framework
Let there be two countries L and F who have preferences over private con-
sumption and public good consumption of Cobb-Douglas type, i.e. consider
the case where this utility component of country i is given by vi = xiG for
i = L, F where xi denotes private consumption. The public good G is pro-
duced by a summation technology, i.e. G = gL + gF where gi is the public
good contribution of country i for i = L, F and public good productivity is
equal to 1 such that gi = wi − xi where wi denotes the initial endowment (we
will later make the additional assumption of equal endowments).
Let us further assume like in Buchholz and Sandler (2017) that a reci-
procity component enters the utility function which is denoted by ϕi(gF, gL) =
αi((gL − gˆL)(gF − gˆF)) with gˆF and gˆL being reference values for country F
and L respectively. For simplicity, we assume that each country considers the
public good supply of the other country as the point of reference.
The reciprocity term enters additive in the utility function such that we
attain the (additive separable) utility function ui = vi + ϕi(gF, gL) for country
i where j denotes the other country:
ui = xiG + αi(gi − gˆj)(gj − gˆi). (1)
Setting gˆi = gj, gˆj = gi, G = gi + gj and gi = wi − xi yields:
ui = (wi − gi)(gi + gj)− αi(gi − gj)2 (2)
the nash equilibrium :
Country i for i = L, F maximizes utility ui which is given by (1): ui = (wi −
gi)(gi + gj)− αi(gi − gj)2 with respect to gi such that the first-order condition
(f.o.c., herafter) is:
∂ui
∂gi
= −(gi + gj) + (wi − gi)− 2αi(gi − gj) = 0 (3)
Solving (3) for gi gives us:
gi =
wi − (1− 2αi)gj
2+ 2αi
(4)
and due to symmetry:
gj =
wj − (1− 2αj)gi
2+ 2αj
. (5)
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Inserting the reaction function of j, grj which is given by (5) in (4) gives:
gi =
wi
2+ 2αi
− 1− 2αi
2+ 2αi
wj − (1− 2αj)gi
2+ 2αj
(6)
Solving this term for gi gives:
gi =
(2+ 2αj)wi − (1− 2αi)wj
3+ 6αj + 6αi
(7)
and due to symmetry:
gj =
(2+ 2αi)wj − (1− 2αj)wi
3+ 6αi + 6αj
. (8)
In the case of equal endowments, public good contributions gi and gj are
independent of the reciprocity parameters αi and αj. To show this, set: w =
wi = wj:
gi =
(2+ 2αj)w− (1− 2αi)w
3+ 6αj + 6αi
=
(1+ 2αj + 2αi)w
3+ 6αj + 6αi
=
1
3
w (9)
and due to symmetry: gj = 13 w.
Both countries’ PG contributions are strictly larger than zero in this case
and the countries can afford their contribution as gi,j = 13 w < w. Public good
supply thus is G = 13 w +
1
3 w =
2
3 w and utilities are:
ui =
(
w− 1
3
w
)
2
3
w− αi
(
1
3
w− 1
3
w
)2
=
4
9
w2(= uj) (10)
such that the reciprocity term does not alter the Nash equilibrium in our
example.
the stackelberg equilibrium
Obtaining the reaction function of the follower:
Maximizing the utility of the follower uF = (wF− gF)(gL + gF)− αF(gF − gL)2
which is given by (2) with respect to gF gives the f.o.c.:
∂uF
∂gF
= −(gF + gL) + (wF − gL)− 2αF(gF − gL) = 0. (11)
This yields the reaction function:
gRF =
wF − (1− 2αF)gL
2+ 2αF
(12)
such that crowding-in occurs, i.e. ∂gF∂gL > 0 for αF >
1
2 .
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Public good contribution of the leader:
The leader’s utility is given by (2) : uL = (wL − gL)(gL + gF)− αL(gL − gF)2.
Inserting gRF in the utility function of the leader yields:
uL = (wL − gL)
(
gL +
wF − (1− 2αF)gL
2+ 2αF
)
− αL
(
gL − wF − (1− 2αF)gL2+ 2αF
)2
(13)
which can be rewritten as:
uL = (wL− gL)
(
wF
2+ 2αF
+
1+ 4αF
2+ 2αF
gL
)
− αL
(
3
2+ 2αF
gL − wF2+ 2αF
)2
. (14)
Maximizing uL with respect to gL gives the f.o.c.:
∂uL
∂gL
= −
(
wF
2+ 2αF
+
1+ 4αF
2+ 2αF
gL
)
+ (wL − gL)1+ 4αF2+ 2αF
− 2αL
(
3
2+ 2αF
gL − wF2+ 2αF
)
3
2+ 2αF
= 0. (15)
Solving the f.o.c. for gL yields:
gL =
(1+ 4αF)(2+ 2αF)wL − (2+ 2αF − 6αL)wF
2(1+ 4αF)(2+ 2αF) + 18αL
. (16)
In the case of equal endowments, i.e. w = wi = wj, this reduces to:
gL =
8αF2 + 8αF + 6αL
2(1+ 4αF)(2+ 2αF) + 18αL
w. (17)
Obviously, the public good contribution of the leader is positive if either one
of the two countries has reciprocal preferences. For our special case, inserting
the public good contribution of the leader into the reaction function of the
follower gives:
gF =
w
2+ 2αF
− (1− 2αF)
2+ 2αF
8αF2 + 8αF + 6αL
2(1+ 4αF)(2+ 2αF) + 18αL
w (18)
and gL > gF holds as soon as:
gL =
8αF2 + 8αF + 6αL
2(1+ 4αF)(2+ 2αF) + 18αL
w >
1
3
w (19)
such that the leader contributes more than the follower as soon as his contribu-
tion exceeds the one of a player in the Nash-Game The leader does, however,
never fare worse compared to the Nash-Game as he could always choose the
contribution level of the Nash-Game which would lead to the public good
supply and utility level in the Nash-Game.
Total public good supply in the Stackelberg Case, G = gL + gF then is using
eq. (17) and (18):
G =
w
2+ 2αF
+
(1+ 4αF)
2+ 2αF
8αF2 + 8αF + 6αL
2(1+ 4αF)(2+ 2αF) + 18αL
w. (20)
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Numerical Example 1:
To illustrate this, let us first consider a non-reciprocal leader and a reciprocal
follower (αL = 0, αF = 1). Then the public good contribution of the leader is
according to (17):
gL =
8+ 8
2(1+ 4)(2+ 2)
w =
16
40
w =
4
10
w
and the follower contributes according to (18):
gF =
w
2+ 2
− 1− 2
2+ 2
16
40
w =
14
40
w =
7
20
w
such that gL > gF, i.e. the leader contributes more. Total public good supply
is G = gL + gF = 34 w. Consequently, the utilities of both countries are:
uSL =
6
10
3
4
w2 =
9
20
w2 >
4
9
w2 = uN
and
uSF =
13
20
3
4
w2 −
(
1
20
)2
w2 =
39
80
w2 −
(
1
20
)2
w2 >
4
9
w2 = uN .
Both countries attain a larger utility compared to the Nash case, the leader,
however, attains a lower utility compared to the follower’s one as:
uSL = 0.45w
2 < 0.485w2 = uSF.
Numerical Example 2:
Let us now consider the case where both have reciprocal preferences (αL = 1,
αF = 1). Then the public good contribution of the leader is according to (17):
gL =
8+ 8+ 6
2(1+ 4)(2+ 2) + 18
w =
22
58
w =
11
29
w
and the follower contributes according to (18):
gF =
w
2+ 2
− 1− 2
2+ 2
11
29
w =
10
29
w
such that gL > gF, i.e. the leader contributes more again. Total public good
supply is G = gL + gF = 2129 w.
Consequently, the utilities of both countries are:
uSL =
18
29
21
29
w2 −
(
1
29
)2
w2 ≈ 0.4483w2 > 4
9
w2
and
uSF =
19
29
21
29
w2 −
(
1
29
)2
w2 ≈ 0.4733w2 > 4
9
w2.
Both countries attain a larger utility compared to the Nash case, the leader,
however, once more attains a lower utility compared to the follower’s one as:
uSL ≈ 0.4483w2 < 0.4733w2 ≈ uSF.
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